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SCHOLASTICISM

Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives

Edited by

José Ignacio Cabezón

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Foreword

Laurie L. Patton

Scholasticism: Comparative and Cross-Cultural Perspectives can be described best as a kind of garland of scholarly jewels. Its essays gather together a number of different authors with similar commitments. Several of the contributors to the volume (Cabezón, Griffiths, Clooney) are also authors of works previously published in this book series, Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions, all of which examined some comparative aspect of scholastic practice. What is more important, however, this book achieves something that a single monograph cannot do: it puts into conversation some of the diverse intellectual commitments of the series as a whole. What is distinctive about this volume in relation to the series, then, is that it takes the various suggestions about comparative scholasticism made in earlier, single-authored studies to embodying the scholastic project itself: disputation and connection across differences.

From its inception the SUNY series—*Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions*—has been committed to nurturing the possibility of bilocated comparison: the engagement of the vernacular and the abstract in a single scholarly perspective. The category of scholasticism combines and reflects this dual commitment in a myriad of ways. While I will leave it to José Cabezón's elegant introduction to outline these ways in greater detail, suffice it to say here that each cultural case explored in these chapters—Tibetan Buddhism, Indian Hinduism, Chinese Confucianism, Judaism, Islam, medieval Christianity—shows a

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two-fold dynamic: first, several of the chapters emphasize the cultural complexity informing the kinds of philosophical abstractions found in scholasticism. Second, several other chapters demonstrate that philosophical abstractions are necessary to make the practices of cultural exchange and contestation possible. In other words, these chapters do not simply assert that both the culturally specific and the philosophically conceptual can and should be combined, or juxtaposed, in the process of comparison. They do more than this in showing the *relevance* of one to the other in that process. This particular virtue is, of course, one of the essential properties of garlands: the inclusion of multiple elements on the string that are not simply added on, one to the other, but whose very multiplicity is essential to the definition of the whole. A garland is an adornment that comprises the juxtaposition of differences held in proximate tension.

Yet the skull necklace of Shiva in Indian mythology, or the albatross of Coleridge's Ancient Mariner also teach us that garlands can be dangerous, weighty things. The delightful danger of this work is that the volume's approach to scholasticism is itself deeply scholastic in nature. It attempts to retrieve a descriptive category which, like casuistry in ethics, has signified dusty pedantry and irrelevant distinction making. In this, the volume risks the charge that all scholiasts risk: that of elitist intellectualism. Yet just when one might think one is crossing that line, the essays pull the reader back in surprising and, I think, very significant ways. The essays in the volume, and Cabezón's introduction and conclusion even more explicitly, deftly make the problematic connotations of the term an intellectual virtue: scholasticism shows, even in its broadest comparative sense, a love of disputation and a belief that it is possible to get the answer right. The volume challenges the reader to dispute, to respond, to change the category itself in order to get the answer right. More specifically, the history of scholasticism demonstrates that the provisional nature of comparative categories is itself based on scholastic practices of testing and refutation. Comparative procedures along these lines are not something invented only by conscience-stricken religionists in the late twentieth century who realize that they must take better care in mapping their concepts across cultures. They have been practiced, and can indeed be modeled on, the scholiasts of many different cultural traditions and periods.

Perhaps what is most important, this volume has boldly constructive implications for the relationship between the fields of theology and history of religions. In *Scholasticism: Comparative and Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, these two areas of inquiry are not simply locked in mutual avoidance or mutual, and occasionally damning, critique. Instead, the normative implications of any given scholastic tradition are constantly

put in dialogue with the vicissitudes of their historical and institutional formations, and vice-versa. Comparative scholasticism prevents one field from being dissolved into the other, and, at the same time, refuses to accept the recent apartheid between the two.

This book is an example of historians of religions and theologians engaging in an enterprise of intellectual risk taking and recovering what is most thought provoking about indigenous traditions of disputation, and as such it leans into a future of a new way of being religious and intellectually serious in the world. Beyond the specific ways that the usual perspectives in religious studies are shaken up by this book, ultimately, its constructive nature derives from the fact that it has, quite simply, given us something new to think about: a possible comparative category whose beads can be strung in any number of combinations. It is up to readers to find the present jewels and writers to find the future ones to attach to the garland.

Introduction

José Ignacio Cabezón

In a little known essay, Wallace Stevens (1951) suggests that "the desire for resemblance" is an innate part of human nature—one that, he implies, emerges from the order, the pattern of resemblances, that exists in the world. Hell for Stevens is precisely an imagined world where similarity to the known is absent. "What a ghastly situation it would be if the world of the dead was actually different from the world of the living . . . [where] nothing resembled anything we have ever known" (1951:77). But if dissimilarity is a fountain of pain, resemblance is as much a source of pleasure. It is the contemplation of likeness that brings us joy, and poetry, he implies, is the most suitable vehicle for bringing about this pleasure—the pleasure that comes from the satisfaction of the desire for resemblance (1951:77).

Stevens's is a generalized narcissism. One step removed from the pursuit of pleasure through perpetually gazing at our own countenance, we seek gratification instead from seeing the world through our own, familiar experiences, even if our expectation to find resemblance is so strong that "we find nothing else" *but* resemblances, remaining forever blind to difference. Nor does Stevens find this problematic. Narcissism *might* be a problem if we could be otherwise than preoccupied with the contemplation of likeness, but we cannot: "Narcissism itself is merely an evidence of the operation of the principle that we expect to find pleasure in resemblances" (1951:80).[1]

This introduction has benefited from the editorial comments of Dan Arnold and from the substanive reading given to it by my colleague Sheila Davaney. Thanks also to Eric Massanari for help with proofreading and indexing.

The student of comparative religious thought, smitten too by a desire for resemblance, also seeks a means for its fulfillment. Though of a different sort, our vehicle—more abstract, systematic and, alas, far less elegant—is nevertheless as much an attempt to satiate this desire as is the poet's art. But what of the charge of narcissism? Are comparativists, like Stevens's bards, fated forever to see the world in their own likeness? The question is not a trivial one. Most of the categories we work with as comparativists—pilgrimage, scripture, even philosophy and religion themselves—have their origin in Western culture, and on the surface possess meanings that are given to them by their respective semantic ranges in Western languages.[2] In the history of the comparative study of religious thought it is not that uncommon to find the scholar succumbing to the temptation to read the cultural other in terms of static categories imported in toto from the culturally familiar.[3]

That narcissism of this kind has existed—and continues to exist—hardly can be denied, but surely this need not be the fate of our discipline. The antidote is to be found in the nuanced treatment of the conceptual categories that we use, one that pays attention both to the similarities *and to the differences*.[4] Equally important is the realization that such categories, as the byproducts of human imagination, are malleable and subject to change in the encounter with what is culturally other. The starting point of analysis usually may be the familiar, but a familiar category becomes modified when it confronts the heterocultural, leading not to complete *un*familiarity (Stevens's hell), but to a new kind of intimacy that comes about from taking into account the broader, cross-cultural context. This process leads to a kind of de- and then re-construction of the original category, culminating not in meaninglessness, but in new meaning(s) embodied in the now modified and necessarily more complex category. This process is in principle unending. Imputing finality to a comparative analysis reifies the category under investigation, making it seem as though any further consideration of data is superfluous. But surely this is never so. All categories are by nature open, tentative, and therefore subject to further analysis and modification.

This volume represents one moment in the reconstruction of the category of scholasticism—achieved by applying it as an interpretive tool to a variety of cultural settings. But why scholasticism in particular?

As several of the contributors to this volume point out, scholasticism as a practice generally has been looked down upon by philosophers and intellectuals since the Renaissance, and the adjective *scholastic* has been used in a derogatory fashion at least since the time of Erasmus (1466?–1536). Scholasticism thus has served for modernists the role of "object to be transcended," in much the same way as modernism has for postmodernists. The modernist derogation of scholasticism continues to

find expression in the work of a variety of contemporary philosophers.[5] Hence, Russell (1945) calls the scholastics "disputatious" (435), and their system "an intellectual strait jacket" (500). And Gramsci (1971:200) ascribes to scholasticism "the regressive tendency to treat so-called theoretical questions as if they had a value in themselves, independently of any specific practice." Whether as ideology, world view, or practice, scholasticism thus has been treated derisively by Western intellectuals. Still, this has not prevented its perpetuation even in the West (in the form of movements such as the neo-scholasticism espoused by Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, for example). Even the early Heidegger believed that the scholastic method in its true form represented a fresh perspective on the problems of philosophy, one that, concerned more with the *actual doing* of metaphysics than with methodological speculation *about how to do it*, could be of value in dispelling what he considered the oblivion of being (see Caputo 1982:18 passim). Responses to scholasticism as a practice therefore have been various, but when considered as a whole it is clear that these reactions for the last five hundred years have been predominantly skeptical, if not out and out disapproving.

Apart from judgments about its validity as a world view, however, there can be little doubt that *as an analytical category*, "scholasticism" has been widely accepted. Even its detractors, of course, find the category valuable, if only for polemical purposes. Hence, the question of its assessment as a mode of philosophical praxis aside, in modern times there have been serious attempts to treat scholasticism as a historical philosophical category worthy of consideration. Any comprehensive intellectual history of Europe, for example, cannot but take stock of scholasticism. What is more, already in the early twentieth century there were attempts to treat scholasticism as a cross-cultural, comparative category. For example, P. Masson-Oursel (1911, 1916, 1920) makes a strong case for the importance of treating scholasticism as a pivotal phase in the history of thought *across* cultures. Whatever their view concerning the phenomenon of scholasticism as a philosophical practice—and they are varied—the chapters in this volume are unanimous in offering positive (re)appraisals of it as a category of cross-cultural and comparative analysis. Each of them will show in its own way why scholasticism is an important interpretive category worthy of consideration and further theorization.

Before turning to the chapters themselves, it might be useful to take a step back in order to see what has brought us to the present point. In an earlier book in this same series (Cabezón 1994), I argued for the usefulness of the notion of scholasticism as a way of understanding Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought. Being interested—like Griffiths (1994)—in the intellectual-linguistic dimension of Buddhist life

as epitomized by the study of doctrine, I found in the category of scholasticism a useful handle on the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist world view, one that allowed me to picture it as a holistic and unified intellectual tradition engaged in a systematic scholarly enterprise.[6] I developed in that study a picture of Buddhist scholasticism that was the result of the dialogical interaction between the Indo-Tibetan Buddist textual tradition, on the one hand, and, on the other, the sources of European scholasticism and the work of certain Euro-American theorists, chief among them P. Masson-Oursel (1911, 1916, 1920)—arguably the father of the discipline of comparative philosophy and, as I have mentioned, the first Western thinker to evolve a mature notion of scholasticism as a comparative category. But my aim in that study was not simply to suggest that scholasticism was a useful category for understanding a certain branch of Buddhist thought. I believed then—and the essays in this volume bear this out—that scholasticism also could be useful to the study of other religio-philosophical systems. Thus, through a process of abstraction and generalization, my goal also was to free "scholasticism" from its parochial associations, as an appellation for a medieval European intellectual movement, and to suggest instead a notion of scholasticism that, now more broadly construed, could serve as a preliminary locus for the comparative and cross-cultural analysis of a variety of other traditions. Though perhaps not essential to every tradition we might wish to call "scholastic," I felt that some of the characteristics that I found in my study of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism could be central to many others. And though aware that the traits of the scholasticism I proposed were peculiar to my particular analysis, I believed that they could—if only by virtue of their absence—at least serve as the starting point for a broader conversation that made the category of scholasticism available as an interpretive option to scholars of other traditions. We shall turn shortly to consideration of some theoretical issues concerning the construction of an analytical category like scholasticism, but given that several of the essays in this volume are responding to the list of characteristics in my earlier study—albeit, occasionally as foils—it might be useful to summarize them now.

1. A strong sense of tradition: self-identification with a specific tradition and lineage and commitment to its preservation. Scholastics have a strong sense of their own religious roots. Seeing themselves as the successors to a long and unbroken line of previous thinkers, their powerful sense of religious history (whether mythic or not) allows for their distinct feeling of location vis à vis the great historical figures of their particular lineage. This tradition centeredness also creates a sense of allegiance and iden-

tity that seeks to perpetuate itself through defensive polemical strategies aimed at the critique of rivals.

2. A concern with language: with sacred language (scripture) and its exegesis and with language generally as medium of expression. Scholasticism is generally confident, rather than skeptical, of the communicative ability of language and is committed to the importance of conceptual thought and categories. This is not to say that linguistic analysis is for scholastics an end in itself. As the early Heidegger was wont to point out, scholasticism and the religious (especially mystical) life go hand in hand (Caputo 1982:44). Of course, the religious life that is the post- (if not extra-) linguistic expression of scholastic speculation manifests itself differently in different religious traditions. In some, it consists of a series of transformative mystical experiences, in others, of proper behaviors (social, ritual, and so forth).

3. Proliferativity: the tendency to textual and analytical inclusivity rather than exclusivity. Scholastics, I maintian, opt for broader (even if inconsistent) canons and for minute and detailed forms of analysis that leave no question unanswered, no philosophical avenue unexplored. Rather to include, even if this requires reconciling inconsistent texts or positions, than to exclude, thereby risking the loss of what might be soteriologically essential.

4. Completeness and compactness: the belief that the tradition overlooks nothing and contains nothing that is unessential. Related to the proliferative tendency of the scholastic mindset is the generally held scholastic tenet that the tradition is complete: that nothing essential to the project of salvation has been neglected. Moreover, to insure that the tradition is taken seriously *in its entirety,* scholastics often maintain that their traditions are what I call "compact": that no doctrine, text, or custom is extraneous.

5. The epistemological accessibility of the world: the belief that the universe is basically intelligible. Scholastics share with modernist science the fundamental axiom that the world is knowable. Some maintain that, at the very least, everything that is of soteriological importance is accessible, while others go farther and claim that every phenomenon, every fact, is knowable. This latter position especially is related in a direct way both to the proliferative character of scholasticism and to the claim of completeness.

6. Systematicity: order in exposition. Scholastics strive to reproduce in their writings the basic orderliness they believe to be

found in the world. Their philosophical literature often evinces a complex structure that divides and subdivides the subject matter under discussion to insure (a) a logical flow to the "narrative," seen as essential to pedagogy, (b) consistency between former and latter points, and (c) completeness (that nothing has been omitted).

7. Rationalism: the commitment to reasoned argument and non-contradiction. Although not *sufficient*, that is, not an end in itself, rationality is nonetheless considered soteriologically *necessary*. Scholastics consider reasoning to be integral to the religious path. The systematic elucidation of doctrine, the "elimination" of inconsistency, and the rational defense of tenets are perhaps the most central attributes of scholasticism. At the same time scholastics see the rational/conceptual understanding of doctrine to be transcended either in mystical experience, in action, or both. Hence, scholasticism as a method strives for a reconciliation of the rational and experiential/active dimensions of human religiosity.

8. Self-reflexivity: the tendency to objectify and to critically analyze first-order practices. Hence, scholastics not only engage in the first-order task of exegesis or commentary, but also in the second-order task of hermeneutics, the self-critical reflection on the rules, principles, and problems related to the act of exegesis. They are concerned not only with systematicity and rational argumentation, but with developing criteria for what constitutes a rational argument, that is, with logic as a second-order discourse.

Now the characteristics of scholasticism just outlined are, as I have mentioned, the result of my reflecting upon texts and movements within the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition. If scholasticism as an abstract category came to be applied successfully—that is, in such a way that it yielded new and interesting questions—to other religious and philosophical traditions, these characteristics would of necessity, I thought, undergo modification, raising in turn new questions of the present analysis. Hence, as far as the present project is concerned, the foregoing list is meant as a heuristic, as a starting point of inquiry. Scholasticism emerges as a cross-cultural, comparative category by the cultural decontextualization that takes place as different traditions are brought into conversation with each other dialogically. This is what this volume seeks to do. But how does one choose which traditions—let us call them "candidates for scholasticism"—to bring into the conversation in the first place? The theorist would seem to be caught in what I will call "the comparativist's dilemma": she cannot choose which exemplars to compare until some decontextualized, general category has

been established, while the establishment of such a category presumes a process of comparison that requires choices to be made regarding the comparanda.

One solution to this dilemma has been offered by Robert Baird (1971). Focusing not on scholasticism but on the category of religion, Baird has argued that, as a methodological principle, it is incumbent upon the historian of religion first to offer a stipulative, functional definition of religion. Such a definition will determine unambiguously what will count as a religion, thereby marking out the limits of a study. The functional definition offered, he says, is semiarbitrary: "arbitrary" in so far as "there is no inherent reason why any word cannot be used for any thing" (7), but "semi-" because not all categories are equally useful "in enabling the scholar to do what he has chosen to do" (126).

There is much that I find valuable in Baird's treatment of this issue. Although he does not identify it as such, his essentially *pragmatic* stance on what makes a definition valuable is, I believe, on target, as is his emphasis on the stipulative nature of categories. However, Baird's insistence that categories need to be delimited in order to be useful is problematic.[7] Baird presumably would solve the comparativist's dilemma by contending that a stipulative, functional definition of scholasticism must precede any study of the subject. The category "scholasticism" is first delimited, and the exemplars that fall within such limits then are studied. Unfortunately, the rules for interesting scholarship cannot be prescribed so neatly. How are we to choose the limits of the category? The traits that I have outlined above are based on a process of comparative decontextualization that takes into account only two traditions. Why should *these* be privileged in delimiting a category that may be equally—and perhaps even more—applicable in elucidating the dynamics of other traditions? True, *scholasticism* is a term whose original semantic range extends over things European, but this is of little consequence to the comparativist, whose goal is to encourage its cultural decontextualization for analytical ends. What is more, is it not the case that considering the candidacy of a movement that is only marginally scholastic can yield valuable insights (if only by way of providing a contrast to more prototypically scholastic traditions)? By virtue of its rigidity, Baird's method would preclude such potentially valuable forms of analysis.

In the process of decontextualizing a concept like 'scholasticism' cross-culturally, no single definition, no one set of features born from reflection upon the practices of one or two historical traditions, can be considered normative—the standard against which all other traditions are judged to be scholastic or not. As Ernest Gellner (1989:169), paraphrasing Wittgenstein, states, "All data in our possession are always, inevitably, fi-

nite. We can never be sure that data which come our way in the future will still fit into the generalisation set up on the basis of past data."

Rather than delimiting the category "scholasticism" from the start, I believe that a different strategy is called for: one that *from the outset* opts for leaving the category open and malleable, that encourages the new data that "may come our way," and that urges vigilance against inflexibility. Now it is true that we must start somewhere, and so I have offered my reflections upon the Indo-Tibetan scholastic tradition vis-à-vis that of medieval European, heuristically, as a point of departure; but these are meant as *nothing more than* a heuristic point of departure. Rather than forming the basis for a definition, they should be viewed instead as an invitation to modification.[8]

Though I see no value in—or need for—an a priori definition of scholasticism preceding comparative work on the subject, I do recognize that as a result of such work there may emerge a series of traits that will be considered more characteristic of scholasticism than others. They will become so not by virtue of being part of the innate character of scholasticism—its essence—but because the traditions that have most benefited from being considered under the rubric of this category have these as *their* traits. Not every encounter of a religious or philosophical tradition with scholasticism as an analytical category will be equally profitable. Those that are will leave a much more durable imprint on the category in the wake of such an encounter. In this way, over time, and as the a posteriori result of the unpredictable nature of scholarship, the texture of scholasticism as a category will emerge: a texture given to the category by the fact that certain traits will be more prominent than others, and this as a result of the fact that certain traditions will be considered more prototypically scholastic than others. If scholasticism is a useful category—if it yields new questions and insights, if it spawns new research programs—then, like other such categories (religion, myth, symbol, scripture, ritual), it will survive and evolve in this way over time. Although the chapters in this volume go a long way toward providing scholasticism as a decontextualized category with the kind of texture just mentioned, it would be foolhardy to consider an a priori delimitation of the category either necessary or useful at the outset.

Let us now turn to the chapters in this volume. My characterization of the various contributions is here at most impressionistic and is intended only as a way of whetting the reader's appetite. A more detailed treatment of the essays and their relationship to the broader project is to be found in the Conclusion.

The Latin West is of course one of the principal sources for the history of the study of scholasticism. It was the flourishing of scholasti-

cism in that particular context that led to the identification of scholasticism as a category in the first place; and hence it is fitting that the volume begin by considering medieval Latin scholasticism as its first exemplar. What Louis Roy finds as he investigates this tradition, however, is not a simple, pristine, uncontaminated intellectual movement, but one that bears the traces of many culturally heterogeneous ideas. Daniel Madigan's contribution focuses on Islam, and, like Roy, he finds there to be a great deal of complexity to the phenomenon of scholasticism *even within* a single religious tradition. By considering several movements within Muslim history as possible candidates for the term *scholasticism,* Madigan shows us how complex the question of identifying an intellectual tradition as scholastic really is. In his contribution, Robert Goss demonstrates how common scholastic presuppositions made possible the polemical dialogue between an eighteenth-century Jesuit missionary and his Tibetan Buddhist interlocutors. Michael Swartz's contribution is concerned with Rabbinic Judaism. Through his analysis we glean how many of the characteristics of scholasticism outlined above (and still others not mentioned there) can be exemplified in very different ways and to varying degrees in a different religio-philosophical context. Like Swartz, Livia Kohn, who writes on Taoism, emphasizes the social context of scholasticism. Kohn, like several other contributors, also stresses the importance of investigating the historical moments at which different scholastic traditions come into contact. In my own essay I explore the relationship of Tibetan Buddhist scholastic ideology and material culture by suggesting that a thesis defended by the medievalist Erwin Panofsky regarding Gothic architecture might be applicable (albeit with some modification) in a very different cultural milieu. John Henderson, whose work centers on Neo-Confucianism, begins his essay with some remarks on the historical evolution of scholasticisms generally, and then goes on to explore how this is played out in a Chinese context. In his contribution Francis Clooney uses three examples from the Hindu tradition to demonstrate some of the problems involved in using scholasticism as a comparative category. And finally, Paul Griffiths offers us an example of the way that scholasticism can be used as an instrument of cultural criticism by suggesting that an ideal-typical form of scholasticism is a way of responding to the deficits implicit both in modernist and in postmodernist modes of intellectual practice.

In the Conclusion I examine in greater detail the ways in which the various essays transform the category of scholasticism by engaging and challenging the different characteristics of scholasticism as I have laid them out above. In that chapter, I explore, in effect, how the cross-cultural analysis of the category that forms the bulk of this book

effectuates its further decontextualization, and how this in turn leads to new questions, the subject-matter of possible future research.

In a recent book, *A Study of Concepts*, Christopher Peacocke (1992:177–97) argues that what he, as a philosopher, and what cognitive psychologists have to say about concepts cannot be independent of one another. Peacocke believes that psychological theories are relevant to the philosophical study of concepts (and vice versa). How relevant is cognitive psychology to *our* task as scholars of comparative religious thought—as wielders of comparative, conceptual categories? I would like to suggest, by way of conclusion, that it is quite pertinent. Recall that I began with the simple question, Why scholasticism? As comparativists we are used to justifying our categories in a variety of ways: practically (in terms of their usefulness), historically (in terms of precedence), pedagogically (by virtue of their utility in the classroom). I would now like to propose that there may be a cognitive-psychological[9] answer to the question, Why scholasticism? Psychologists provide us not so much with a justification of the concept as they do (or might do) with an explanation of why it is that we tend to construct categories such as scholasticism in the first place.

Eleanor Rosch (1978) has argued "that human categorization should not be considered the arbitrary product of historical accident or of whimsy but rather the result of psychological principles of categorization" (27). Rosch and her colleagues conducted a series of experiments and found that the human mind tends to categorize the external world into classes of objects of differing levels of abstraction or inclusiveness. They found, moreover, that of these different levels of abstraction one—an intermediate level of abstraction—tended to be more "basic" than the rest. These basic level categories had the property of being "the most inclusive level of classification at which objects have numbers of attributes in common" (Rosch 1978:32). Superordinate categories are categories more abstract than those at the basic level, and subordinate ones are less so. Hence, if "chair" is a basic level category, "furniture" represents its superordinate counterpart, and "kitchen chair" its subordinate. When subjects were asked to list all of the attributes they could think of that were shared by all of the members of a particular category, the researchers found that comparatively few such attributes could be named for the superordinate class (furniture), many more for the basic class (chair), and not *that many more* for the subordinate class (kitchen chair). Put another way, basic-level categories are the most general categories which evince for subjects the greatest richness of detail. They are also the most general categorical levels at which an object belonging to the category is identified. Hence, when shown a picture of an object with four legs that could be used to sit on, the nat-

ural response was to call that thing a chair (not furniture or a kitchen chair). The human mind, Rosch concludes, tends naturally to categorize the world at the basic level.

The obvious question then is this: do we, as taxonomists of religion, tend naturally to categorize our—albeit more abstract—world into basic-level objects? If so, do these correspond to the categories that have today (or will in the future evolve to) become the backbone of the field: scripture, pilgrimage, *and scholasticism*? Scholasticism then might become a natural categorical construct for comparativists because it is a class of the most abstract level at which our minds can work with the greatest number of attributes. Hence, to the question, Why scholasticism? the answer might be, Because it is in some sense basic.

With some exceptions,[10] cognitive psychologists and anthropologists have focused their research on "real-world" objects such as colors, plants, and furniture. And of course, it is not at all clear that their findings with regard to this relatively circumscribed area can be generalized to the kind of hyper-abstract categories used by scholars. However, there is no a priori reason why this should not be the case. What, cognitively speaking, should make a category such as scholasticism natural or useful for scholars is *in principle* an askable and interesting question. Even if the cognitive sciences are able to offer no substantive answers to questions of this sort, however, this by no means implies that the data of the cognitive sciences cannot or should not be used heuristically to stimulate discussion, for example, among comparativists, concerning the evolution, nature, and function of comparative categories.

As might be expected, even in regard to simple, real-world phenomena, there is considerable controversy as to *why* the mind tends more naturally to categorize objects at the basic level, and as to the *implications* of the existence of such natural categories. Lakoff (1987) suggests that our tendency so to categorize the world has to do, not with anything intrinsic to the categories themselves (the objectivist view), but with *our* nature as embodied beings. We do so because "at this [basic] level, people function most efficiently and successfully with discontinuities in the natural environment . . . so that our bodies can interact optimally with them" (269–70). Integrating the work of Mark Johnson and Gilles Fauconnier, Lakoff suggests that complex cognitive models about abstract things are based on image schemas that have their origin in our embodied experiences. It is obviously beyond the scope of this introduction to go into any detail concerning Lakoff's views on the formation, nature, and function of categories. Suffice it to say that his is one attempt to extrapolate from the cognitive scientific data concerning categorization, one that I see as having major implications for a cognitive theory of cross-cultural comparison.

The preceding discussion obviously represents an oversimplification of the cognitive scientific research data. My hope in raising some of these issues here is to be provocative rather than conclusive. I leave it to other scholars to determine whether I have achieved even that more modest goal. Whether the conceptual category "scholasticism" is in some sense basic or not, whether it is analyzable in terms of Lakoffian kinesthetic image schemas, what such an analysis might look like, and what its implications might be for comparative theory generally are questions that can only be pursued elsewhere.

However the cognitive sciences do or do not impact on our construction of a category like scholasticism, at the very least the essays in this volume are a testament to the fact that a variety of traditions benefit from being considered through the lens of such a category. As a whole, the essays also confirm the importance of a nuanced treatment of categories: one that, giving equal weight to both similarities and differences, is far removed from Stevens's narcissistic paradise of likeness only. They also, it seems to me, cause us to pause and reflect on the likelihood of a postulate set forth by Durkheim almost a century ago, namely, that "comparison is the only practical means we have for the understanding of things" (1898, reprinted 1974:1).

Notes

1. That Stevens's theory is motivated in part by a philosophical attraction to realism is evident from his work. What is perhaps less apparent is the way in which his views are the expression of his white, suburban, middle-class social situation and ideology. See Morse (1970) and Gioia (1992: 113–14, 141–53).

2. As Ames (1989: 265) points out, "When a concept is assigned an English equivalent, much of the depth of the original concept tends to be lost: its word image, its allusive effectiveness, its morphological implications. At the same time, especially with philosophical vocabulary, inappropriate associations are evoked by the translated term to the extent that it is burdened by its own cultural history." When this is so of translation—where there is presumably some level of semblance to a term in the source language—how much more so must it be of conceptual categories derived originally from the culturally same, where such semblance is not at all guaranteed. See also Daya Krishna 1989 and Smart 1989.

3. For an critique of the tendency to impute an etic category in toto to other cultures, to the detriment of the analysis, see Mary Douglas's charge against Malinowski in her foreword to Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* (1990: vii–viii). For a more general, theoretical treatment of this problem, see Larson 1989.

4. This point of course has been emphasized repeatedly in the theoretical literature on cross-cultural comparison. See, for example, J. Z. Smith (1982:21 passim) and John B. Carman and Steven P. Hopkins (1991:302).

5. An interesting exception is Alfred North Whitehead, who presents a more balanced picture (1933: 117).

6. As an aside, it is worth reiterating that my emphasis on the intellectual dimension of Buddhism as expressed in its preoccupation with doctrine is not meant to exclude other forms of analysis: anthropological, literary critical, sociological, art-historical, and so on. This is a point that I have explicitly made in the conclusion to my *Buddhism and Language* (1994: 197–198), one that seems to have escaped Eckel (1994: 1094) in his characterization of my approach. But even if Eckel had read my last chapter more carefully, it is probably the case that even my more modest claim—that the philosophical and systematic study of doctrine was/is central to Buddhist intellectuals and therefore must be so to us in our study of those intellectuals—would be problematic for him. Eckel's basic position, at least as expressed in his *To See the Buddha* (1992), is that (a) the identity of Bhavaviveka as a philosopher is somehow secondary to—perhaps even having its source in—his identity as a religious figure, which comes "to a climax with a devotional vision of the Buddha" (7) achieved through grace (94, 146), and that (b) his more philosophical language as expressed in formal argument is secondary to his use of metaphorical and other literary devices, which, far from mere embellishments (22), somehow reveal "the deeper structures of Bhavaviveka's thought" (21, 141), make it cohere in ways that formal philosophical argument cannot (144), and are what truly make the tradition "his own" (114). Indeed, Eckel goes to the extent of making Bhavaviveka's philosophical vision "gratuitous" (146–47). Much could be said in response to such a view. Suffice it to summarize my reply as follows: though I grant Eckel the importance of nonphilosophical forms of analysis when it comes to understanding the identity of Bhavaviveka, I deny his claim that these can take precedence over—that they carry greater explanatory weight than—philosophical ones.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, of course, has written, if not extensively, at least influentially, on this topic. And Lofti Zadeh's fuzzy set theory represents a formalization of this intuition in the realm of mathematical logic; see Lakoff (1987: 14, 21–22).

8. This, incidentally, is similar to the view espoused by anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, a view which Eggan (1975: 205) characterizes thus: "In place of the comparative method he (R-B) proposes the 'experimental method,' in which preliminary conclusions are formulated and then tested by the same or other social anthropologists on different societies, thus gradually developing broader and more adequate hypotheses." However, I see no reason for considering such a method comparative. Nor, apparently, does the later Radcliffe-Brown (1958). This same approach also seems to be taken by Bronislaw Malinowski in his few comparative forays, in regard to which Lowie (1937: 240–41) states: "His generalizations purport merely to provoke parallel in-

quiries in other regions; he has indeed expressly demanded 'a fuller testing in the various anthropological provinces.' "

9. In actuality, the field I am drawing from, called "categorization theory," is interdisciplinary, being comprised of the work of psychologists, linguists, and anthropologists (see Rosch and Lloyd, 1978), but I will chiefly be invoking the work of the psychologists in what follows.

10. See Lakoff's (1987: 45–46) discussion of the work of Lawrence Barsalou on ad-hoc categories, "categories that are not conventional or fixed, but rather are made up on the fly for some immediate purpose." Although closer to the analytical categories used by academics than those normally considered by cognitive psychologists, Barsalou's examples ("what to get for a birthday present") are still considerably more mundane and concrete than categories such as "scholasticism."

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Chapter 3

The First Meeting of Catholic Scholasticism with dGe lugs pa Scholasticism

Robert E. Goss

The neo-scholastic revival of Catholic scholasticism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by philosophers such as M. De Wulf allowed for the possibility of scholasticism as a social phenomenon existing in other religious traditions (1953: 57, 73). If method becomes the sole constituent structure for identifying a particular discourse or pedagogy as scholastic, then scholastic discourse can be considered to exist in a variety of cross-cultural settings and in a wide range of disciplines such as jurisprudence, philosophy, literary criticism, and theology.

De Wulf insists, however, that scholasticism can be comprehended only by its methodological features together with its particular doctrines. He restricts scholasticism to a specific set of methods and doctrines identified with particular religious systems (1953:19–144). De Wulf's adamant refusal to isolate methodological features from doctrine in his definition of scholasticism emerges from his own Catholic scholastic paradigm, including specific dialectical and systematic exigencies in the service of faith. He is correct to consider aspects of method and doctrine as definitional features of scholasticism, but his restricting definition to theistic doctrine while recognizing Jewish, Islamic, or Hindu intellectual movements as scholastic yet excludes the nontheistic Buddhist doctrinal system as scholastic.[1] While I agree with

the general direction of De Wulf's definition of scholasticism as including specific methodological and doctrinal features, I disagree with his move to restrict the doctrinal content to theistic questions that emerge from Catholic scholasticism.

Recently, Panikkar, Adshead, Cabezón, and others have given serious consideration in identifying particular features of intellectual movements within the major world religious traditions that might be heuristically useful in characterizing these as scholastic. Adshead compared Buddhism to transcendental Thomism while Cabezón has made a strong case for applying scholasticism as a cross-cultural category to Indo-Tibetan philosophical tradition. This chapter explores the particular encounter of Catholic second scholasticism as it briefly engaged Tibetan dGe lugs pa scholasticism in the work of the early eighteenth-century Jesuit priest, Ippolito Desideri (1684–1734). Desideri, residing in Tibet from 1716 to 1721, studied Buddhist scholasticism in its Tibetan dGe lugs pa formulation and engaged it from his own Catholic scholastic point of view. Desideri recognized a resemblance of the Tibetan scholastic method to his own scholastic training and attempted to bring dGe lugs pa scholastics to an awareness of his own doctrinal tenets by a Jesuit pedagogy rooted in a revitalized Catholic scholasticism. Desideri acknowledged some foundational resemblances of Catholic and dGe lugs pa scholasticism on the levels of method and doctrine, though the two traditions diverge on the question of a creator God. For the Jesuit missionary, these resemblances in method and doctrine form a preamble for engaging in a scholastic disputation and a full exposition of Catholic faith. This first historical, albeit brief, encounter between the Catholic and dGe lugs pa scholastic traditions illustrates the limits of De Wulf's definition and points to the need for a revision of his particular understanding to include the case of Buddhist scholasticism.

First this chapter will examine Catholic medieval scholasticism as an investigative pedagogy and its apologetical engagement with other religious traditions. Then it will turn to second scholasticism and the Jesuit contribution to scholastic pedagogy, positioning us to assess Desideri's apologetic interaction with dGe lugs pa scholasticism.

Catholic Medieval Scholasticism: An Investigative Pedagogy

Bernard Lonergan, a twentieth-century, neo-scholastic Catholic philosopher and theologian, defines scholasticism as a "thoroughgoing effort to attain a coherent and orderly assimilation of Christian theology" (1974:309). Catholic scholasticism, a monumental achieve-

ment of the European Middle Ages, sought to reconcile the elements of faith and reason in a coherent intellectual system. As an intellectual movement, it is divided into three major developmental periods: medieval scholasticism (1050–1500), second or baroque scholasticism (1500–1830), and neo-scholasticism (1830–present). Medieval scholasticism created a conceptual system, giving coherent answers to all the possible questions concerning the textual traditions of Christianity and the ancient world. Scholasticism widened the authority (*auctoritas*) of Scripture and patristic teaching to include reason (*ratio*). Reason became authoritative because of its epistemological function in analyzing the content of faith and demonstrating its meaningfulness. The role of reason was extended to all philosophical and doctrinal questions and allowed for analytical and systematic thoroughness.

J. A. Weisheipl (1967:1145–46) describes the Catholic scholastic method as "essentially a rational investigation of every relevant problem in the liberal arts, philosophy, theology, medieval law examined from opposing points of view, in order to reach an intelligent, scientific scholastic solution that would be consistent with accepted authorities, known facts, human reason, and Christian faith." The scholastic method employed a particular form of reading (*lectio*) of Scripture and classical Christian texts. It differed from monastic theology in its use of logic in reading strategies of the Scriptures and classical Christian texts and by introducing new pedagogical methods for learning and research. Monastic reading of the Scriptures (*lectio divina*) was oriented toward meditation (*meditatio*) and prayer (*oratio*), while the scholastic reading of Christian texts culminated in scientific knowledge (*scientia*) (Leclercq, 1960:89). Monastic reading united an imaginative reading of the Scriptures with meditative prayer, and its objective was wisdom and appreciation (Leclercq, 1960:91ff.). Monastic reading was a contemplative activity centered directly on God (Vallet 1988). The scholastic strategy of reading differed in that it attempted to grasp the text rationally, to interrogate it, and to determine the exact meaning of the word of God.

Scholastic reading developed the oral form of question (*quaestio*) and disputation (*disputatio*), forming a pedagogical strategy for investigation and learning.[2] The scholastic method introduced questions to interrogate a particular text, to surface and to define clearly the problems obscuring understanding of that text. Study and interpretation maintained a dialectical form of question, provisional answer, objection, and final definition. This pedagogical strategy created "active methods, mindful to keep open, even under the dead-weight of school work, the curiosity of both the student and the master" (Chenu 1964:96).

This rigorous structure of questioning, answering, and objecting (*sic et non*) did not restrict the creativity of research but forced the

scholastic to clarify those questions otherwise remaining hidden and unanswered, generating new approaches to solving the problem of understanding. The teacher (*magister*), or regent master in theology, would organize questions into a set of propositions for consideration and disputation: "From this starting point, the pro and con are brought into play, not with the intention of finding an immediate answer, but in order that under the action of dubitatio, research be pushed to the limit. A satisfactory explanation will be given only on the condition that one continue the search to the discovery of what caused the doubt" (Chenu 1964:94).

All arguments or points of view were examined in the disputation. The teacher resolved the doubts of the conflicting interpretations, authorities, or opinions. His resolution of conflicting interpretations presented in the disputation of the question were aimed at dispelling doubt and establishing certitude. The regent master in theology applied the certitude established by the lectio and disputatio to preaching (*praedicatio*) (Weisheipl 1967:1145). The communicative dimensions of this scholastic pedagogical strategy had a wider application than education in the university classroom. Catholic scholastics went beyond the difficulties of the text to understand the basic problems of the Christian life of faith. They investigated the meaning of the text and the meaning of Christian life by constructing a rational system of sacred doctrine. Their pedagogy had pastoral applications in establishing, constituting, and communicating the certitude of the Christian message through preaching and catechesis.

The questions and disputations detached themselves from the texts and were compiled into written collections. Monastic theology's expository technique of interlinear glosses on Scripture or classical Christian texts gave rise to the new literary genres of interlinear glosses of questions and objections in Catholic scholasticism. The glosses, interlinear questions, and comments were collated into sentences (*sententia*), or resumes, of diverse opinions on texts under interrogation and dispute. Collections of sentences were expanded into systematic commentaries, and commentaries evolved into the more comprehensive systems of the *summas* with their articles (See Roy in this volume). The minutely questioned, disputed, and defined questions, objections, and answers were organized into an orderly system. From these dialectical and systematic methods, the comprehensive systems of sacred doctrine were constructed.

The Protestant reformation and the humanism of the Renaissance precipitated a transformational shift from medieval scholasticism into second scholasticism. In turn, the Enlightenment, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical, scientific, and historical discourse challenged the metaphysical coherence of scholastic philosophy and the-

ology. However, scholastic theology continued to provide the intellectual framework of Roman Catholic pontifical documents and conciliar decrees until Vatican II. For neo-scholastics such as Lonergan, scholasticism has been largely abandoned because of the inadequacy of medieval aims: "The Scholastic aim of reconciling all the elements in the Christian inheritance had one grave defect. It was content with a logically and metaphysically satisfying reconciliation. It did not realize how much of the multiplicity in the inheritance constituted not a logical or metaphysical problem but basically a historical problem (Lonergan, 1972:279–80).

Catholic Scholasticism and Apologetics: Dialogue with Other Religions

Medieval scholasticism considered unbelievers or non-Christians from the view point of the intellectual difficulties that they possessed concerning the truths of Christianity. Scholastic theologians applied scholastic philosophy with its problem-solving methods to confrontation and conversion of nonbelievers. Reason in scholastic philosophy demonstrated and validated the evidence of Christian revelation, but it also was extended to the defense of Christian faith against rival religious systems. Scholastic apologetics employed its philosophical method to search for a foothold of faith within non-Christian religious traditions so as to engage them in dialogue.

The basic structure of the dialogue took the form of the written text in which two or more persons engaged in rational argument. These apologetical texts were intended to establish a rational basis for communication between traditions and to enable opponents to learn about Christian doctrine and its superiority. From the scholastic perspective, apologetics created a rational language establishing the antecedences of faith in regard to issues such as the existence of God, the meaning of life, and morality. Reason established the truth of a proposition, and a proposition was demonstrated to be true only if it expressed the conclusion of a valid reasoning process, all of whose premises previously had been established as true. The Catholic apologist created a rational medium of communication in which the antecedences of faith could be uncovered rationally and from which the apologist could lead the dialogue partner through reasonable arguments to the truth of the revelation of the Triune God of faith.

For example, Thomas Aquinas understood that the purpose of dialogue with other religious traditions was to manifest the truth and refute the error of others (*Summa Theologiae*: 2.2, q.10, a. 6–10). Dialogue consisted for Aquinas and other medieval Catholic scholastics of an

apologetical engagement with another tradition. It utilized a comparative method, first defining and refining the categories under consideration, and then demonstrating the relative superiority of one over the other. As an active disputation, dialogue was intended to establish a preamble to faith (*praeambula fidei*) and to demonstrate the superiority of Christian doctrine against rival religious traditions. Such public discourse with nonbelievers was not meant for the less educated Christian. Only those Christians with a strong foundation in the doctrine and who were well instructed in faith and scholastic reasoning could enter into dialogue with nonbelievers.

Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, written for missionaries confronting Islam in Spain, began with Aristotelian philosophical principles which he knew his opponents would acknowledge. He recognized that Gentile or Muslim philosophers did not accept the authority of the Christian Scriptures and that he had to establish mutually acknowledged principles prior to answering their objections to the content of Christian faith. The medium for dialogue between religions had to be natural reason, to which all rational persons are forced to give their intellectual assent. Aquinas indicates the first principle of natural reason, the wise man's task of ordering things rightly and governing them well. The wise man sees everything in light of the first principles from which all realities derive (*Summa contra Gentiles lib.* 1, c.2). The wise man can know about the existence of a personal God but cannot know more of God's internal life unless there is a revelation. Aquinas states his apologetic intention of showing what errors are excluded and how rationally demonstrable truth is in agreement with the principles of Christian religion (*Summa contra Gentile*s lib.: 1, c. 2).

There was limited dialogue between medieval scholastics and Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and other non-Christian traditions (Horvath, 1990). Scholastic writings about other religious traditions, mainly Islam and Judaism, were unquestionably polemical, and their objective was the refutation of their particular doctrinal errors and the acknowledgment of Christian revelation as unique and superior. Little fruit came from such attempts at dialogue in Spain when the Inquisition forced a monologue of Christian truth.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the influence of non-Christian religions was progressively felt as a result of increased contact between Europe and Asia. Some Catholic missionaries—especially the Jesuit missionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Asia and the Americas—became sensitive to the questionings and reasonings of non-Christian believers. The Jesuits became open to the difficulties that nonbelievers faced when confronted with Christian doctrine and realized that there was a need to create a preamble to

faith, a common language to rationally engage their dialogue partners on the question of the nature of God. One of these Jesuit missionaries was Ippolito Desideri, S.J., who traveled to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, and engaged dGe lugs pa scholasticism.

Second Scholasticism: The Jesuits and the **Ratio Studiorum**

The sixteenth century witnessed Catholic attempts to revive and reinvigorate earlier medieval scholasticism. Several religious orders—the Benedictines, Dominicans, Franciscans, and the Jesuits—revived medieval scholastic philosophy and theology, creating an intellectual movement often labeled as "baroque" or "second" scholasticism (1530–1830). The focus of this chapter, however, will be on Jesuit scholasticism since it provides the background and the heuristic framework for Desideri's encounter with dGe lugs pa scholasticism in the early eighteenth century.

Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556) fused the pedagogy of medieval Catholic scholasticism with his own spirituality manifested in the Spiritual Exercises and the Constitutions. He mandated that logic, natural and moral philosophy, metaphysics, and scholastic and positive theology be part of the curriculum of studies for Jesuit scholastics (Ignatius of Loyola 1970:188).[3] He prescribed St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* rather than Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as the basis for lectures in theology at the Roman College, a college established for the philosophical and theological education of Jesuits. Ignatius clearly set the direction for contemporary and future Jesuits in devoting themselves to the revival of medieval scholasticism. The fourth part of his *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus* is devoted to the subject of education of Jesuits in seminaries, colleges, and universities. Ignatius spells out his *Ratio Studiorum,* his educational code for Jesuit scholastics and collegiates (Ignatius of Loyola 1970:171–229). Jesuit training would include a rigorous three-year philosophical curriculum covering logic, natural and moral philosophy, metaphysics, rational psychology, and scholastic and positive theology. With a foundation in the study of classical languages, grammar, rhetoric, and Latin and Greek literature, the Jesuit student then pursued scholastic philosophy. Humanist classical studies was propaedeutic to the study of scholastic philosophy.

Jesuit educators employed the scholastic pedagogical method of reading (*lectio*) and disputation (*disputatio*) in training their own scholastics and students. For Ignatius, the *Ratio Studiorum* was a wonderful pedagogy for appropriating Catholic scholasticism. Such a scholastic

pedagogy emerged primarily from the love and worship of God, which was the basis for all human learning, culture, and existence. The *Ratio Studiorum* enabled the Jesuit colleges and universities to become the most efficient educational institutions in Europe for the next two and a half centuries. By 1710, 612 Jesuit colleges implemented the *Ratio Studiorum* educational code. Ignatius' pedagogical code led to an explosion of Jesuit scholarship in philosophy, theology, the sciences, geography, ethnology, philology, and the literary arts.[4] In this way, the Jesuits became leaders in education in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Ignatius' *Ratio Studiorum* also inaugurated and directed the Jesuit revival of Catholic scholasticism. The Jesuit expression of second scholasticism attempted to restore established doctrines and defend them against attack. Leading Jesuit theologians—Robert Bellarmine, Francisco de Toledo, Francis Suarez, Gabriel Vasquez, and Luis de Molina—reinvigorated scholasticism by employing the scholastic method to respond to Protestant reformers and to the study of the natural sciences in which there was renewed interest. Jesuit scholasticism produced several prolific writers, modifying the medieval scholastic method to include the form of theses, proofs, and answers to objections that met contemporary catechetical and apologetic exigencies. Furthermore, Suarez, in fact, wrote ample commentaries on Thomas' *Summa* and treatises on diverse theological topics (Trentman 1982). Suarez pioneered a new style of scholastic manuals that simplified the teaching of medieval scholasticism and incorporated the new sciences. His *Disputationes Metaphysicae* was a systematic treatment of science, not based on Aristotle but upon the latest scientific evidence. It was read both by Catholic and by Protestant scholars. What is apparent in second scholastic texts is a methodological shift from the medieval quaestio to thesis and proof. The openness of the quaestio in Aquinas is replaced by dogmatic theses and proof, and this shift resulted from the challenges of the Reformation and the development of late Renaissance humanism. This apologetic syllogistic method of second scholasticism later would come to influence the developments of the early neoscholastic movement (Schüssler-Fiorenza 1991:29–35).

Robert Bellarmine systematized Catholic doctrine so as to respond to the Protestant reformers. His three-volume work, *Disputationes de Controversis Christianae Fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos*, was a critical work on Reformation theology, pointing out its strengths and weaknesses. Bellarmine's scholasticism lacked the calm speculative scholarship of the apologetic treatises of earlier scholasticism. He wrote two catechisms in Italian, *Dottrina cristiana breve* and *Dichiarazione piu copiosa della dottrina cristiana*. These catechical manuals, practical vehicles for teaching Catholic scholastic doctrine, remained normative for

all catechisms until the Vatican I Council in the late nineteenth century. The catechism was the major pedagogical text for introducing Catholics and converts to the doctrines of Catholic Christianity.

By Bellarmine's time, practically all the professors at the Roman College were Spaniards, and the Roman College had been firmly established as a center for a reinvigorated Catholic scholasticism (Weisheipl 1987:118; Volloslada 1954:214–22). It was at the Roman College that Ippolito Desideri received his training in scholastic philosophy and theology. The practical dimensions of Jesuit scholasticism were expressed in implementing Ignatius' educational code, the apologetic defense of Catholic Christianity, the writing of catechisms for teachers and the laity, preaching, administering the Spiritual Exercises as a retreat movement, and missionary activities to the New World and Asia.

J. Gurr outlines the general characteristics of second scholasticism: (1) continuity with the past, (2) orientation of philosophy to the word of God, (3) systematic realism, (4) rational method, (5) adjustment to contemporary science and modern philosophy, (6) concern with ideology, and (7) the characteristic stresses of the different religious orders (Gurr 1967:1158). Second scholasticism modified and adapted medieval scholasticism to contemporary exigencies: the confrontation with the Reformation, the Enlightenment and scientific investigation, the discovery of the Americas, and a global world of diverse religious cultures. The Jesuits gave a rigorous articulation of second scholasticism, producing their texts in the defense of Catholic Christianity and the papacy. Many of these characteristics detailed by Gurr are found in Ippolito Desideri's Tibetan writings and his interaction with dGe lugs pa scholasticism. Many of these characteristics of Catholic second scholasticism overlap with the characteristics of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism detailed in Cabezón's introduction to this volume.

Desideri's Earlier Scholastic Method

The Khoshot Mongol ruler of Tibet, Lha bzang Khan (1658–1717) summoned Ippolito Desideri, shortly after his arrival in Lhasa in 1716. The Jesuit missionary had mastered spoken Tibetan in Ladakh and on his long trip to central Tibet. The Khan and the dGe lugs pa scholars at court questioned him about his intentions to stay in Lhasa and about the nature of his religion (*chos*):

> I was asked the difference between our law (*chos*) and theirs. I did not venture to answer such delicate topics by word of mouth ex professo and in public, so long as I had not made a very perfect and prolonged study of the language, and so I pledged myself to

> explain the whole thing little by little in different books, in which one can speak more . . . to distract myself from my uninterrupted application to the study of the language, I had kept composing every day for some hours two booklets in Italian. In the first (*The Allegory*), I refute the widespread error that everyone can be saved in his law (*chos*), and I show that there is but one road to salvation, all the rest leading to perdition. . . . On the 8th of September (1716) I started by myself to translate into his language the first of my two said booklets and to make it still more attractive I did it in Tibetan verse. (Desideri 1938:649)

He presented his first exposition of Christianity to the Khan on the Feast of the Epiphany (January 6, 1717). Desideri titles his first Tibetan manuscript *The Allegory of Sunrise Dispelling Dawn's Darkness* (*Tho rangs mun sel nyi ma shar ba'i brda*). This Tibetan manuscript reflects Desideri's Catholic scholastic method and training in its philosophical arguments and shows only a cursory understanding of Tibetan Buddhist doctrines. *The Allegory* provides, however, a significant marker for measuring and judging the maturation of Desideri's understanding of Tibetan Buddhism and its doctrines in his last manuscript. According to Desideri, the text is written in Tibetan verse to stress the doctrinal content, since he thought Tibetan verse to be a more elegant style. Desideri eventually abandoned Tibetan verse for Tibetan philosophical prose. Nonetheless, this first text is written in verse as a dialogue between the "wise and holy person seeking truth" (*mi mkhas dag pas bden 'tshol ba*) and the "white-headed father (*padri*) who explains the dharma of pure truth" (*mgo skar dpa' 'dri dag par bden pa'i chos 'chad pa*). The form of the dialogue was a typical stylistic feature of apologetic texts of medieval and second scholasticism. The objections raised by the "wise and holy person seeking truth" are European, not Tibetan Buddhist objections.

The Allegory develops the genre of natural theology treatises, an apologetic form of scholastic philosophy demonstrating that the fundamental questions about existence depended upon God.[5] Desideri uses the image of light as a metaphor for truth and compares the person to a house. Light becomes the central metaphor of the text, and there are two forms of light reflecting in the world. There is the light of a lamp in the house that dispels a limited amount of darkness. This is compared to the truth that can be apprehended through natural reason. There is also the light of the sun which can dispel the darkness completely, and this type of truth can only be apprehended through revelation and reason. However, revealed truth does not contradict reason; in fact, reason opens the individual to the highest revealed truth. In *The Allegory*, Desideri repeats the arguments of scholastic apologetics: that natural reason is insufficient for salvation, that humanity cannot be saved

through other religions, that God reveals the teachings of religion, namely within Christianity, and gives humanity precepts for right views and right moral action, and the necessity of one true religion.

The Allegory reflects a number of the salient characteristics that Gurr (1967) underscores as prominent in the writings of second scholasticism:

1. Orientation of philosophy to the word of God. Desideri makes the philosophical distinction between two types of knowledge: natural and supernatural knowledge. Natural knowledge is derived from reason while supernatural knowledge remains above the natural comprehension of reason and must be revealed by angels, prophets, and God's Son in the canonical scriptures. Revealed truth does not contradict reason but becomes intelligible through rational appropriation.

2. Rational method. *The Allegory* popularizes the Jesuit form of scholastic disputation, starting with a thesis and its defense, an explanation of the terms of the thesis, a list of contrary opinions, a proof of the thesis, and answers to opponents of the thesis. Reason provides the means for explaining the text and for reconciling the inconsistences between the canonical scriptures and classical Christian writers into a systematic whole.

3. Concern with ideology and the particular characteristics of the religious order: Desideri intended to refute Tibetan Buddhist errors and the false doctrine that any person could be saved through his or her religion. His intention was to engage in interreligious apologetics. The particular ideological characteristics of the Jesuit order included its devotion to the papacy, the taking of a fourth vow of obedience, and its service in the defense of the Church and Catholic doctrine.[6] Desideri's intellectual formation occurred in the culture of European Catholic Christianity where non-Christian religions were regarded as falsehood and the work of Satan. He understood that his mission in Tibet was to win souls for the standard of Christ.

The only extant sources that we have describing the reactions of dGe lugs pa scholastics to the Jesuit's Tibetan works are Desideri's own writings. The dGe lugs pa lamas accorded the Jesuit the respect of a European lama, treating him as a professed religious and scholar. According to Desideri, *The Allegory* was well received. Lha bzang Khan and the dGe lugs pa scholars at court remained open to his attempt to write a philosophical explanation for the existence of a Supreme Being who created everything. Desideri describes their reactions: "Their (dGge lugs

pa scholastics') opinion was that the maxims and principles contained therein were well set forth and seemed to be well reasoned but were entirely opposed to their dogmas and opinions" (Desideri 1934:101). If Desideri's words are an accurate account, then the dGge lugs pa scholars perceived structural affinities between the moral maxims outlined by the white-headed lama and their own moral philosophical precepts. Perhaps what intrigued them about *The Allegory* was his scholastic method of presenting philosophical arguments for the existence of God. His scholastic method, systematic organization of tenets into a series of connected arguments to refute an opponent's position, was in accord with their own dGe lugs pa scholastic method of question and answer in philosophical disputation. (Perdue 1992:24–60, Cabezón, 1994:84–85, 142–50)

Tibetan scholastics appreciated a "well-reasoned" philosophical argument. Their educational formation occurred in a Tibetan intellectual climate where philosophical debate was an art and where scholastic reason was propaedeutic to religious practice (Cabezón, 1994). Desideri's argument for the existence of a creator God could be comprehended against the background of traditional Buddhist critique of the Hindu concepts of a 'creator God' and 'metaphysics,' and there would have been other sections understandable to dGe lugs pa scholars: on love and compassion, aids to overcoming obstacles and evils, the unicity of the law, the need for faith, and how to achieve the highest religious perfection. After reading *The Allegory*, Lha bzang Khan, prompted by his dGe lugs pa advisors, encouraged Desideri to immerse himself in the scholastic writings and pedagogical training of the dGe lugs pa lamas at Ra mo che monastery. Lha bzang Khan gave Desideri the opportunity to study firsthand dGe lugs pa scholasticism, its arguments, and its doctrinal tenets. To my knowledge, Desideri was the first European to study dGe lugs pa philosophy.

Desideri Immerses Himself in dGe lugs pa Scholasticism

At Ra mo che, a small but renowned dGe lugs pa monastery in Lhasa, Desideri studied the classical texts of dGe lugs pa scholasticism. He hoped to further develop a heuristic strategy for entering the dGe lugs pa scholastic system, rationally engage it, and argue persuasively for the truths of Christianity. This meant that he had to study dGe lugs pa scholasticism and to appropriate it through the traditional curriculum of dGe lugs pa studies. Desideri learned the Tibetan language, its philosophical vocabulary, and the method of Madhyamaka dialectics and argument. The Jesuit missionary read many of the important

works of the scriptures (*bka' 'gyur*) and their commentaries (*bstan 'gyur*) found in the Tibetan Buddhist canon in order to better understand their doctrines and religious culture. At Ra mo che, he witnessed the frequent doctrinal debates of dGe lugs pa monks in the courtyard and even participated in some of these disputations. In his journals, Desideri notes that he began to make a separate dictionary of terms used in the doctrinal language (*chos skad*) of Buddhist scholasticism as a preamble for comprehending dGe lugs pa scholasticism.

After five months, Desideri moved to Se ra monastery, a dGe lugs pa monastic university of approximately eight thousand monks on the outskirts of Lhasa. The monastic university made available to him both a library and other scholarly resources. At Se ra, the Jesuit studied Madhyamaka dialectics under dGe lugs pa scholars, attended lectures, and participated in philosophical disputes in the courtyard. Desideri studied the writings on emptiness (*stong pa nyid*), particularly the relevant sections of the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam rim chen mo)* of Tsong Kha pa (1359–1419).[7] Tsong Kha pa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment* was one of the central philosophical works of dGe lugs pa scholasticism. His classic work presents a synthesis of Indian Buddhist doctrines and practices and had a status similar to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* in Catholic scholastic theological education and practice. Desideri's notes from his study of the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment* consist of a compilation of quotations from that work, texts on logic and philosophy, and Māhayāna scriptures. These Tibetan quotes, interspersed with interlinear glosses in Latin and Italian, indicate the breadth and depth of Desideri's study and his understanding of the classical dGe lugs pa curriculum in Māhayāna Buddhism. Tsong Kha pa's *Great Exposition of the Stages* provided Desideri with an outline of the basic philosophical teachings of Indian Māhayāna Buddhism and introduced him to the philosophical treatises of great figures of that tradition such as Nāgārjuna, Aryadeva, Candarkirti, Śāntideva, and others. *The Great Stages of the Path* functioned as a syllabus for studying the vast corpus of Buddhist scriptures and commentaries.

From his own training in Catholic scholastic philosophy and theology, Desideri recognized dGe lugs pa scholasticism as scholastic practice and appreciated its deep concern for authority and reason and its stress on logical argumentation. Much of dGe lugs pa scholastic philosophy was framed in syllogisms, and the respondent either challenges the reasons that support the syllogism or accepts the opponent's syllogisms. This form of dGe lugs pa philosophical argumentation reminded the Jesuit of his own scholastic training in philosophy and theology at the Roman College through the methods of *lectio* and *disputatio*.[8] For exam-

ple, he describes Tsong Kha pa's great exposition as a "book in which is expounded with admirable method and clarity the dogmas of the Tibetan religion, and the treatises of emptiness (*stong pa nyid*)" (Desideri 1934:107). Ippolito Desideri respected the dGe lugs pa scholasticism of Tsong Kha pa, and he understood the role that rational inquiry, logic, and reasonable arguments played in dGe lugs pa pedagogy and philosophical investigation. Both the dGe lugs pa and the Jesuit stress on reason (Tibetan: *rigs pa;* Latin: *ratio*) provided each participant in this nascent Christian-Buddhist encounter with the foundational tools to engage in the art of interreligious polemics, the type of religious conversation to which both scholastic traditions were accustomed. For each tradition, reasoning was the means for ascertaining the precise meaning of a scriptural passage or a classical text and critically investigated the objections to doctrinal tenets. Reasoning and rational argumentation thus provided the medium for demonstrating the validity of one's own system and the lack of validity of other religious systems.

In his journals, Desideri reflects on his decision to engage dGe lugs pa scholasticism and fight for the "Standard of Christ" through rational argument: "Having by my aforesaid diligence discovered the site of the enemy's camp, the quality of their arms and their artifices, and provided myself with arms and ammunition, towards the end of November, I resolved to challenge them and begin war. In the name and by the aid of God, I commenced to confute the errors of that sect and declare the truth of our holy faith" (Desideri 1934:106).

Desideri engaged dGe lugs pa scholasticism by reading Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical texts, studying dGe lugs pa scholastic method, and applying Catholic scholastic method to develop an interreligious apologetic.

Desideri's Scholastic Engagement with dGe lugs pa Scholasticism

The Essence of the Christian Doctrine represents Desideri's most mature engagement with and understanding of dGe lugs pa scholastic practice and doctrine. The manuscript is divided between the refutation of the Buddhist notion of emptiness (folios 1–13a) and the exposition of the Christian doctrine (folios 13a–50a). The division follows a Catholic scholastic pattern of the critique and refutation of the central truth claims of the adversary and presentation of the rational superiority of the truth claims of Christian revelation. The basic method of the text also follows a pattern similar to the rhetorical framework of dGe lugs pa argumentation: (1) invalidating the opponent's doctrines by

demonstrating their logical fallacies and contradictions, (2) demonstrating the validity and consistency of one's own doctrinal system, (3) demonstrating the uniqueness and superiority of one's own doctrinal system vis-à-vis other systems (See Cabezón 1990:16ff).

The first section, refuting emptiness, is patterned after the rhetorical strategy of the invalidation of the opponent's doctrine. It surfaces the logical fallacies or inconsistencies inherent in the opponent's argument, a method employed by Tsong Kha pa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and by Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*. The exposition of Christian doctrine in the second section is further divided into three subsections: "Faith" (folia 13a–28a), "Hope" (folia 28a–34a), and "Charity" (34a–50). Desideri's sections on Christian doctrine follow the typical catechetical content and method found in the Italian Jesuit Robert Cardinal Bellarmine's catechism, *Dottrina Cristiana*. Bellarmine's catechism became normative for Italian catechesis; it develops a catechical exposition of the doctrinal tenets of the creed, the Pater Noster, and the seven deadly sins. Instead of the dialogue between teacher (*magister*) and disciple (*disciplina*), Desideri composes a dialogue between the teacher, using the transliterated Sanskrit term *pandita*, and the "seeker of further wisdom" (*yang shes rab kyi snying po zhu ba po*), a term borrowed from the Perfection of Wisdom corpus of literature. Desideri's usage of "further wisdom" (*yang shes rab*) is significant in that he acknowledges a wisdom already present within the Buddhist tradition.[9] Part 2 of *The Essence* reflects the literary genre of Catholic apologetics and catechesis.

Part 1 of *The Essence* marks the first historical engagement of the Summa with the *Great Stages*, the interaction of scholastic method of Thomas Aquinas with the scholastic method of Tsong Kha pa. Desideri opposes Thomas' philosophy of being (*esse*) against Tsong Kha pa's philosophy of emptiness (S: *śūnyatā*, T: *stong pa nyid*). It is on the doctrinal level that the two scholastic traditions are most divergent. In his *Account of Tibet*, Desideri notes the primary difference between the two religious traditions to be doctrinal: "I explained that in every religion there were two principal facts: firstly, principles, maxims, or dogma to be believed, and secondly, precepts, counsels, or instructions as to what to do or not do. As regards the first, our religion and theirs were absolutely different, but in the second, the difference was slight" (Desideri 1934:99–100). Since the truth claims of Buddhist doctrines presented an obstacle to him, these had to be refuted prior to any acceptance of Christian truth claims by Tibetans. Desideri proposes to examine and compare the two doctrinal systems (*chos lugs*) in order to show the logical fallacies of the dGe lugs pa tenets, the coherence and superiority of the truth of Christian revelation. He qualifies Christian doctrine as a faith system (*dad lugs*) in addition to a doctrinal system,

and this remains for the Jesuit an essential difference between the two forms of scholasticism.

In the opening folio of *The Essence,* he states the general dGe lugs pa position on emptiness:

> If one examines the scriptures and the philosophical systems of Tibet with a wisdom which remains honest, without partiality, and without hatred and attachment, they (their scriptures / systems) assert that there is not even one substance established as inherently existent. They understand that all existing substances are viewed as empty, the emptiness of inherent existence itself. (Goss II, folio 1)

Desideri claims to restate the primary thesis of dGe lugs pa scholasticism from a perspective of "wisdom which remains honest, without partiality." The Jesuit missionary understands that dGe lugs pa scholasticism equates its notion of emptiness with dependent origination, and this is apparent in the first section of *The Essence of Christian Doctrine,* as well as in comments in Italian journal writings and letters.[10] Desideri does not consider the Buddhist notion of emptiness to be nihilistic but rather radically relativist. Both emptiness and dependent origination exclude a self-existent creator as part of the more general deconstruction of any form of independent being or essence.[11] For the Jesuit, the truth claims of the Buddhist notion of emptiness require the falsity of the Christian doctrine of the self-existent God. There was no middle ground for him to reconcile the Buddhist notion of emptiness and the Christian notion of God.

Desideri rehearses the arguments for emptiness of all substances found in the *Great Exposition of the Stages,* focusing on the following topics: causality, the relationship of the relative to the absolute, the natural knowledge of the absolute, the birth of a person, the origin of substances, contingency and necessity, and the aggregates (folios 1a–12). According to his own journals, he uses arguments and rational disputations that conform to the form and method of Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka philosophy and their canonical writers. He took seriously dGe lugs pa scholastic rhetoric, imitating its method and style of argumentation. When a flawed position has been advanced, the dGe lugs pa scholastic is ready to attack it by raising a series of logical fallacies to disprove the premise untenable. Desideri's strategy is to bring out what he perceives to be the contradictions within dGe lugs pa arguments for the notion of emptiness and then gives a common-sense example to demonstrate how the tenet is contradictory. For the Jesuit, the contradictions arise from what is not proven in dGe lugs pa arguments: the cause of causes, or first cause, and the necessity of a Supreme Being (folio 12a).

Ippolito Desideri disagrees with the dGe lugs pa arguments for the emptiness of inherent existence due to his own scholastic doctrinal presuppositions that are based on the notion of a creator God. Radical relativity without a first cause (*prima causa*) is the major error to be overcome if an explicit notion of God is to be introduced. From a Thomistic perspective, God's essence (*essentia*) is a pure act of being (*esse*). In other words, the "to-be" (*esse*) is to be within God's act of self-being; this means that everything, thus created, participates in God's act of being (*De Ente et Essentia* 1, 2; *Summa Theologiae* I-I, q.3, a.4; LaCugna 1991:150ff; Hankey 1987:57–80). The difficulty that Ippolito Desideri has with the notion of emptiness is neither its radical contingency nor its corollary, the interdependency of phenomena. Catholic scholastic philosophy's notions of potency and act allow for viewing reality as contingent, interdependent, and relational. Emptiness, however, excludes a first cause (*prima causa*) and thus excludes the creator God of Catholic scholastic theology.

Desideri demonstrates what he perceives to be the logical fallacies of the dGe lugs pa scholasticism from his own Thomistic perspective based on notions of being, essence, and potency. He retains the method of Madhyamaka argumentation to refute the notion of relativity without a first cause, arguing that the relative requires the absolute. He develops his scholastic argument for the need of natural knowledge of absolute truth as well as the necessity of a first cause (*prima causa*) to counter the pure relativity of the notion of emptiness. For dGe lugs pa scholastics, the relative does entail the absolute (emptiness), but relative, contingent, or conventional existence does not entail absolute or inherent existence, which is precisely the notion being refuted (*dgag bya*) in Madhyamaka arguments for emptiness.

For Desideri, the arguments for the existence of God emerge from the Thomistic tradition of construing God as "subsistent self-existence" (*ipsum esse subsistens*). Aquinas' metaphysical construal of God as "subsistent Being" provided the foundational basis for exposition of the question of the Trinity and other tenets of Christian doctrine. The Jesuit translates or mistranslates the Tibetan "jewel" (*dkon mchog*) for God. He misperceived the triadic significance of the Buddhist Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha) that gave rise to the act of taking refuge for an incipient trinitarianism. As he read through the Tibetan scriptures and commentaries, Desideri realized that the Three Jewels was a not reference to the Christian triune God. He, nevertheless, translates the notion of the "self-existent God" into the Tibetan phrase "the self-existent jewel" (*rang grub dkon mchog*), attempting to create a triadic parallel of God and the "Three Jewels" in the act of worship. He lists the attributes of God as "independent, immutable, uncreated, non-

dependent, free from another, perfect, eternal, free from fault, without sin, unrivalled." Desideri's scholastic method not only includes hermeneutical appropriation of dGe lugs pa scholastic techniques but also hermeneutical appropriation of Buddhist semantic terms. For example, he appropriates the Māhayāna Buddhist notion of "immeasurable compassion" *(thugs rje tshad med pa)*, often attributed to bodhisattvas and Buddhas, to explain the Christian notion of grace and God's salvific love. Desideri is not just literally translating Christian concepts into a Tibetan cultural milieu; rather, he is modifying a pre-existent doctrinal language and scholastic method that is hermeneutically significant to his Buddhist readers, so as to convey new meanings. Ippolito Desideri creates an interpretative medium, a rhetoric, for Buddhist-Christian communication and thus for polemical engagement of these two forms of scholasticism. Desideri describes how his three-volume work created an interest among the learned lamas in Lhasa. He writes, "My house suddenly became the scene of incessant comings by all sorts of people, chiefly learned men and professors, who came from the monasteries and universities, those of Se ra and 'Bras spungs, the principal ones to apply for permission to see and read the book" (Desideri 1934:106). Desideri notes that the learned lamas would read some of his statements, examine them with care, and specify further distinctions for consideration. The dGe lugs pa lamas provided corrections and refinements to his reasoned arguments. However, they would disregard the logical consequences of some of his arguments but would write their own corrections and solutions for explaining clearly the truth. The lamas were as much committed to the rational investigation and ascertainment of doctrinal truth as Desideri was. This interaction between dGe lugs pa scholars and Desideri proved to be a mutual learning process, forming a language for intercommunication and the preliminaries of the first Christian-Buddhist dialogue.

How the dGe lugs pa lamas and dGe bshes, in fact, understood Desideri's presentation of Christian doctrine is only speculation, yet their intellectual curiosity and openness brought them from their monastic universities to read the scholastic work of the "white-headed lama." Even if the dGe lugs pa scholastics would have disregarded Desideri's conclusions because they contradicted their own Buddhist tenets, they, nevertheless, would have found an appreciation for the rational philosophical argument and interreligious apologetics within *The Essence*. As for Desideri's doctrinal exposition of Catholic Christianity, the dGe lugs pa scholastics would have heard some of the elements of the story of Jesus in terms of the bodhisattva path. We catch a glimpse of such a reading in Desideri's journal. He notes, "Many a time when telling them what the image of the Crucifix meant they would prostrate themselves,

beat their breasts and beg to hold it in their hands, when they would kiss and shed many tears on hearing that Jesus Christ had suffered for the redemption of their souls" (Desideri 1934:177). This Buddhist response of perceiving Jesus as a bodhisattva has been typical of even the current Buddhist-Christian dialogue (Lopez and Rockefeller 1987).

Interreligous Apologetics as Scholastic Dialogue

Apologetics is a form of religious discourse, attempting to demonstrate that the truth claims of one particular religion are superior to the truth claims of another religion. It is a systematic and argumentative form of scholastic discourse that aims at religious persuasion. Initially, apologetics relinquishes its primary and secondary sources of authority such as Scripture, revelation, or tradition in order to engage an adversary that would not accept such sources of authority. Apologists use methods, arguments, and criteria of knowledge acceptable to their adversary. When apologists present their own doctrinal truth claims as part of a coherent system, they necessarily rely on those initially excluded sources of authority along with the use of reason. In this fashion, apologists present their doctrinal system as rationally and cognitively superior to those of others that have, from their perspective, proven to be flawed. Recently, Paul Griffiths (1991) has argued for the necessity of interreligious apologetics as integral to interreligious dialogue. His premise certainly holds true in the particular case of Desideri's rhetorical encounters with dGe lugs pa scholasticism, a case of Catholic second scholasticism interacting with dGe lugs pa scholaticism.

Both Catholic and dGe lugs pa scholasticism considered the art of apologetics as integral to religious discourse. Both traditions understand that doctrine is based on intelligible principles and methods whose goal is to make evident a higher (theological or Buddhist philosophical) discourse. Both scholastic traditions strive to reproduce a systematic orderliness that is comparative, critical, consistent, and hierarchical. For both, reason is soteriologically necessary to their religious goals. The dGe lugs pa tradition uses rhetoric, logical argumentation, and rational dispute in pursuit of enlightenment, while logic and reasoning were essential to Desideri's pursuit of grace. Both traditions accept a rational method for critically analyzing adversarial positions and arguments, comparing and exposing them to logical principles, and arriving at a hierarchical system of doctrinal tenets.

Desideri's own Jesuit education prepared him in the tradition of scholastic philosophy, logic, metaphysics, and rhetoric. When Desideri immersed himself in the study of the philosophy of the dGe lugs

pa tradition, he studied the Buddhist scholastic method of logic, dialectics, and the art of debate. The Catholic scholastic philosophy and theology at the Roman College served him in his study of the arguments of dGe lugs pa scholasticism and Tibetan philosophical language. He employed the method of *lectio,* reading, to understand Madhyamaka philosophy and method, and he utilized the method of *disputatio* to analyze the truth claims of both doctrinal systems. Both *lectio* and *disputatio* formed the heart of his pedagogical method, but they were also at the heart of Buddhist philosophical method. Desideri, therefore, learned the Tibetan language so as to learn the particular art of Tibetan philosophical dispute and argument. He further proposed to examine the two doctrinal systems (*chos lugs*) in comparison to each other to determine which doctrine is "pure and immaculate," or, that is, which is cognitively superior to the other. From the beginning of his interreligious apologetics, Desideri understood this to be Christian doctrine.

Desideri chose to introduce Christian doctrine by traditional Tibetan and Catholic scholastic practices: (1) the use of reason and dialectic argument in invalidating the dGe lugs pa notion of emptiness, (2) a coherent exposition of the Buddhist doctrinal system and the faith system of Christianity, (3) the demonstration of the uniqueness and superiority of Catholic doctrinal truth. Argumentation plays an important role in the learning process of both scholastic traditions, and it is equally vital for reaching consensus between two conversation partners. One dialogue partner either acknowledges the force of the reasons of the other's arguments or is forced to reply with critical counter-arguments. The point of the arguments is to convince the other dialogue partner to accept or refute the claims to truth of doctrinal statements. Reaching understanding or consensus between two dialogue partners depends on their mutual acceptance of the recognizable claims to truth of their statements.

Apologetic engagement was the only pedagogical method available to Desideri for carrying on a fruitful communication with the dGe-lugs-pa scholasticism, but it could take place effectively only in his learning of the Tibetan language and through hermeneutical appropriation of the dGe lugs pa philosophical terminology and scholastic method. Ippolito Desideri created an expanded language for argument and consensus between the two traditions and indicated the directions for future apologetic interactions between the two scholastic practices. Unfortunately, a territorial dispute between the Jesuits and the Capuchin-Franciscans forced Desideri to be recalled to Rome (Snellgrove and Richardson, 1986:224–26) He was, however, the most successful Christian to engage dGe lugs pa scholasticism until the modern era.

Notes

1. The comparativist philosopher Paul Masson-Oursel conceives of scholasticism as a cross-cultural philosophical category and stage within an evolutionary schema of human civilization that culminates in scientific and critical inquiry (1920:123–41). For Masson-Oursel, scholasticisms emerge as a philosophical response to sophism. He comprehends Buddhism as sophism and as a forerunner to scholasticism and something that prevents him paying serious attention to the development of Buddhist scholasticism.

2. Leclercq asserts that monastic theology perfected its writing in the obligations of silence. The literature of monastic schools was expressed in writing, whereas scholastic literature was created from the oral style of exchange between master and pupils. The question and disputation style of scholasticism emerged from the alteration of question and answer in dialogue. The scholastic oral style was more pedagogical than monastic writing. Leclerq, 1960:188–190. Weisheipl notes that both the lectio and disputatio employed three means: definition, division, and reasons. Weisheipl, 1967:1145. For a fuller exposition of scholastic method, see: Weisheipl, 1974:115–18 and de Wulf, 1954: 26–31.

3. The term *scholastic* was applied to all Jesuits who had taken vows and prior to their change of status with ordination to the priesthood and final vows.

4. See Harney's (1941:192–258) discussion of Jesuit education and learning and their achievements in the missions, as well as Volloslada's (1954:96–115) discussion of the *Ratio Studiorum* as implemented at the Roman College.

5. Sherburne calls *The Allegory* a "catechism." It lacks the typical catechical form of presenting the basic tenets of the Christian creed as Desideri does in the latter part of *The Essence of Christianity*. It is rather an apologetic text, more properly labeled as natural theology. See Sherburne 1989:298.

6. Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises* provides an ideological framework for Desideri's scholastic method of apologetics. It divides the world into the standard of Christ and the standard of Satan, providing a combative spirituality. See "Two Standards" meditation in the *Spiritual Exercises* (Ignatius of Loyola 1992: 65–67). See Ganss' notes pp. 69–73, 167–69. The "Two Standards" meditation informs Desideri's apologetic by placing his encounter with Tibetan Buddhism as a form of spiritual warfare.

7. Desideri was the first non-Asian to translate the *Lam rim chen mo* into a Western language, Italian. His translation of this important Tibetan text has been lost.

8. Desideri's heuristic framework consists of more than the rational combativeness of the "Two Standards" of the Spiritual Exercises and Catholic apologetics in refuting the errors of Tibetan Buddhism. It also includes the positive valuation of created things in the Ignatian principle of "finding God in all things," lacking in Tibetan culture. The positive valuation of created things is found in the "Principle and the Foundation" meditation of the Ignatian Exer-

cises (Ignatius of Loyola 1992:32). See Ganss' note 17 on the "Principle and Foundation" (146–48). Desideri states, "Their (Tibetans) morality agrees with our own" (Desideri 1934:256). There was much in Tibetan Buddhist preceptual and moral practice that reminded Desideri of his own Catholic Christian practice of morality. Resemblances in preceptual practices and scholastic method provoked the Jesuit into a deeper investigation of Tibetan Buddhism, keeping him open to seeing its positive dimensions and resemblances. His writings constantly reflect the tension of refuting philosophical error for the "greater glory of God," while finding positive elements within Tibetan Buddhism and scholasticism with strong resemblances to his Catholic Christianity.

9. One could easily argue that Desideri is just adopting the "seeker of further wisdom" from the Perfection of Wisdom literature that he read. The notion of "further wisdom" is also congruent with a Catholic scholastic recognition of a wisdom already present in human rational inquiry. In *The Allegory*, Desideri uses the image of light of the lamp within a house that dispels limited darkness as a metaphor for natural reason.

10. In his *Account of Tibet*, he summarizes his understanding of the Buddhist notion of emptiness: "Nothing exists because nothing has any essence by itself, and therefore, nothing exists which is not dependently originated *(rten cing 'brel bas 'byung)* or unconnected, unfettered, and without correlativity"(Desideri 1934:249).

11. Desideri calls dGe lugs pa atheists but qualifies their denial of the existence of God: "Although the Tibetans theoretically and speculatively deny the existence of a divinity and the existence of an immortal soul . . . I only wish to make clear that these blind people unwittingly admit and confusedly recognize the Divinity which they persistently deny in words" (Desideri 1934:251). Desideri recognized an implicit notion of God within Tibetan Buddhism evident in Tibetan religious practices, faith, and morality. In another instance, he noted that the real aim of Madhyamaka philosophical treatises was "to exclude and absolutely deny the existence of any uncreated and independent Being and thus effectively to do away with any conception of God" (Desideri 1934:104–5).

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Chapter 4

Scholasticism as a Comparative Category and the Study of Judaism

Michael D. Swartz

Introduction

A colleague tells a story of a conversation he had about twenty years ago with a senior scholar.[1] The older gentlemen was a product not only of European universities, but of the great rationalist Lithuanian talmudic academy—the Yeshivah. The conversation turned to current developments in Jewish studies and the burgeoning study of Jewish mysticism and spirituality. All this talk about mysticism, said the good professor, is silly. "I worship God with my mind."

There are, of course, responses to that statement. One might ask, quite seriously, what other part of the anatomy might be used to worship God. The heart is the seat of the intellect in classical Hebrew, and, therefore, is in fact the mind. Perhaps we can refer to the kidneys and related organs, which were the seat of the emotions for the ancients and which are said in Jewish tradition to praise God.[2] Or we could suggest that the proposition that scholars, unlike mystics, worship God with their minds implies a false dichotomy of intellect versus emotion.

But when we look further at our senior colleague's statement, it is not so simple as it appears. For when he said that he worshiped God with his mind, he was referring to specific patterns of behavior that

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Chapter 6

Tibetan Gothic: Panofsky's Thesis in the Tibetan Cultural Milieu

José Ignacio Cabezón

Tibetan Buddhist temples are not Gothic cathedrals, but for all their differences (and there are many) there is a level at which semblance can be explored. The locus of this comparison—the site of the exploration of the pattern of similarities and differences—is the relationship of the scholastic world view of each culture (medieval Tibetan and European) to its respective architectural forms. I do not expect such a pattern to be immediately evident even to those conversant with the intellectual and architectural histories of these two very different cultures. My goal is not to uncover superficial similarities of architectural style, iconography, or even function. The comparability I wish to explore is more complex than this, involving as it does the relationship of an ideology—what, fittingly I think, is sometimes referred to as "a mode of thought"—to architecture. Stated briefly, my thesis is this: there is an isomorphism between medieval European scholasticism and Gothic architecture on the one hand, and Buddhist scholasticism and Tibetan architecture on the other, which is to say that both medieval Western and Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism are reflected in their respective material cultures. *How* material artifacts (in this case architectural ones) act as mirrors of the scholastic world view may well differ from one society to the next, but *that* the prevailing ideological idioms of these two premodern societies filters down—or perhaps siphons up—to the realm of material production seems to me to be invariant across the two cultures.

Of course, it is the *how* (and not the *that*) of the relationship between the ideological and the material—between scholasticism as an intellectual movement and architecture—that is of primary interest. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to suggest that *how* in the Tibetan case. To repeat, my goal is not to attribute to a mythic common scholasticism the superficial similarities we may find in the religious architecture of medieval Europe and Tibet. Mine is not a search for the Tibetan equivalent of the flying buttresses of Notre Dame or of the motives of the great windows of Chartres. Nor is it, essentialistically, to attribute these—even assuming they could be found—to some common ideology. Instead, it is my purpose to demonstrate that, in a way homologous to the Christian West, the scholastic method—as the intellectual world view of Buddhist Tibet (at least from the twelfth century on)—is reflected in Tibet's religious architecture. Hence, the objects of comparison here are neither architectural styles nor ideological world views. To the extent that this work is comparative, the comparanda are the *relationships* between the distinct scholastic methods and the religious architectural styles of two cultures.

The original inspiration for this project came as a result of reading the work of the great medievalist Erwin Panofsky. Though perhaps not the first to suggest a link between the medieval scholastic method and Gothic architecture, his was the most systematic and developed argument for this view. Unlike Panofsky, however, I wish to remain neutral on the question of causal influence. Although I believe the question to be answerable in principle, I am not interested here in whether scholastic thinking is the causal source of certain architectural artifacts (or, conversely, whether those artifacts created an ambience that promoted a nascent scholasticism as a method). But even apart from this issue (more on which below), it seems to me significant simply to establish how scholasticism as an ideology is mirrored in another aspect of culture (in this case a material aspect, to wit, architecture); or perhaps more accurately, that these two aspects of culture—one conceptual and abstract, the other visual and concrete—mirror, reflect, and recapitulate each other.

Panofsky's Thesis

In his Wimmer lecture of 1948, subsequently published under the title *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (1951, 1957),[1] the eminent scholar of medieval Europe, Erwin Panofsky, put forward a thesis that has influenced medieval studies to this day. Briefly, it is that there exists a historical correspondence between the rise, evolution, and demise of European

scholasticism and Gothic architecture, and that this parallelism, far from being accidental, is rather "a genuine cause-and-effect relation . . . that comes about by diffusion rather than by direct impact . . . by the spreading of what might be called, for want of a better term, a mental habit" (Panofsky 1957:21–22). Although equivocal at points, Panofsky for the most part concedes that there is little evidence to suggest that architects and builders had actual firsthand knowledge of scholastic philosophy. He argues, nonetheless, that the fabric of medieval society was so imbued with the scholastic ethos, and especially with the scholastic method, that the latter affected, causally, the nature and evolution of Gothic architecture. As B. B. Price notes (1992:138–41), Panofsky's thesis has not gone unchallenged, and yet, despite the controversy surrounding it, his rather detailed argument concerning the "homology" between Gothic architecture and scholasticism is still influential today.

A detailed overview of Panofsky's study is of course beyond the scope of the present chapter. Nonetheless, a summary of some of the more salient points is in order:

1. Panofsky sees a parallelism between the evolution of scholastic literature—from the simpler *libri senteniarum* to the more comprehensive *summa*—and the the evolution of Gothic architecture—from its origins in Suger's St. Denis to its culmination in high Gothic style.

2. The scholastic insistence on lucidity in exposition, which Panofsky refers to as *manifestatio* or "the postulate of clarification for clarification's sake" (Panofsky 1957:39) he sees to be reflected in the Gothic visual arts (e.g., in the representational scenarios found in portals) "through an exact and systematic division of space" (1957:39). The tendency to greater organization and clarity is for Panofsky the result of scholastic influence.

3. The Gothic cathedral, in its imagery, seeks to "embody the whole of Christian knowledge, theological, moral, natural and historical with everything in its place" (1957:44–45), thereby evincing the principles I have called "completeness" and "systematicity" (see the Introduction).

4. And just as the scholastic seeks to order the disparate parts of tradition through systematic synthesis, Panofsky sees the structural design of the Gothic edifice as a synthesis of "all major motifs handed down by separate channels" (1957:45). Hence, the authority of the architectural tradition as much as that of the intellectual tradition is preserved through the reconciliation of disparate elements, that is, through the principle of *concordantia* (1957:64 et passim).

5. The tendency to divide and subdivide texts for greater clarity, says Panofsky, "is most graphically expressed in the uniform division and subdivision of the whole structure" (1957:45), first into the three main parts (nave, transept, and chevet), and further into subparts (high nave, side aisles / apse, ambulatory and hemicycle of chapels / fore choir, and choir proper).

6. Finally, just as the primary purpose of the scholastic treatise was to uphold the validity of doctrine, the primary purpose of Gothic architecture was functional: the stability of the edifice. Nonetheless, Gothic architectural form, claims Panofsky, went further than was necessary for mere stability. "Just as the membrification of the *Summa* permitted [the scholastic] the re-experience of the very process of cogitation," through the contemplation of structure, so too did the "panoply of shafts, ribs, buttresses, tracery, pinnacles, and crockets . . . [allow for] a self-analysis and self-explication of architecture" (1957:59). The aim, both in the case of the scholastic *summa* and in that of the Gothic cathedral, was twofold. There were the first-order goals of (a) validity / stability, and (b) making the content explicit; and there was the second-order goal of making the very process and principles of reasoning / architecture manifest by bringing the very structure of the work to the fore, a principle I have referred to above as self-reflexivity.

The Analogical Argument

As we already have mentioned, Panofsky formulates his argument as a historical one. There exists for him a clear causal relationship between scholasticism as an intellectual world view and Gothic architecture. Such a formulation of the argument makes it necessary for Panofsky to find actual instances of influence, that is, specific cases of the conscious use of scholastic principles in the design of Gothic cathedrals.

Whether or not historical proof of this kind is forthcoming in the medieval European setting—and Panofsky himself seems to vacillate on this—in Tibet detailed proof of this kind is difficult to find. Tibetan Buddhist scholastics did have an important role to play in the construction of religious buildings and monuments; this much we know (see below). But our knowledge of the historical minutiae necessary to make the kinds of connections necessary to defend such a thesis in all its complexity—connections between Tibetan intellectual, institutional, political, and architectural history—is simply too limited, lacking as we do the details of the interactions between scholars, artisans, monks, and workers in medieval Tibet. This is to say nothing of questions concern-

ing the dates of the construction of particular free-standing temples and the variety of structures within monasteries, their historical evolution, patterns of patronage, and so forth.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that the archival records of Tibet's great religious institutions are not yet fully accessible to scholars outside of China and Tibet. Only when this material, the inscriptions found in temples and the other sources (principally historical and auto/biographical) are fully examined can we hope to determine the direct causal impact of the Buddhist scholastic world view on religious architecture and other modes of cultural production. Until then our conclusions concerning the actual historical links between scholastic philosophy and architecture will be restricted to those that can be gleaned from the few texts in the public domain that make reference to the building activities of scholars (on which see below).

Even apart from determining the actual historical role played by scholastics in the construction of religious edifices, however, there is an alternative way of formulating Panofsky's hypothesis that circumvents the difficulty that results from our dearth of knowledge concerning historical detail. Formulating the argument not historically but analogically allows us to point out instances of structural similarity without having to suggest specific causal/historical influence. This is the tack I shall take here in arguing for the relevance of Panofsky's thesis to the Tibetan cultural sphere. Approaching the problem in this way vitiates the need to make a case for specific historical influence, allowing for the possibility both of scholasticism's influence on art and architecture and, conversely, the influence of the visual arts and architectural technique on the Tibetan intellectual tradition. In short, by avoiding the question of determining unidirectional influence, we extricate the argument from the realm of history proper and free ourselves to consider a wider range of semblance. In the Tibetan case, adopting such an approach represents not only a judgment call related to scholarly style, but, given the dearth of historical detail available to us, it is in fact a practical precondition for the task at hand.

Evidence of a Scholastic Link to Architecture

The history of Tibetan architecture has yet to be written,[2] and for the reasons just outlined above, this is not likely to occur in the near future. Nonetheless, a few texts available to us (as well as the inscriptions that have been studied to date) do give us clues as to the processes and personages involved in the building of religious monuments and monasteries. Among the more important texts for our purposes are:

1. The autobiography of the first Paṇ chen bla ma bLo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1570–1662) (Ngawang Gelek Demo 1969; Paṇ chen bLo bzang ye shes 1981, 1990; see also Cabezón, 1995), a work that describes in general terms the multitude of architectural and artistic projects undertaken by one of Tibet's most renowned scholastic polymaths, both at his home monastery of bKra shis lhun po, and throughout central and western Tibet generally.

2. The biography of Thang stong rgyal po (1385–1481?) (Lo chen 'Gyur med bde chen 1982; see also Vitali 1990:123–36). An accomplished yogi, but also a renowned architect, he is known popularly as Tibet's great builder of iron bridges. His greatest architectural undertaking, however, was the magnificent Ri bo che *stūpa* in La stod byang (western Tibet). Though not that of a scholastic in the classical sense, his autobiography is important because of the rich sociological detail related to the construction of this monument.

3. The *History of Myang* (MCB:1983; see also Ricca and Lobue 1993; and Vitali 1990:39 et passim), a text that contains a wealth of information concerning the erection of temples, monasteries, and other religious monuments during the high scholastic period.

4. 'Jigs med grags pa's fifteenth century history of the rGyal rtse princes, which contains invaluable information concerning the construction of one of the great centers of scholastic learning in western Tibet, the monastery of dPal 'khor chos sde and its great *stūpa* ('Jigs med grags pa 1987; see also Ricca and Lobue 1993).

From these and other sources we can glean, albeit impressionistically, some important facts relevant to the present study:

1. Famous scholars often played an important part in the architectural process. Those with power and wealth at their disposal (e.g., the first Paṇ chen bla ma and the fifth Dalai bla ma) often commissioned the construction of monasteries and religious monuments directly. Those who did not have such means at their disposal sometimes found the necessary funds and support from local rulers, as mKhas grub rje (1385–1438) did from the rGyal rtse prince Rab brtan kun bzang (see Cabezón 1992:17–18; and Ricca and Lobue 1993:20, 22). In a few instances scholars were enticed to move to a different location by a local ruler with the promise of a monastery; this was the case, for example, with Rong ston Shākya rgyal mtshan (1367–1449) (see Jackson 1988).

2. Whatever the means of support, monks with scholastic training often had a substantial role in the design and supervision of

building construction and in the renovation of existing structures. The great Bu ston rin chen grub (1290–1364), for example, supervised the building of a retreat at Ri phug and a chapel at the Zhwa lu gSer khang, and he oversaw a great deal of the interior decorative restoration at Zhwa lu.

3. In rare cases, great scholars were themselves artists and were responsible for murals, statues, or other works of art that adorned the interiors of temples (see, e.g., Ricca and Lobue 1993:20, 25).

4. It is more common, however, to find senior figures in the scholastic tradition not in the role of artist but as supervisors of the artisans[3] who decorated chapels or entire temples. When other duties prohibited their direct participation, they sometimes delegated the responsibility to more junior monks (Vitali, 1990:111). The art work in the great circumambulatory pathway (*skor lam*) at the Zhwa lu gSer khang, for example, is said to have been executed under the direct supervision of the third Karma pa, Rang 'byung rdo rje (1284–1338). (Vitali 1990:107)[4]

Thus, even though the minutuae of historical detail may escape us, we can at the very least infer from this admittedly impressionistic evidence that in some cases the great figures of Tibetan scholasticism had a direct hand in the architectural process.

Two Examples

In the case of Buddhism, most of the literature on the relationship between ideology / world view and art / architecture has tended to focus on East Asia—a good deal of it on Ch'an / Zen. In the case of Zen, numerous popular and scholarly works have convincingly shown the link between an aesthetic of absence as expressed in artistic and architectural minimalism, on the one hand, and Zen ideology and practice, on the other hand (see, e.g., Suzuki 1993).[5] Little, however, has been done to explore the link between intellectual world view and art in Tibet. In what follows, we turn our attention to two specific examples of Tibetan architecture in the hope of establishing the homologies that exist between architectural / artistic artifacts, and the Buddhist scholastic ideology of Tibet.

dPal 'khor sde chen or dPal 'khor chos sde

Before the final Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1959 this was one of the most important monastic centers of western Tibet.[6] Although a

small temple seems to have existed at the site from as early as 1370, it was not until the third decade of the fifteenth century, during the reign of the rGyal rtse prince Rab brtan kun bzang, that serious building began. By 1425 two wings had been added to the original structure and three chapels to the upper story (Ricca and Lobue 1993:20, 23; see also figure 6.1). On the first floor, the central chapel contains as its principal image a statue of the Buddha; to its left was a chapel dedicated to the deities of the *yogatantra* (the second highest class of *tantra* in the standard fourfold schema; see below); to its right was the chapel of the *Dharma* kings of Tibet. On the second story above the central chapel we find the *gzhal yas khang* or "divine palace," a chapel that contains a variety of tantric *maṇḍalas*, the central one of which belongs to the deity Kālacakra, the chief deity of the monastery; to its left we find the *Lam 'bras lha khang*, dedicated to the deities and important lineage figures in the Sa skya practice known as "The Path and Its Result" (*lam 'bras*); the chapel of the sixteen arhants (practices related to whom are meant to insure long life, stability, and prosperity) is to the right of the central chapel on the upper story (Ricca and Lobue 1993:23–25).



Figure 6.1. Schematic (frontal view) of the dPal 'khor sde chen temple (not to scale). (1) central (Buddha) chapel, (2) Yogatantra chapel, (3) Dharma King chapel, (4) Kālacakra chapel, (5) Lam 'bras chapel, (6) Sixteen Arhants chapel.

Those familiar with the systematics of the Buddhist scholasticism of this period will not find it difficult to see these reflected in the spatial organization of this temple. Fittingly, the historical Buddha, as the source of the exoteric teachings, is found in the central chapel of the first floor. But it is the Buddha in his esoteric, tantric form—as the deity Kālacakra, the source of the highest teachings—who is appropriately situated in the central and uppermost chapel, above that dedicated to the historical Buddha. As a practice belonging to the *anuttarayoga* (highest yoga) class, it is significant to find Kālacakra not only above the Buddha in his exoteric form, but above the deities of the *yogatantra* class as well (located on the first floor to the left of the central, Buddha chapel). The same logic explains the positioning of the chapel of the *Lam 'bras* tradition—a tradition of practice also belonging to the highest yoga class, though one not as central to this monastery as that of Kālacakra—above the *yogatantra* chapel. Finally, just as Tibet's great Dharma kings have insured order, stability, and prosperity through their manifestation in the physical realm that is the "Land of Snows," the sixteen arhants (located directly above them) are the guarantors of this stability in the nonphyiscal realm they inhabit.

Thus, the systematicity—the internal, hierarchical logic—of the Buddhist scholastic world view is reflected in what we might call the "spatial semantics" of the main temple of dPal 'lhor sde chen. It should not be surprising that mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang—one of the greatest scholastic minds of the time (see above; and Cabezón, 1992:13–19)—served as Rab brtan kun bzang's consultant in the building of this architectural masterpiece.

This sort of spatial semantics—the use of space in such a way that the juxtaposition of elements mirrors scholastic systematicity—is even more explicit in another structure at dPal 'khor sde chen, the *sku 'bum* or "great stupa" (see figure 6.2), an incredible eight-storied monument with dozens of chapels whose contents recapitulate the systematic ordering of the Buddhist Tantra into four tantric classes, with the *kriyā* and *caryā* represented at the lower levels, the *yoga* and *anuttarayoga* at the higher levels, and the Kālacakra at its highest point. Ricca and Lobue (1993) have provided us with the details of the spatial semantics of this edifice, demonstrating conclusively the way that the building mirrors the four-fold classification scheme developed by Tibetan Buddhist scholastics as a way of ordering the Tantras.[7] In their words:

> The seventy-five temples and chapels distributed on the eight storeys of the sKu-'bum, representing the deities of all the chief tantric cycles and the spiritual lineages who propagated them, afford a global view of the world as conceived in the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist culture of the 15th century, a visual *summa* of all the



Figure 6.2. The sKu 'bum or "Great Stupa" at dPal 'khor sde chen (photo by K. Mortensen)

> knowledge of the time, as well as a true pantheon (*sku-'bum*) of images, which for years to come will be an inexhaustible reference source for students of Tibetan art and religion. (1993:32)

The Monastery of Se ra

Anyone who has ever visited the great monastic universities of central and western Tibet—Sa skya, dGa' ldan, 'Bras spungs, Se ra—cannot but be struck by their size and vastness. Usually having started out as small retreats for the study and practice of Buddhism, these monasteries grew over time. Se ra, as paradigmatic of the great dGe lugs pa[8] seats of learning (*gden sa*), began in just this way, that is, as the residence of a small community of monks. Founded by Byams chen chos rje Shākya ye shes in 1419, it evolved into a monastic university with four colleges which were eventually consolidated into three: the colleges of Byes, sMad, and sNgags pa (the latter being the Tantric College). The larger colleges were further subdivided into *khang tsan* or "regional houses." The Byes College, for example, had in 1959 a monastic population of close to seven thousand monks and was divided into seventeen regional houses that ranged in size from sixty to over three thousand monks.[9] The houses were further subdivided into "households" (*shags*), and households in turn consisted of several senior monks, most of whom were responsible for a group of younger ones. It takes little imagination to see in the hierarchical arrangement of the colleges the analogue of the system of textual subdivisions (*za bcad*), with its branches and subbranches. This same type of systematic and tree-like arrangement can be seen as well in the administrative structure both of the monastery and of the colleges. And of course it is recapitulated in the architecture of the monastic quarters.

The proliferative character of scholasticism and its tendency to "completeness" also has an institutional and architectural analogue. It was a fundamental policy of the colleges never to turn monks away. This policy of open admissions is of course what gave rise to the huge monastic populations of the great dGe lugs pa monasteries. It also led to a tremendous disparity in the quality of monks; hence the saying that the great seats of learning (*gden sa*) were like the ocean, in which everything from precious gems to trash could be found. Just as scholastic philosophers of Buddhist Tibet opened their canons for fear of missing some essential Buddhist truth, so the scholastic monasteries opened their doors for fear of turning away the one great scholar or practitioner who might become a master of the doctrine and who would thereby enhance the monastery's reputation.



Figure 6.3. Schematic (as viewed from above) of the first floor of the Congregation Hall of the Byes College of Se ra Monastery (not to scale). (1) main meeting hall, (2) Tsong kha pa chapel, (3) Maitreya chapel, (4) Mañjuśrī chapel, (5) front portal, (6) debating courtyard.

As the number of monks grew, so too did the monasteries that housed them. Both temples (the meeting places for the congregation and subcongregations of monks) and monastic quarters were expanded consistently over hundreds of years. In keeping with the scholastic principle of synthesizing and reconciling rather than eliminating, few structures were destroyed. Instead, temples often were expanded. For example, the main, forward (and largest) portion of the present congregation hall of the Byes College (see figure 6.3, no. 1) is actually an addition, the original meeting place being what is today the smaller rear chapels of the building (figure 6.3, nos. 2, 3, and 4). And when the sheer number of monks necessitated the construction of a new building, as was the case with the Great Assembly Hall (*tshogs chen*) of Se ra in the eighteenth century,[10] the previous building was put to another use, in this case as the headquarters for the Se ra Tantric College, which dates from this time. As in the great commentarial traditions of scholastic philosophy, monks opted for building onto an already existing base, rather than starting from scratch.

In addition, the tradition-centeredness and conservatism of the scholastic mind-set finds its analogue in the consistency and uniformity of architectural style, with relatively little being introduced by way of

innovation. Finally, proliferativity as a principle finds expression in the rambling character of monastery buildings: not only in the layout of the monasteries as a whole, but also in the structure of individual buildings. It is as easy to get lost in one of the great *gden sa* as it is to get lost in a Tibetan scholastic treatise, and it takes equal amounts of skill to find one's way through each.

The organization of temples and their decoration also reflect scholastic principles. To take the meeting hall of the Byes College as an example (see figure 6.3), it is no exaggeration to say that one is, even from the portal, bombarded by the history, cosmology, and philosophical doctrines of Buddhist scholasticism in visual form. On the left wall of the portal (figure 6.3, no. 5) one finds a mural of the wheel of life, the pictorial representation of the process of transmigration and its causes. To its left, above the door leading to the second story, is a mural of the founders of Buddhism in Tibet (*mkhen slob chos gsum*), and to the left of that, facing the façade, are pictorial representations of the garments and accoutrements permitted to monks according to the Vinaya's code of discipline. Flanking the portal at either side are *bskal bzang khor lo-s*, intricate cross-word murals on religious themes that are one of the Tibetan scholastics' favorite forms of wordplay. On the front portal wall, and covering virtually every inch of the interior walls of the temple are extremely intricate murals on a variety of iconographic themes, ranging from depictions of protector (*srung ma*) and tutelary (*yi dam*) deities to scenes from the life of the Buddha. Statues and reliquaries (*stūpa, mchod rten*) of every size and dimension fill the altars of the main hall and chapels, and extremely ornate brocade hangings and canopies adorn the pillars and roof. To say that the temples of the great colleges exemplify the principles of proliferativity, completeness, and scholastic totalism would be an understatement.[12]

As we have seen in the case of dPal 'khor sde chen, the scholastics' schematic organization of Buddhist doctrine often finds material expression in architecture. Tibetan Mahāyāna scholasticism divides its doctrines (and therefore its texts) into two: those that deal primarily with method (*upāya, thabs*) and those that deal primarily with wisdom (*prajñā, shes rab*). Such a division also finds its way into the curriculum, where it constitutes the basis for the two longest and most important classes (*'dzin grwa*): those of the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka. In the visual arts of the dGe lugs pa school, this textual/curricular distinction finds expression in paintings known as *tshogs shing* or "assembled field," where a central figure (usually the Buddha or Tsong kha pa, the founder of the school) is flanked by Maitreya (the reputed author of the chief Prajñāpāramitā commentary that forms the basis for the "method" side of the curriculum) on the left, and by Mañjuśrī (the embodiment of wisdom, and the "patron" of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness) on the right.

It is interesting that we find this same motif to be reflected in the arrangement of the earliest, aft chapels of the main temple of the Byes College (see figure 6.3).[12] There, the rear central chapel (figure 6.3, no. 2) is dedicated to Tsong kha pa and houses an immense statue of the founder of the school that is, according to tradition, said to be a simulacrum (*nga 'dra ma*) of the "Precious Lord" (rJe rin po che), as he is known to his followers.[13] To the left is the Byams pa lha khang, the chapel to the future Buddha Maitreya (figure 6.3, no. 3), and to the right (closest to the debating courtyard, figure 6.3, no. 6) is the 'Jam dbyangs lha khang, the Mañjuśrī chapel (figure 6.3, no. 4), whose main representation of Mañjuśrī is said actually to preach the doctrine ('Jam dbyangs chos 'khor gsung byon). Hence, temple layout recapitulates curriculum, which recapitulates the organization of the textual corpus and of the doctrine.

The scholastic philosophical concern with sacred texts is reflected socially in a variety of practices: the most common is called *chos klog*, or "the reading of the doctrine," in which a portion of the canon (bKa' 'gyur) will be divided among the monastic congregation and each individual portion read aloud simultaneously in assembly; this can take several days (depending on the number of monks in the community). Another is a ritual practice in which the canon is taken on procession into the fields in spring to bless them and to insure fertility.

In terms of architectural design, most of the larger temples have chapels in which the canons are housed. There the volumes will be supported above the floor on shelves, usually with an ambulatory beneath the shelving for devotees to walk (usually in a crouched position of respect) so as to receive the blessing of scriptures located above them. In the temple of the Byes College (see figure 6.3) there are two sets of the canon: one (a bKa' 'gyur) is housed in the Maitreya chapel, the other (a set of both the bKa' 'gyur and the commentarial texts that comprise the bsTan 'gyur) is housed in the Mañjuśrī chapel. This latter set of scriptures is highly revered as it is said to have been extracted as "treasure" (*gter*) from a statue of Vaiśravaṇa, the god of wealth, housed today in a corner of the Hayagrīva chapel in the Byes Meeting Hall.

In addition, of course, most of the larger monasteries in Tibet had separate library buildings, in which the blocks for the printing of textbooks were housed. Hence, the scholastic preoccupation with scripture finds expression both in social/institutional practices and in the structural layout of monasteries and temples.

Conclusion

Of course, other kinds of reasons can always be adduced as explanations for the phenomena I have dealt with here. The vast and rambling

character of the great monastic universities is certainly as much a response to the need to house ever-increasing numbers of monks (a social fact) and as much the result of the financial patronage of those in power (an economic one) as it is a reflection of the Tibetan scholastic concern with quantity. The extreme elaboration of detail and symbol in decorative motives is undoubtedly influenced by the fact that Tibetan Buddhism is the child of Indian tantric Buddhism, which is in its own right highly proliferative in character. Likewise, psychological factors having to do with living in the barrenness that is the Tibetan landscape perhaps can be adduced to explain the Tibetan propensity for decorative detail and love of color. The analogical argument I have put forward here is not meant as a challenge to these more causal explanations. But whatever other factors may come into play in explaining the phenomena I have discussed above, it is my belief that scholasticism as an intellectual world view mirrors these phenomena, and that they, in turn, reflect the character of the Buddhist scholastic mind-set that was, and to this day continues to be, the all-pervasive intellectual idiom of Tibetan religious culture.

Notes

The author would like to express his thanks to Dr. Anne Chayet for her kindness in making available to him several of her published works on architecture. Research for this essay was supported in part by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung (Bonn).

1. Hereafter, reference will be made to the 1957 edition in its seventh printing (1963).

2. The *most* detailed, scholarly work on the subject are in French: Chayet (1994) and Mortari Vergara and Beguin (1987), which also contain the most complete bibliographies. For a brief and general overview with some useful bibliographical references see White (1990:139–54). Among the more scholarly works available in English are Vitali (1990) and Ricca and Lobue (1993).

3. Few artisans attained the kind of reputation that warranted their mention in the textual sources, but there are exceptions. One of the most famous artisans of his day was the Newari architect and master craftsman Aniko (1244–1306), who is mentioned in several sources; and both the first Dalai bla ma (1391–1474) and Thang stong rgyal po are said to have competed in 1461 for the services of a certain bKra shis rin chen, the "supreme artist of the La.bstod Byang school" (see Vitali 1990:103, 133; and also Ricca and Lobue 1993:17).

4. On the supervisory role played by Bu ston in the religious decoration of Zhwa lu, see Vitali (1990:110).

5. But see also LaFleur (1983) for a more general treatment of the relationship of medieval Buddhism to the literary arts of that period in Japan.

6. The most detailed study of this monastery in a Western language is Ricca and Lobue (1993), on which I base most of the remarks that follow.

7. This scheme seems to have been set forth and elaborated from the twelfth century on (Ricca and Lobue 1993:47). One of the most popular texts on the subject, the *rGyud sde spyi rnam*, was written by mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (Collected Works, vol. *nya*, Tohoku no. 5489; translated in Lessing and Wayman 1959), who, as we have seen, was a consultant to Rab brtan kun bzang in his building of dPal 'khor sde chen.

8. The dGe lugs pa is the youngest and politically most powerful of the four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism, founded by Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa (1357–1419).

9. These figures are based on interviews I conducted in Tibet in 1991 with monks from each of the *khang tsan* of Se ra.

10. It is interesting to note that the present monastery of Se ra in exile, in the Bylakuppe settlement of Karnataka, South India, recently has undergone a similar expansion of its Great Assembly Hall. The Byes College meeting hall presently faces the same problem. Since there is no place for further expansion, however, in this case a new hall is being built.

11. One other point is worth mentioning as regards iconography and the arrangement of statuary. We have seen that for Tibetan Buddhist scholastics quantity (that is, proliferativity in numbers) is as important as quality. We find this principle best exemplified in the literally hundreds of statues of Tsong kha pa that constitute the main altar of the re-established Byes College of Se ra in the Bylakuppe settlement in south India. More—at least as it applies to explanation, categories, and religious imagery—is always better.

12. Again, the central temple of the monastery of bSam yas (the dBu rtse), one of the earliest and most important structures in all of Buddhist Tibet, is flanked symmetrically by two smaller temples, to the west and east, dedicated, respectively, to Maitreya (Byams pa gling) and Mañjuśrī ('Jam dpal gling). See Buffetrille (1989:373–76), and Chayet (1988:25).

13. The oral tradition has it that this statue was said by Tsong kha pa himself to be the one that most resembled him from among all the statues of himself he had seen.

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Chapter 7

Neo-Confucian Scholasticism

John B. Henderson

Like the other great religious traditions discussed in this volume, that of Confucianism has a long and variegated history, ranging from classical times (fifth through third centuries B.C.) to the present day. Most of the currents and movements within this broad Confucian stream from ancient to modern times exhibit *some* of the attributes of scholasticism enumerated in the other articles in this volume. But the *most* scholastic version of Confucianism is that movement that is rather broadly and vaguely called "Neo-Confucianism," which arose and flourished in China during the Sung era (960–1279) after a long period in which "heterodox" teachings, particularly forms of Buddhism and Taoism, had been dominant. While the Neo-Confucians claimed that they were simply restoring the transmission of the Confucian Way after a prolonged hiatus, they in fact constructed new versions of Confucianism designed in part to meet the philosophical challenges posed by Buddhism and Taoism.

A particular form of Neo-Confucianism known as *Tao-hsüeh* (Learning of the Way) or the Ch'eng-Chu school, centered on the thought of the most famous Confucian philosopher of postclassical times, Chu Hsi (1130–1200), became established as the orthodoxy of both state and intellectuals in subsequent eras. Indeed, Ch'eng-Chu Confucianism was the mainstay of the all-important civil service examination system until the official abolition of that system in 1905. From the fourteenth to the early twentieth centuries, Ch'eng-Chu commentaries on and interpretations of the Confucian classics dominated the educational curriculum in schools throughout China and were "studied and mastered by millions of examination candidates for the civil

service" (Elman 1994:62). Since the imperial civil service was by far the most attractive and prestigious career in late imperial China, as it was in late traditional Korea where Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy also prevailed, the Neo-Confucian Learning of the Way was solidly situated, both institutionally and culturally.

The contemporaneity of Neo-Confucian scholasticism with Western medieval scholasticisms is striking. The paramount Neo-Confucian scholastic synthesizer Chu Hsi was a near contemporary of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Maimonides (1135–1204), and al-Ghazali (1058–1111), arguably the greatest and most influential scholastic philosophers in their respective traditions. Moreover, Tsong Kha pa (1357–1419), the founder of the dGe lugs pa school of Indo-Tibetan scholastism, lived only a little later. Although these temporal correspondences may not in themselves have any great significance, they do at least suggest the possibility that scholasticism might develop as a stage or phase in the intellectual and cultural history of widely separated civilizations, a hypothesis explored as long ago as 1920 in Paul Masson-Oursel's article "La Scholastique (étude de philosophie comparée)." Masson-Oursel proposes a three-phase schema of world intellectual history in which the initial period of chaotic creativity or "sophism" is succeeded by a grand systemization and stabilization of thought achieved by scholasticism, which is superseded in turn by the advent of the critical spirit of modern science and scholarship (Masson-Oursel 1920:140 passim). Without necessarily endorsing Masson-Oursel's three-phase schema, it might be illuminating and relevant here to suggest some reasons for the rise of the second of his phases, scholasticism, before going on to examine in greater detail the attributes that distinguish Neo-Confucianism as a scholastic tradition. This will enable us to view these attributes as concomitants of historical processes that occurred concurrently, if independently, in widely separated civilizations.

First, scholasticisms both in China and in the West (including those of medieval Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) seem to require the formation and closure of a canon that not only is sacralized but also is decontextualized historically from its diverse points of origin. As such, it is regarded as an integrated and complete whole in which there can be neither inconsistencies nor superfluities. The existence and institution of such a canon inspires the enterprise of commentary, the chief literary medium of scholasticisms everywhere, designed to establish the integrity, consistency, comprehensiveness, and compactness of the classics or scriptures. Scholastic commentary does not generally take a historico-

critical approach to the canon. Far from attempting to stratify texts into their various historical and authorial components, it endeavors rather to *de*stratify them, to present canonical texts as an integrated whole.[1]

The formation and historical decontextualization of a canon of scriptures may be sufficient to stimulate the rise of early or pre-scholasticisms such as existed in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe and the Han Era (202 B.C.–A.D. 220) in China. But the more mature "high scholasticisms" of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Europe, China, and the Middle East require another major input, namely a new encounter with and challenge by a superior or at least highly developed philosophical tradition. Such a tradition, such as Aristotelianism in the medieval West and Middle East, and Buddhist philosophy in Sung China, provides both the stimulus and the tools for the formation of a high scholasticism. It furnishes an impetus insofar as it challenges the religious tradition concerned to demonstrate the philosophical validity, as well as the order and comprehensiveness, of its canon. It also provides some of the tools, ranging from metaphysical and cosmological ideas to logical and dialectical procedures, that make such a demonstration possible or plausible.

However, high scholasticisms in general are profoundly ambivalent and deeply divided over how far this external philosophical tradition, be it Aristotelianism or forms of Buddhism, should be accommodated or even acknowledged in the newly constructed scholastic synthesis. In fact, it would be fair to say that this issue is perennially the most divisive and debated one in various forms of scholasticism, East and West. While Thomas Aquinas may be said to have Christianized Aristotle, both he and some of his contemporaries also were accused of having Aristotlized Christianity, as illustrated particularly in the condemnations of Aristotelian propositions at the University of Paris in 1277. And while Chu Hsi charged some of his Neo-Confucian scholastic opponents with being crypto-Buddhists or Taoists, the orthodox philosophical provenance of aspects of Chu's own philosophy was also open to question. But like the great Vedantin scholastic, Śaṅkara (788–820), Chu was loath to acknowledge the heterodox Buddhist (or Taoist) associations of some of the ideas incorporated into his scholastic synthesis of Neo-Confucianism.

This issue or conflict sometimes is presented in a Western context as one between "reason and revelation." But the problem may be more generally stated as that of a confrontation between a revered religious tradition based on a canon of scripture, and a relatively new (or newly recovered) philosophical or religious system of considerable depth and breadth. In any event, out of this confrontation emerges a final major issue in high scholasticism, the problem of where to draw the exclu-

sionary line between orthodoxy and heresy. As noted in the article by Paul Griffiths included in this volume, scholasticism must have both a canon of sacred texts and an index of forbidden ones.

High scholasticism, at least in China and the medieval West, thus arose with the circulation and absorption of a body of philosophical sources unknown to the founders of the religious tradition concerned or to the composers of its canon. Indeed, there was a great leap forward in the quantity of philosophical sources available to the Latin West in the twelfth century, as there was slightly earlier in China with the invention of printing. But the body of new sources must not be *so* large or diverse as to overwhelm the prospective architects of a scholastic synthesis, such as Thomas Aquinas or Chu Hsi. As long as the flow of new information remains below a certain threshold, primary or high scholasticism, which attempts a rather universalistic synthesis of old and new sources, may be sustained. But when the flow of new information exceeds a certain limit, instigated in the Renaissance West by the invention of printing, the Scientific Revolution, and the Age of Discovery, and in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China by the upsurge in the quantity of printing and the contact with Western science and religion through Jesuit missionaries, then the comprehensive syntheses that marked the apogee of primary scholasticisms are possible only by restricting the information flow, usually either through ignorance (either in the sense of "ignoring" or of "not knowing") or through the index.[2] Indeed, the index, and ecclesiastical censorship in general, may serve just as well to make a "second" or derivative scholasticism possible by artifically limiting extra-canonical sources available, as to curb "dangerous thought." Lacking either ignorance or the index, the latter-day would-be scholastic synthesizer might well wind up in the sad predicament of Voltaire's "theologian": "the difficulty of organizing in his head so many things whose nature is to be confused, and to throw a little light into so many dark clouds, often disheartened him, but as these researches were his professional duties, he devoted himself to them in spite of his disgust" (Voltaire 1983:387).

Nevertheless, various "second" and "neo" forms of scholasticism have arisen and even flourished in modern times, not just in ecclesiastical quarters but in modern ideologies as well. Even the Great Books program in American universities of the midtwentieth century may be plausibly interpreted as a form of scholasticism, as Josef Pieper has pointed out (1960:153), particularly in its attempt to present a synthesis of the Western intellectual heritage that is *well-ordered,* fairly *comprehensive, compact,* and *profound.* As the multiculturalists of our own time have pointed out, it also resembles scholasticism in its *exclusionary* dimension, although it does not explicitly condemn the excluded works as "heretical."

The above discussion has attempted to place the various attributes or aims of high scholasticisms in a comparative developmental context that might explain their appearance in various civilizations as remote from one another as China was from Europe. In other words, we see these attributes (underlined in the previous paragraph) as products or concomitants of the historical developments that gave rise to scholasticism in the first place. Now it remains to examine just how and to what extent these traits are manifested in the Neo-Confucianism that flourished in China from the Sung era. We will also point out areas in which Neo-Confucian scholasticism differs from other scholastic traditions.[3]

Scholastics were primarily commentators on a canon of scripture, the elucidation of which they regarded as their main task, even their life's work. The way in which they presented their canon, the traits they attributed to it, is thus probably a fairly reliable baseline for illuminating the main points of the scholastic world view. Moreover, there is a remarkable resemblance between high scholastics' characterizations of their canons and the characteristics of their own commentarial works on those canons. It is almost as if the scholastics were trying, through the medium of the commentaries they composed, to demonstrate those qualities which *should* have been present in the canon, and which the scholastics endeavored to prove were really there, despite some appearances to the contrary. So it is small wonder that several scholastic commentaries in various traditions, such as Chu Hsi's commentary on the canonical Four Books of Confucianism, assumed a sort of canonical aura. Far from being mere handmaidens to scripture, commentaries in various scholastic traditions could be transformed for all practical purposes into canon.

Perhaps the first priority of high scholastics, confronted with a formidable philosophical system such as Aristotelianism or Buddhist philosophy, was to demonstrate that their canon, too, was well ordered and systematic, and not just a motley collection of disparate ancient writings. The most celebrated instance of Neo-Confucians' ordering of a group of classical texts is their arrangement of the canonical Four Books into a pedagogical series that constituted a complete Confucian curriculum. In the words of Neo-Confucian scholar Fang Hsiao-ju (1357–1402), one should "begin with the *Great Learning* to rectify the foundations, follow it with the book of *Mencius* to activate the spirit, proceed to the *Analects* [of Confucius] to observe equilibrium, and bind it with the *Doctrine of the Mean* to meet the sources" (Fang 1966:6.8a).

Neo-Confucian commentators also were concerned with establishing the internal orderliness of the individual classics on the micro

level of chapter and verse, and even word and phrase. As Daniel Gardner has observed of Chu Hsi's commentary on the canonical *Great Learning*, "Every effort is made by Chu to explain how one statement of the text relates to another, or one chapter to another" (Gardner 1986:44). So caught up was Chu in this rage for order that he went so far as to revise the received text of the *Great Learning* to match what he regarded as the Sage's true intentions in composing it (Gardner 1986:24, 35–36). But Chu Hsi was by no means the last Neo-Confucian commentator to revise or alter classical texts to make them conform to the more perfect order supposedly intended by their original sagely authors. Two eighteenth-century Japanese Neo-Confucian scholars, Nakai Riken and Matsui Rashu, reorganized the texts of the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the canonical "Great Commentary" of the *Changes Classic*, respectively, in order to eliminate inconsistencies and repetitions (Najita 1987:198; Shchutskii 1979:162). And K'ang Yu-wei (1858–1927) rearranged the text of the book of *Mencius*, complaining that "in the seven sections [of the standard arrangement] of the *Mencius*, the 'great meanings and subtle words' are confused and scattered" (1.1).

Like their scholastic counterparts in other cultures, Neo-Confucians devoted their energies to composing epitomes of canonical works, as well as of later-day philosophers. The most important example of the latter is the Neo-Confucian anthology composed by Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien (1137–1181), the *Chin-ssu-lu* (Reflections on Things at Hand). Finally, Neo-Confucian scholastics' rage for order may be illustrated even in their language, which is punctuated by parallelism and framed by formalism. In some cases, it appears that the parallelist tail is wagging the philosophical dog, as in the following statement by Chu Hsi (1973:1.36): "The essence of humanity (*jen*) is hard but its application is soft. The essence of rightness (*i*) is soft but its application is hard." In sum, Erwin Panofsky's (1957:34) statement that the scholastics made the orderliness and logic of their thought more palpably explicit than did the ancients applies just as well to Neo-Confucian as to medieval Christian scholastics. This orderliness, moreover, often took a particular form: "the scholastic machine," as Jacques Le Goff (1984:266) has observed, was "always intent on finding symmetries."

The Aristotelian and Buddhist world views that confronted medieval Christian and Neo-Confucian scholastics of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were not only relatively systematic, but also comprehensive, at least to their adherents who believed them to contain all significant knowledge or truth. As such, they presented both a chal-

lenge and a model for Christian and Confucian scholastics, inspiring them to formulate a vision of completeness that was more in accord with their own particular religious traditions. The Neo-Confucians, in particular, saw the need to formulate such a comprehensive vision in order to avoid being relegated by their Buddhist and Taoist rivals to the limited or inferior status of specialists in statecraft or moral pedagogy who failed to grasp the big picture.

In the first place, Neo-Confucian commentators retrospectively attributed a sort of cosmological completeness to their own classical Confucian canon. The seventeenth-century Japanese scholar Ito Jinsai (1627–1705) maintained that the five Confucian classics, the *Documents*, the *Songs*, the *Changes*, the *Rites*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, present "a vast panorama of heaven, earth, the ten thousand creatures, human emotions, and the changes of the world" (Yoshikawa 1983:70). Chu Hsi marveled that this relatively small corpus of classical texts covered all the subtleties of philosophy and vicissitudes of history (Quoted in Chu I-tsun 1968:296.7b–8a). According to Chu Sheng (1299–1371) (Quoted in Chu I-tsun, 1968:297.1a), the inexhaustibility of the classics derived from their sagely origins: "The Way of the sages is recorded in the classics. Since the minds of the sages are unlimited, the principles in the classics are also unlimited." Another fourteenth-century commentator, Wang Shen (Quoted in Chu I-tsun:297.4a), attributed the cosmic comprehensiveness of the classics to the sages' having patterned them on the way of nature, on the cosmos at large: "The reason why the writing in the Six Classics plumbs heaven and earth and extends over past and present without change is that it emanated from the way of nature." In sum, Neo-Confucian commentators regarded their canon as comprehensive in what Cabezón (1994:91) calls the "strong sense": it includes not only "religiously valid doctrines" but extends to "every phenomenon."

Neo-Confucian scholars also frequently ascribed comprehensiveness to the writings of the grand Neo-Confucian synthesizer Chu Hsi. They exalted Chu's synthesis of the earlier Neo-Confucian masters of the Northern Sung Era (960–1126) in the same terms reserved by Mencius to describe Confucius himself: Chu was "a complete concert" (*chi ta-ch'eng*) who harmonized and synthesized the works of his illustrious predecessors (Ch'en Ch'un:181).

As Cabezón (1994:79) has indicated, the flip side of the completeness of scripture in scholasticism is its compactness: "Most scholastics consider scripture to be both *complete* (nothing essential is left out) and *compact* (it contains nothing unessential)." Neo-Confucian scholastics, in-

deed, went so far as to credit Confucius himself with having expurgated inessential and inappropriate material from the original Six Classics in the course of editing them. According to Chu Hsi, Confucius "deleted [from the *Songs Classic*] what was superfluous and corrected what was disordered. As to what was good yet not fit to be taken as a model, and evil yet not fit to be taken as a warning, he cut and deleted it in order to conform with succinctness" (n.d.:1) The most famous Neo-Confucian philosopher of the Ming Era (1368–1644), Wang Yang-ming (1472–1526), credited Confucius with even grander expurgatory achievements, remarking that "when Confucius expounded the Six Classics, he feared that superfluous writing was creating a chaos in the world; so he lost no time in simplifying them to cause the [people of the] world to strive to eliminate [superfluous] writing and seek the real substance" (Wang 1971:20). Wang extended his ideas on the virtues of expurgation to the point of arguing that the notorious first emperor of the Ch'in dynasty (221–206 B.C.) should not be condemned for burning books, only for burning the wrong ones (the Confucian classics) and for harboring a selfish intention in doing so (20–21).

Confucius' alleged efforts at expurgation notwithstanding, Neo-Confucian scholastics faced allegations that repetitions and other superfluities still existed in the received versions of the classics. They dealt with such problems partly through the use of scholastic modal distinctions. Chu Hsi (1974:105), for example, explained the appearance of a repeated phrase in the *Analects* of Confucius by commenting that "the former instance speaks in terms of *action*, while this one speaks in terms of *knowledge*." However, Ch'eng I (1033–1107) interpreted the seemingly superfluous repetition of the names of four states in the canonical *Spring and Autumn Annals* as a sort of rhetorical device, meant to accentuate their crimes (Quoted in *Ch'un-ch'iu san-chuan* n.d. 48)

Finally, Neo-Confucian scholastics, like their counterparts in other scholastic cultures, were not above composing their own abridgements of those canonical and semicanonical works which seemed to suffer from superfluities that were beyond the point of local repair or rationalization. Into this category might fall Chu Hsi's *Comprehensive Explications of the Text and Commentaries of the Ceremonial Rites (I-li ching-chuan t'ung-chieh).*

From the perspective of scholastics both in Eastern and in Western civilizations, a problem in canonical texts that was even more disturbing than apparent superfluities was apparent contradictions. As Cabezón (1994:55) has pointed out, several modern students of Western

scholasticism have identified the "source of scholasticism" in "the fact that it attempts systematic reconciliation of the contradictions that plague the Tradition, thereby implicitly establishing this as the essence of the scholastic method." A recent interpreter of Hellenistic hermeneutics on Homer extends this concern to characterize Western hermeneutics in general: "from its beginnings hermeneutics seems to have been bent to the task of reconciling apparent contradictions whether within the work of a single author or between authors" (Lamberton 1983:5).

To resolve such apparent contradictions, scholastics had to marshall, or devise, considerable resources of language and logic. On this point, however, scholastic traditions differ most markedly from one another, particularly according to the disparateness of the sources that the scholastics of a particular tradition recognize as authorities worthy of being reconciled. It appears that the more inclusive a scholastic tradition is, and the more disparate its recognized authorities, the larger and more important looms the task of eliminating inconsistencies and apparent contradictions. Thus, while the techniques of reconciliation, such as those pioneered by Abelard, were essential to the more ambitiously inclusive scholastic enterprise in the medieval West, they were of relatively minor importance in other traditions, such as Neo-Confucianism, that aimed to synthesize traditions that were fewer in number and less diverse in character.

Nevertheless, Neo-Confucian scholastics did find some occasion for textual reconciliation, albeit within a more limited selection of texts than those reconciled by many Western medieval scholastics. The philosopher Ch'eng I, for example, mediated between two different characterizations of human nature (*hsing*) appearing in the *Analects* of Confucius and the book of *Mencius* by saying that while Confucius was speaking of the "temperamental side of human nature," Mencius was speaking of the "basis of human nature" (Quoted in Chu 1974:119). Another method used by Neo-Confucian commentators to explain apparent divergences or contradictions in the classics bears some resemblance to the Buddhist technique of *upāya* (accommodation or skill in means). For example, both Chang Tsai (1020–1077) and Wang Yang-ming explain instances in the Confucian *Analects* where Confucius gave different answers to the same question by remarking that his responses were intended to meet the needs or to accord with the intellectual or spiritual attainments of particular disciples (Kasoff 1984:x; Wang 1971:100–101). However, such discrepancies within the Confucian classics were generally not of such an order as to require a highly developed skill in logic or dialectic to resolve.

While Neo-Confucian scholastics were less absorbed than were their Western counterparts with the reconciliation of apparent contradictions in authoritative texts, they were probably *more* concerned with asserting and maintaining the purity of their scholastic lineage. The Neo-Confucians of the Ch'eng-Chu school or "Learning of the Way" (*Tao-hsüeh*), in fact, identified themselves primarily by their claim to have resumed the orthodox transmission of the Way (*Tao-t'ung*) in the eleventh century, after a 1,400-year hiatus following the death of Mencius. While several prominent Confucians lived in the intervening era, none quite measured up to the high (or exclusionist) standards set by Chu Hsi and his scholastic successors. In the centuries following Chu Hsi's promulgation of the transmission of the Way, a perennial theme in Neo-Confucian discourse was the identification of those who deserved to be included in the main line of the tradition as Chu Hsi's continuators. The question of "through whom the succession ran, after Chu Hsi and his immediate disciples" became a pressing and divisive issue in Ming and Ch'ing times (1368–1911) (de Bary 1989:228). Later Neo-Confucian scholars, in fact, composed a considerable number of scholastic genealogies devoted to presenting partisan versions of the transmission of the Way.[4] Even twentieth-century neo-scholastic Confucian philosophers, such as Mou Tsung-san, have focused on this issue. As John Berthrong (1994:107, 109) has remarked, Mou's "concern for the definition of orthodoxy and the proper understanding of the 'transmission of the Way' is highly traditional. Nothing could be more Confucian than worrying about lineage and teachings."

Analogies to the Neo-Confucian transmission of the Way may be found in other traditions, as in the Catholic notion of apostolic succession. But in the history of Neo-Confucianism, this issue was perennially the main focus of debate on questions concerning the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of particular subtraditions. The most convincing version of the transmission of the Way went a long way toward validating the orthodoxy of whoever claimed and presented it. Those Confucians who could not plausibly claim affiliation with at least one of the figures in the orthodox line of transmission risked being characterized as crypto-Buddhists or Taoists. An even worse fate might await particularly obstinate or notorious opponents of the orthodox Neo-Confucian tradition of the Way: they might be fit into the parallel line of heresiarchs descending from the heterodox ancient philosophers through the Buddhists of the post-Han Era, culminating in Ch'an (=Zen).

The Neo-Confucian confrontation with the "heretical" Buddhists gave rise to a final major feature of Neo-Confucian scholasticism, the at-

tempt to establish the philosophical profundity and respectability of their canon and tradition. On the face of it, the Four Books and Five (or Six) Classics of the Confucian canon seemed to lack the profound cosmological, metaphysical, and soteriological dimensions of some of the better-known Buddhist texts. Even the sayings of the primary Confucian sages of antiquity, as recorded in the *Analects* and *Mencius*, were seemingly sadly deficient in philosophical acumen. One scholastic solution to this difficulty was to virtually ignore those parts of the received canon that were not especially philosophical or profound and to focus attention on a few particular books, passages, and ideas in the classics that were. Indeed, the Sung Neo-Confucians went so far as to raise two previously obscure chapters of the canonical *Record of Rites* (Li-chi), namely the *Great Learning* and *Doctrine of the Mean*, to the status of being independent classics, in part because of their philosophical promise. Some Neo-Confucian commentators took a small number of selected passages from these two texts as the mainstays of their classical cogitations. Wang Yang-ming, for example, held that the first chapters of each of these two classics "taught the complete task of Confucian learning" (Chan, n.d.:271 citing *Wang Wen-ch'eng kung ch'üan-shu* 26.2a).

Along this same line, Neo-Confucian commentators extracted a limited number of scattered metaphysical terms from the classics, such as *li* (pattern or principle), *ch'i* (material force), *hsin* (heart or mind), *hsing* (human nature), and *jen* (cohumanity), and attempted to array them into some kind of philosophical order or system.[5] Indeed, so important was this project in Neo-Confucianism that various schools of Neo-Confucian thought, such as the "School of Principle" (*li-hsüeh*) and the "School of Mind" (*hsin-hsüeh*), sometimes are distinguished from each another by the particular ways in which they related such philosophical terms to one another. Some Neo-Confucian texts even give the impression that a type of enlightenment might proceed from a realization of the proper order and interrelationships of such terms. The great Korean Neo-Confucian scholar, Yi T'oegye (1501–1570), constructed elaborate diagrams showing the relationships of various Neo-Confucian philosophical terms and concepts to one another. By correctly contemplating some of these diagrams, one could achieve "a level of insight in which discordant notes fall into place and the whole may be grasped as a polyphonic unity" (Kalton 1988:108–9). But however grand was the realm of Neo-Confucian metaphysics thus constructed from scattered and diverse terms and concepts in the classics, Neo-Confucian scholars had still to confront the problem of the superficial lack of profundity in the bulk of the canon, even in the *Analects* of Confucius. Why, they asked, could the Master's discourses on profound topics such as human nature (*hsing*) and the Way of heaven (*t'ien-tao*) not be heard (*Analects* 5:12)? One possible explanation was that these

ideas were too profound and subtle for the auditors of Confucius' own time to grasp (Ho, 1974:5.4b). Another, posed by Chu Hsi (1973:2.40), was that "the Sage [Confucius] taught people the broad outline. He spoke only of filiality, brotherliness, fidelity, and trust, words for daily use and constant practice." Another Neo-Confucian commentator on the *Analects*, Hsieh Liang-tso (1050–1103), averred that Confucius really did communicate his teachings on human nature, the Way of heaven, and other profound conceptions, but only subtly and indirectly, not explicitly through words (Quoted in Chu I-tsun, 1968:214.3a). However diverse these explanations of Confucius' reticence in speaking on such topics as human nature and the Way of heaven, they all support the point that Confucius was no philosophical lightweight, that he had profound things to say even if he didn't always express them directly or systematically.

As indicated at several points in the above discussion, Neo-Confucian scholasticism was by no means a carbon copy of its Western counterpart. Not only was the balance of Neo-Confucian scholastic qualities somewhat different, but Neo-Confucianism seems to lack the strong concern for technical questions of language and logic so characteristic of medieval Latin (as well as Indo-Tibetan) scholasticism. However, Neo-Confucian scholasticism shares with the Taoist scholasticism outlined by Livia Kohn in this volume a couple of traits that were not prominent in Western scholasticism: it was less divided from society as a whole as well as more politically involved. It was a more popular form of scholasticism, particularly by dint of its wide dissemination through the schools and academies of late imperial China.

Its relatively popular character as well as its firm political and institutional supports helped Neo-Confucian scholasticism to outlive the primary high scholasticism of the Western Middle Ages. Nevertheless, Neo-Confucian scholasticism increasingly was corroded by some of the same historical developments that so devastated its Western counterparts. First, as mentioned above, the explosion of printing and the input of Western science and religion that took place in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China so increased the flow (or flood) of information that a new scholastic synthesis, one that was comprehensive and compact, systematic and consistent, was hardly humanly possible. At the same time, the new learning and science of this era showed up the deficiencies of the old scholastic synthesis by Chu Hsi. For example, Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–1695) and Chang Hui-yen (1761–1802) revealed serious flaws in Chu's understanding of astronomy and cosmology (Huang 1970:1.14;

Chang 1970:28a). Second, the rise of new movements of historico-critical scholarship in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries undermined one of the central foundations of scholasticism, the view that canonical writings were in a sense all of a piece and could be worked into a coherent and compact system with no major inconsistencies. The historical recontextualization of the Confucian classics revealed diversity and variety in these standard texts, and even that parts of them were forgeries not composed by the sagely hands to which they were commonly attributed. Later commentators thus criticized earlier scholastic attempts to harmonize or systematize this rather unharmonious and disparate congeries of ancient writings. P'i Hsi-jui (1850–1908), for example, remarked that Cheng Hsüan's (127–200) commentaries on the three Confucian ritual classics had attempted to "reconcile the theories of the Old and New Text schools. Even in cases in which he could not harmonize them, he forcibly sought to bring them into accord" (3.54). Instead of celebrating the brilliance of scholastics' synthetic insights, critical scholars of the Ch'ing era (1644–1911) were more apt to fault them for their empirical oversights.

In this area, as in others, high scholasticism helped to sow the seeds of its own destruction: it exalted the commentary on the classics while not recognizing that this genre would develop a historico-critical mode, epitomized in the works of Ch'ing textual scholars, that undermined rather than supported scholastic approaches to the canon. While some in our day might be attracted by the promise of various neo-scholasticisms, including those of modern ideologies, to restore a higher sense of order and purpose to learning and to the world in general, such a restoration might exact a heavy price: the strict control both of historical and critical scholarship and of the parameters of learning in general to include only that which can be reasonably and comfortably integrated into a new scholastic synthesis. Scholasticism, like several other important phenomena in world intellectual history, can only thrive in its primary form within bounds governed by the quantity and rate of information flow. But this technical consideration might have little effect on romantics and ideologues who seek to establish a closed intellectual community within an open society.

Notes

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1. A similiar point is made in Cabezón (1994:59).

2. The article by Robert E. Goss in this volume marks the end of medieval or "primary" scholasticism at about 1500, around the time of the invention of printing, the beginning of the Age of Discovery, and the first stirrings of the scientific revival leading to the Scientific Revolution.

3. The characteristics of scholasticism discussed in this chapter are based mainly on a sort of synthesis of those explored in Henderson (89–138) (where they are identified as "commentarial assumptions"), with those examined in the article by Cabezón included in this volume. Despite some rather superficial differences in terminology, there is a large degree of overlap between the two lists, even though Cabezón and I focus our works on different scholastic traditions (Indo-Tibetan vs. Chinese Confucian) that had little contact with one another.

4. These scholastic genealogies are examined in Wilson (1995).

5. A similar concern inspired Renaissance aestheticians who inherited from classical antiquity only "a small number of scattered notions and suggestions" on aesthetics which "had to be carefully selected, taken out of their context, rearranged, reemphasized and reinterpreted or misinterpreted before they could be utilized as building materials for aesthetic systems" (Kristeller 1980:174).

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Chapter 9

Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice

Paul J. Griffiths

Scholasticism was once, in ordinary spoken English, a term of praise or simple value-neutral description. Like *casuistry* and *dogma* it has become a term of abuse. It connotes a compulsive concern with uninteresting and useless matters of detail, an obsessive interest in hopelessly fine conceptual distinctions. To call someone a scholastic in this sense is close to calling her a pedant. Here the connections with casuistry are clear. But 'scholasticism' also suggests, to most native speakers of American English, a discourse based upon authority, a discourse whose axioms are unquestioned and unquestionable. And here the connections with dogma are clear. There is a complicated and interesting historical story to tell about why these words have accrued just these connotations. I shall not attempt to tell it here, but it is worth noting that for Western intellectuals it begins several centuries back, at least in the sixteenth century. By 1686, for example, when Leibniz wrote his *Discours de métaphysique,* the term *scholastic* already had become sufficiently problematic that he was obliged to apologize for it and to explain, defensively, his attempt to rehabilitate some elements of scholastic philosophy. He claims, for instance, in the eleventh section of that work:

> I know that I am advancing a grand paradox in attempting to rehabilitate to some extent the ancient philosophy, and to restore the

> almost banished substantial forms to their proper place. But perhaps I shall not be easily condemned when it is known that I have meditated long on modern philosophy; that I have given much time to experiments in physics and proofs in geometry; and that I was for a long time persuaded of the vanity of these beings [substantial forms] which finally I was obliged to embrace in spite of myself and as if by force after having myself carried out certain studies which made me recognize that we moderns do not give sufficient credit to Saint Thomas [Aquinas] and to the other great men of that time, and that there is, among the opinions of scholastic philosophers and theologians (*dans les sentimens des philosophes et theologiens scholastiques*), more solidity than one imagines, provided that one uses them appropriately and in their place.

Leibniz is right in that there is more solid merit in the substance of medieval European scholastic theory than is generally granted by contemporary academics. But there is also much merit in, and much of interest to say about, the intellectual practices that constitute scholasticism, a matter to which Leibniz pays little or no attention.

In treating this, I identify and give a formal description of scholasticism in terms of four principal variables: how scholastics typically read, how they typically compose, what their epistemological commitments are likely to be, and in what instutional contexts their practices are likely to flourish. The description given is of an ideal type, not of any specific historical phenomenon. This disclaimer does not mean that the ideal type is unrelated to any historical phenomena: many of the examples I shall use inevitably will be of just such phenomena. But I do not wish to claim that the ideal type I describe in this chapter ever has been instantiated (or ever will be) in all its details. Like all such descriptions, my identification of what scholastics do is meant as a heuristic device, a tool to use in answering certain questions. These are principally questions about the contemporary desirability and viability of scholastic practice. But they are also empirical questions as to the significance of scholastic practice for the intellectual life of tradition-based communities.

Since two of the variables (reading and composition) through which I shall identify scholasticism have to do with the relations between scholastics and their texts, I begin my description of scholasticism by offering a lexicon for the discussion of some basic and controversial theoretical problems about textuality.

Composition, Display, Storage

Texts must be composed in some fashion: this is a property constitutive of textuality. They will usually, though not always, be displayed after (or simultaneously with) their composition; more rarely they may

be stored after they have been displayed; and those texts that are stored may sometimes be taken from storage and redisplayed. How may these things be done? Which technologies can be used to do them, and which are likely so to be used? These questions are important because engaging them will allow resolution of, or at least some new ways of thinking about, controverted and significant issues about the cultural and practical significance of speech, memorization, and writing. Asking the questions separately is important in another way as well: it will help to keep questions about composition and display distinct from questions about storage and redisplay. These questions often are merged or confused.

I begin, then, with the question of first display, the pivotal moment in the life of a text. This occurs when a text is first displayed in a fixed form with firm boundaries, a form in which it can enter storage. In the case of a verbal text displayed orally, the moment of display occurs when the last syllable of the text is uttered; in the case of a verbal text displayed in writing it occurs when the last graph (letter, character, word) is written.

As I use it here, the term *display* has as its contrastive term *inaccessibility*. A displayed text is one that could be (though need not actually be) consumed (read, heard, tasted, memorized) by a public. A nondisplayed text is one for which this is in principle not the case. All nondisplayed texts, then, will exist as thoughts, since only these are in principle inaccessible to a public. (I note that for God all texts are always displayed, even those that exist only as thoughts. When God is the consumer, the completion of a text's composition is also the completion of its display. But since scholastic communities are composed of human persons, this exception need not detain us.)

Given this definition, a verbal text can be displayed in only two ways. The first is by speech, understood as the creation by the human voice of semantically loaded patterns of vibration in the air; and the second is by the partial encoding of such patterns in some other form, most commonly (but not necessarily) one accessible to the eye rather than the ear. This second option usually will mean writing. Display by writing is secondary to and parasitic upon speech, because it requires that writing be understood as a secondary means of encoding or representing the primary data which are given by speech. This is true even though, in some cultural settings and some institutional locations, writing may be the only working mode of display and storage. The reason is that, both for individuals and for social groups, writing has speech among the necessary conditions for its development, while the reverse is not true. There are no instances either of individuals or of social groups in possession of writing but not of speech. This is not, of course, to say that writing, once it finds a place in the life of some individual or

group, may not develop properties, semantic and other, that are neither determined by, nor in any significant way causally related to, properties of the speech-habits already possessed by that individual or group.

Given this understanding of display, the essential point of which is the in-principle public availability of a bounded text, what of composition? This always will occur either before display or simultaneously with it. For most texts, composition and display will be virtually simultaneous: the last moment of display (the moment at which the bounded text is made available) will be the same as the last moment of composition, and the processes by which a text is composed will not easily be separable from those by which that same text is displayed. Consider ordinary conversational texts. The (short) spoken text 'How do you do?' is, for most native speakers of English on most occasions of its use, effectively composed and displayed simultaneously. The same may be the case, though I think rarely, for much longer and more complex texts. Consider the performance art of an action painter, the inspired recitation of a bardic singer, or the speaking in tongues of a Pentecostal Christian. But composition (especially of long and complex texts) also may occur before the acts of speech or writing whose completion signals the moment of their display. That is to say, composition sometimes includes acts that occur prior to or alongside of productive acts and are intentionally directed toward their completion. Composition in this sense usually will include mental acts: deliberation, volition, intention, choice, and so forth. It also may include physical acts: writing a draft, scribbling phrases on paper, speaking words aloud.

Questions about display are, therefore, not necessarily the same as questions about composition. I take the former to be about the means by which a particular text is first made accessible to a public, while the latter are about the (often private) processes of thought, artifice, memorization, or draft that may have gone on before this happens. For instance, to say that some text is displayed orally is perfectly compatible with saying that it is the product of a process of conscious and lengthy artifice using nonoral methods (memorization, writing, gesture) on the part of some individual; it is compatible also with saying that it is the spontaneous result of an onrush of afflatus. The improvisations of a skilled jazz pianist usually are spontaneous in something like this way: they are prepared for in a very nonspontaneous way (the pianist listens to other pianists, practices a lot, and so forth), but the production of a musical text (a performance) may use none of these methods, even though they are among the necessary conditions for its occurrence. Similarly, the texts displayed by *rhetors* in ancient Greece, by preachers in contemporary black gospel churches, and by some politicians and lecturers often may be entirely oral in terms of their dis-

play, but have behind them much intentional work, and therefore a long process of composition that need not be exclusively or at all oral.

The third and fourth concepts that need to be explained are intimately linked: storage and redisplay. Once a text has been displayed, it may be stored in some way for later redisplay. Most texts, of course, are not stored intentionally. The vast majority of texts produced by humans are ordinary conversational ones without sufficient intrinsic interest or potential for future use to suggest that it would be proper for any individual or community to put effort into storing them. But some texts are stored, either by accident or with intention. How may this be done?

A text given its first display aurally, in speech, if it is to be reused, must be stored by an act separate from that which gave it its first display. As Augustine put it in the *De doctrina christiana* (ii.4), uttered words last no longer than the vibrations in the air in which they consist; if they are to endure longer, storage in some form is necessary. But storage need not occur only by writing. It also may occur by memorization and by various technologies of recording.

In the case of texts given their first display visually, in writing, there is a similar range of possibilities for storage and redisplay. The text may be read aloud and then memorized, written down again, or recorded electronically. But this suggests an important point about writing. Writing is unique in that it, and it alone, is a technology for composition, display, and storage all at once. A text may be composed (in part, at least) by writing (as was the case for the text you now are reading); one so composed is simultaneously and already displayed and stored, the latter for as long as the physical medium (paper, palm leaf, computer disc) upon which it is written survives. None of the other technologies mentioned have this property. Thought is a mode of composition and storage, but not of display; speech is a mode of composition and display, but not of storage; and the various electronic methods of recording are modes only of storage and (re)display, but not of composition. Writing therefore holds a unique and pivotal position, one that goes some way toward explaining the dominance it has come to have in contemporary Western culture as a tool for all three tasks (composition, display, storage).

This brief discussion should suggest that texts may be composed, displayed, stored, and redisplayed without the use of writing and without literacy understood in the narrow sense of the ability to decode marks on some enduring medium of storage. It also should suggest, by making a clear conceptual distinction among composition, storage, and display, that the use of a particular technology for one function implies nothing about the use of that same technology for others. It is important to emphasize this point because of a tendency among

contemporary scholars, most of whom do their thinking in a cultural context in which writing is dominant for the composition, display, and storage of all texts, to assume that wherever writing is present at all it will assume the same kind of dominance. That it need not is obvious: it is not difficult to imagine a context in which writing is one mode of storage among others, but not the most important; or a context in which it is effectively the only mode of storage, but in which the preferred mode of display is aural; or one in which it is used for composition, but never for storage; and so forth. It also is important to notice another common assumption: that the existence and use of writing makes possible the composition of kinds of texts—texts with specifiable formal characteristics—that in principle cannot be composed orally or by thought. The correlate of this assumption is the view that "oral texts" have clear and specifiable properties that mark them off from "written texts." There is a cluster of issues here, the discussion of which has generated an enormous literature in the last thirty years. Since it is important for my argument about scholasticism to distance myself from the more dubious among the views expressed in this literature, I offer next a brief review of the current state of play in discussion about orality and literacy.

Orality and Literacy

Twentieth-century debates about orality and literacy have three axes. The first has to do with textuality itself, with the formal features of texts and what these features reveal about how they were composed, stored, and displayed. The second has to do with cognitive psychology and epistemology, with whether the presence and use of a particular technology (writing, say, or printing, or more recently electronic media) may or must have direct and specifiable effects upon the thought patterns, epistemological habits, and compositional practices of its users. And the third has to do with the effects that the presence of a particular technology of composition and storage (typically writing) may or must have upon forms of social organization. In spite of the volume of literature on all these questions, there are common threads which make it relatively easy to disentangle the issues and to isolate desirable and undesirable strategies for dealing with them.

One such thread is the tendency to tie the three issues together by making very strong claims about all of them. So, for instance, it is sometimes argued that there are formal features of texts (their length, say, or the degree of complexity of their internal organization, or the presence in them of repeated formulaic elements) that signal with a very high

degree of probability how they were composed. It also sometimes is argued, as a correlate of this claim, that the presence and use of a particular compositional technology is determinative of the cognitive psychology of its users: that, for instance, users of technologies of thought rather than technologies of writing for composition and storage will, in some important respects, live in a different cognitive world than those who live in a "world on paper," as David Olson (1994) puts it. And, as a final connecting link, it might be argued that the presence of writing acts not merely as a necessary condition for the existence of certain forms of social organization (the bureaucracy of the nation-state, for example), but also as a sufficient condition.

Defenders of these strong views will place great emphasis upon the determinative force of technology: in the case of writing, if these views are defensible, almost everything of interest about a culture (the cognitive psychology of its members, the nature of the texts they compose and store, and their modes of social organization) will be more or less directly traceable to the presence or absence of this technology. The presence or absence of writing (or of whatever technology is under discussion) on these views becomes a panacea for all explanatory difficulties: technologies of composition are presented as floating free of specific cultural settings, and, upon entering a particular culture, like aliens from outer space who always turn the locals into identical gray and willing slaves no matter what they were like before the aliens got there, turning that culture into one more token of whatever type is under discussion—a writing culture, an oral culture, an electronic culture, and so on.

Such arguments are present (though perhaps never in quite the extreme form stated here) in the pivotal works from the 1960s on these topics by Marshall McLuhan, Jack Goody and Ian Watt, and Eric Havelock, as well as in later work by Walter Ong. But these strong views on the cognitive and social significance of writing and on the possibility of determining compositional technology on the basis of a work's formal features are almost certainly mistaken, or at the very least too crude. The most that can be said with any degree of plausibility is that a particular compositional technology, in certain settings, may have the kinds of effects upon cognition, compositional practice, the formal features of texts, and social organization suggested by Goody, Watt, Ong, and others.

Certainly, particular instances of such causal relations can be shown with a very high degree of plausibility—as, for example, in Elizabeth Eisenstein's study of the effects of the introduction of print technology in early modern Europe; or in the study by C. A. Read and others of the effects of alphabetic literacy (rather than ideographic literacy) upon readers of Chinese. But this is very different from claiming

that the presence of such technology always will have just these effects no matter what other cultural variables are in place. Making the more limited claim should lead to studies of the effects of particular technologies in particular cultural settings and to the relations between these effects and other variables. And, as might have been expected, such studies, insofar as they have been carried out, suggest strongly that the effects of particular technologies, whether of composition or storage, are very different in different cultural settings. The monolithic views are simply not adequate to the data: they pay insufficient attention to the proper distinctions among composition, storage, and display.

Studies of culturally specific instances of the use of various technologies of composition and storage have increasingly called into question such monolithic views of the effects of literacy upon social organization and individual cognitive habits. Rosalind Thomas's work on Greece, Frits Staal's and Harry Falk's work on India, and Gregor Schoeler's on Islam all show this. Writing may, but need not, become dominant as a technology for composition and storage when it is present in a particular culture. Written texts may, but need not, become the paradigm for all texts. Writing may, but need not, be understood as a medium of representation and communication as well as an aide-memoire, as Paul Zumthor says (1987:123). Writing may, but need not, become an instrument in the bureaucratic repertoire of the capitalist nation-state. Reading (in the sense of decoding marks upon an enduring medium of storage) may but need not, upon being introduced into a specific cultural setting, or even upon becoming widespread there, become the dominant mode of ingesting texts. Whether any of these things happen will depend upon variables other than technological ones, and this is because reading and writing, like any other ways of composing and storing texts, are always social practices that involve much more than the use of a particular technology (the work collected by Jonathan Boyarin [1992] is good on this). And so, in the sketch of scholasticism that follows, I shall avoid assuming that scholastic compositional practices and storage needs must be correlated with particular technologies. There is simply no good reason to suppose this to be the case and much empirical evidence against it.

Scholastic Reading

The root-metaphor for scholastic intellectual practice is that of reading. Reading usually is understood to denote the visual consumption of ordered patterns of print on a page (or script on vellum; or

scrach marks on palm leaves; or hieroglyphs on granite; or ideographs on plates of silver; or pixels of light on a liquid-crystal screen). It usually is understood, that is, to require written objects to be read, and so to entail the specific technical skill of extracting meaning from such objects. I have in mind a practice both more and less specific than this and shall call it "scholastic reading" in order to mark its differences from ordinary or generic reading. Scholastic reading has to do primarily with the establishment of certain relations between readers and the things they read, relations that are at once attitudinal, cognitive, and moral, and that therefore imply an ontology, an epistemology, and an ethic.

This kind of reading requires neither written objects nor the technical skill of extracting meaning from them, though it commonly will be connected with both and may in the end, if certain other cultural and institutional variables are in place, entail their production and use. Scholastic reading, then, though it does require texts, if texts are understood broadly as ordered systems of signs, does not require written texts. It may take as its object that which it reads, a text that exists only as an ordered pattern of sounds in the air (something spoken or musical) or a text that exists only as an ordered pattern of three-dimensional shapes (an icon or a picture) or (just conceivably) a text that exists only as an ordered pattern of tastes, smells, or tactile stimuli—as in the case of the Tathāgata Sugandhakūṭa, which are said in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* to be given not in words but only by means of smells (Prāsādika and Joshi 1981:505).

But scholastic reading will, in every case, imply a distinctive set of relations between reader and text. The first and most basic element in these relations is that the text read is understood as a stable and vastly rich resource, one that yields meaning, suggestions (or imperatives) for action, matter for aesthetic wonder, and much else. It is a treasure-house, an ocean, a mine: the deeper scholastic readers dig, the more ardently they fish, the more single-mindedly they seek gold, the greater will be their reward. The basic metaphors here are those of discovery, uncovering, retrieval, opening up: scholastic readers read what is there to be read, and what is there to be read always precedes, exceeds, and, in the end, supersedes its readers. According to these metaphors, there can be no final act of reading in which everything is uncovered, in which the mine of gold has yielded all its treasure or the fishpool has been emptied of fish. Reading, for scholastic readers, ends only with death, and perhaps not then: it is a continuous, ever-repeated process.

The second, almost equally important, constituent of the relations between scholastic readers and their texts is that readers are seen as intrinsically capable of reading and as morally required to read. Their capacity for retrieving the riches of the text by the act of reading is

something intrinsic to them; they are essentially and necessarily readers, to the point where the phrase *homo lector* can be substituted for *homo sapiens* without loss and with considerable gain. Nonreaders, on this view, are precisely those who have renounced their humanity, renounced their defining characteristic; and it is typical of scholastic readers that for them, in George Steiner's (1989:193) phrase, the act of reading is an "unmistakable witness to the ambiguous mastery of texts over life." The text's intrinsic stability and fecundity as a resource therefore is matched by the reader's intrinsic stability and ingenuity as a discoverer. Both texts and readers are ordered: it is this that makes acts of scholastic reading possible and this that guarantees their continuation and fruitfulness.

Scholastic readers therefore treat their texts with reverence. Since the text is what it is for them, they will necessarily adopt toward it an attitude incompatible with those implied by uses of texts that treat them only as instruments for the achievement of other ends. Consider, as a contrastive case, professional academics in Europe or America at the end of the twentieth century: the attitude toward texts implied in their practice is largely instrumental. Their use of texts is presented and described almost entirely in the language and images of consumerist capitalism and is therefore dominated by talk of control (scholastic readers never control their texts; they are controlled by them), use, production, and consumption: they consume the texts of others and produce their own; they are defined and given status by the body of literature they control and upon which they are accredited to give authoritative (expert) voice for appropriate reward; they cite and mention (rather than scholastically read) and are in turn judged largely by the extent to which the texts they produce (again, the industrial metaphor, the image of mass production) are cited and mentioned.

Or, as a rather different but complementary contrastive case, consider the reading practices of the (usually male) user of pornography or the (usually female) user of romantic novels. Such readers read only to produce certain effects: sexual arousal, perhaps, in the case of the pornography user; or catharsis in the case of the romance user. When the required effects have been produced, the objects read have no more useful work to do for that consumer. They can be discarded: returned to the circulating library, sold back to the used bookstore, or given away. Analogous points could be made, mutatis mutandis, about the use of textbooks or most of the occasional writing found in magazines and newspapers: readers read such works to gain ephemeral information, to titillate rather than to cultivate, to entertain rather than to transform.

So much, in brief, for the ideal-typical relations between scholastic readers and their texts, and for the attitudes possessed by such read-

ers to their texts. Recall that a sketch such as this neither makes nor implies any claims as to whether this ideal type, or anything like it, ever has been instanced; it serves only as a heuristic device. In order to sharpen the ideal type, and so to make it more pointedly useful for those engaged in historical or comparative studies, I would now like to contrast the root metaphor of reading used in the preceding paragraphs with another root metaphor: that of writing, using this word, as I used *reading*, in a rather different sense than the usual.

By the term *writing* I mean not necessarily a practice that involves making visible marks on some permanent medium of storage; I mean rather a practice that is quintessentially creative, a process that brings order and structure where there was none before, a process whose description involves inevitable appeal to images of making, of construction, of conceit (both in the literary and in the affective sense), of ornamentation, and of artifice. Focus on the root metaphor of writing as essential to and constitutive of human beings, makes them, as writers, the center of epistemological and metaphysical interest. The practice of writing, understood in this way, is the only creative act, the only act by means of which order and structure can be given to things. There is no order or meaning other than that inscribed by the act of writing and created by writers, and this means that writers, in writing, inscribe always and endlessly themselves, their own potential for creating order. This is a familiar, now almost a tired, trope of theory: everything, even (especially) philosophy is a kind of writing, as Richard Rorty (1982:90–109) has put it, and the proper object of all intellectual inquiry is, in the end, rhetoric.

In one important sense the postmodernist writer is about as far from the scholastic reader as it is possible to get. For the latter the world is a (textualized) field of endlessly uncoverable ordered riches; for the former, the world is an (also textualized) endlessly constructable field of play, and not just any play, but most especially the free play of signifiers that can be ordered at whim into lightly orgasmic objects of *jouissance*. Writers, according to this interpretation, are radically autonomous, subject to nothing other than the limits of their creative impulses and constrained by nothing other than the strictly limitless potential of the signifiers arrayed to serve them. To take a financial analogue: scholastic readers draw upon a very substantial savings account but have to balance the books as they go and can do so only by handling currency; postmodernist writers have to hand a credit card with a strictly infinite balance and need never touch cash. They get their pleasure solely from engaging in the process of production, and in this they are, as Fredric Jameson (1991:275–76) has claimed, most at home in the culture of late capitalism:

> One's sense, particularly when dealing with foreigners who have been enflamed by American consumerism, is that the products form a kind of hierarchy whose climax lies very precisely in the technology of reproduction itself, which now, of course, fans out well beyond the classical television set and has come in general to epitomize the new informational or computer technology of the third stage of capitalism.

This is typical of the attitude of writers to the activity of writing. It is important to have written, to be writing, and to project the process of writing into the future. The product of writing (the text) is relatively unimportant, just as the artifacts to be consumed in late capitalist cultures are unimportant in comparison to what the process of anticipating, lusting after, and consuming them signifies. Scholastic readers are, by contrast, strictly feudalist: for them, the object is of central importance and the processes of production of marginal interest.

There is some superficial similarity between scholastic reading and postmodernist writing as I have described them. Both are deeply text centered, and that this is the case goes some way toward explaining the attraction of scholastic practice for some postmodernist writers. Geoffrey Hartman (1994:343) has some perceptive comments to make about this, in the context of a discussion of Midrashic commentarial practices:

> Of course, literary commentaries and Midrashic ones have their differences. But these are not easy to define except by pseudo criteria. The very advance of contemporary theory toward Midrash makes Jewish scholars more zealous to avoid contamination. There is fear that the motive for Midrash will be mistakenly reduced from *Everything is in the text, and what the text signifies is its relevance to the actions and thoughts of the interpretive community*, to *Everything is text, and the text is a structure of imaginary relations, a tissue without issue*. I acknowledge the danger, but why be frightened by those who insist on being superficial?

According to the scholastic reader, the textualized world is intrinsically other than the human, ordered independently of it, and capable of acting upon it. But according to the postmodernist writer, as I have suggested, the nonhuman effectively dissolves into the human. Ontology becomes epistemology, and the self becomes the all-absorbing (perhaps in the end the only) topic of philosophical interest.

These contrasts may help to make clearer what I mean by saying that reading is the root metaphor of scholasticism; they also offer some suggestive possibilities in the way of classifying movements in intellectual history, categories to be used in painting, with very broad brush-

strokes, the allegiance and methods of particular schools of thought and particular thinkers. Writing, as described above, is the root metaphor of postmodernity, and reading, that of the premodern scholastic, dominant in the West until the seventeenth century. Then, with Descartes, with Spinoza, with Locke, and above all with Kant, reading began gradually to be transformed into writing; and writing has been the dominant metaphor for our intellectual practices for at least the last half-century, coupled as it so often is in philosophy with what Alvin Plantinga (1990, 1992) has usefully called "creative antirealism."

More can be said about the intellectual practices that constitute the ideal type of scholastic reading. The first additional point to emphasize is the role of memory. If scholastic reading involves the kind of inexhaustibly repetitive rereading indicated here, then inevitably memorization of the text will often happen. A text can be reread or reheard only so often before it becomes stored in the memory to become recalled (reread) at will without further need for external stimuli. Scholastic readers, unlike postmodernist writers, will therefore have a large body of texts at memorial command. But although such memorial storage would occur anyway, as a by-product of the ordinary practices of scholastic reading, it typically will be actively sought and inculcated through the intentional use of mnemotechnical devices. As Paul Zumthor and Mary Carruthers have shown for Christians in medieval Europe and Paul Demiéville (245–257) for medieval Buddhists involved in the translation of Sanskrit works into Chinese, and as Jonathan Spence has entertainingly dramatized in the case of the Jesuit Matteo Ricci in China in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, large bodies of material can be stored and recalled with relative ease and rapidity by scholastic readers trained in the use of such devices. The ideal-typical community of scholastic readers will therefore harbor virtuosos of the arts of memory and will require even of its nonvirtuoso members feats of memory that are almost unbelievable to, and certainly unattainable by, most contemporary writers.

Use of the memorial arts is important for scholastic readers for more than these practical reasons, however. For such readers the ideally–read text is the memorized text, and the ideal mode of reading is by memorial recall. This is because a text whose potential for being understood and used is both inexhaustible and nonconventional, intrinsic to it and endlessly extractable from it, is worth inscribing on the tablets of the memory where neither moth nor rust can damage or destroy it, and where the only threat to its continued availability for reading and rereading is also a threat to the continued existence of its reader. Ezekiel's eating of the prophetic scroll is a representation of the kind of incorporation and internalization involved in scholastic reading: the

text is ingested, incorporated, used for nourishment, and becomes the basis for action. And here again the contrast with the practices of those writers who presently dominate the academy is very striking: the memorial arts are scarcely used or recommended by them because their ideal is not retention but production, and ideally production that gives the illusion of being *ex nihilo*. Consider, as illustrative of this difference, the following view of the importance of memory, found in Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon* (iii. 11), composed around 1120:

> We should, therefore, collect together brief and reliable portions (*breve aliquid et certum colligere*) of all that we study and consign them to the treasure-chest of the memory (*arcula memoriae*) so that later, when there is need, we might derive the remainder [of what we have studied] from them. We ought often to replicate these [portions], and bring them out from the stomach of the memory (*de ventre memoriae*) to be savored, so that they will not be lost by long inattention. So I ask you, reader, not to rejoice immoderately if you have been able to read much; and if you have been able to understand much not to rejoice because of the extent of your understanding, but rather because of what you have been able to retain. For otherwise there is benefit neither in much reading nor in much understanding.

The necessary condition for all other fruits of scholastic reading, according to Hugh, is placing what has been read in the treasure-chest of the memory. Only when it is there can it be ruminated over at leisure; and only then can it issue in understanding. Any other kind of reading is mere passing the time, running one's eyes over words in a daze of impatience. Hugh's claims about memorization suggest that he takes it to have a moral significance, and he is entirely right to do so. A memorized text—like a lover, a friend, a spouse, a child—has entered into the fabric of its possessor's intellectual and emotional life in a way that makes deep claims upon that life, claims that can be ignored only with effort and deliberation. Just as spouses make claims upon one another that can be ignored or removed only with pain and intentional action (in divorce), so also memorized texts are present and efficacious until uprooted. In this they differ at least in degree, and probably also in kind, from texts that have been read only as a contemporary academic reader reads. Those texts sit inert upon the shelf, usually forgotten, and if remembered at all remembered not for their flavor and fabric, but for their title and place of publication. The claims of such texts are minimal; the claims of memorized texts are maximal and properly moral.

Scholastic reading and its concomitant memorization need not, of course, always be presented in a positive light. One of the most horrifying portraits of obsessive monomaniacal madness in twentieth-century

literature is that of the fictional Peter Kien in Elias Canetti's *Die Blendung* (variously translated into English as *The Tower of Babel* and *Auto-da-Fé*). Kien is the apotheosis of the scholastic reader and mnemonic artist, as the following sketch of his mnemonic capacities makes clear:

> He did indeed carry in his head a library as well provided and as reliable as his actual library . . . he could sit at his writing desk and sketch out a treatise down to the minutest detail without turning over a single page, except in his head. Naturally he would check quotations and sources later out of the books themselves; but only because he was a man of conscience. He could not remember any single occasion on which his memory had been found at fault. His very dreams were more precisely defined than those of most people. Blurred images without form or colour were unknown in any of the dreams which he had hitherto recollected. In his case night had no power to turn things topsy turvy; the noises he heard could be exactly referred to their cause of origin; conversations into which he entered were entirely reasonable; everything retained its normal meaning. It was outside his sphere to examine the probable connection between the accuracy of his memory and the lucidity of his dreams. (Canetti 1982:20)

In Canetti's novel the scholastic reader's mind is shown becoming coextensive with what he has read, becoming exclusively textualized, which means that any intrusion of a nonbookish reality—a reality that cannot be read and memorized—must end in disaster. Kien's lucid dreams and his eidetic memory for words on a page are no match for the destructive capacities of calculating stupidity. Kien ends in madness: he and his library are burned. Canetti's novel is much more (and much less) than a parable about the fate of scholastic readers; it was first published in 1935 and must be understood in part as a reflection of the European political situation at that time. But it can be read usefully as a dramatic (and unremittingly negative) presentation of scholastic reading, as a *reductio* of the ideal-typical sketch given to this point. The *Kopfbibliothek*, like all other human creations, can be demonic as well as life giving; but that this is so does not call into question my earlier claim that memorization creates a moral relation between text and reader that is unique, profound, and transformative. Stocking the *Kopfbibliothek* is the proper end of scholastic reading and the best possible basis for the composition of commentaries.

A final point is that the works in a scholastic reader's well-stocked memorial library are unlikely to be individuated in the same way as the physical objects on a library shelf. The content of a book—a physical object—is bounded both physically (by its covers) and legally (by

copyright law). The content of a memorized work is not necessarily so bounded; indeed, the mnemotechnical devices used to make possible the memorization and easy retrieval of large quantities of material work against such bounding and sit more easily with fluidity. This is because text must be broken up into relatively small units in order to be stored in memory in the appropriate way, and these, together with the ordering schemata used to make their retrieval possible, are likely to be the basic units of the scholastic memorial library. Divisions among works will therefore tend to be of less importance than they are for a print-dominated culture, though there may be reasons in particular scholastic communities for paying attention to the boundaries of particular works, reasons that counteract the opposing tendencies of scholastic reading.

The entire body of text that constitutes a scholastic reader's library, as a result of scholastic reading practices, ideal-typically will be treated as a single fabric composed of interlocking parts that can be retrieved and recombined variously as occasion demands, without respect to the fact that they may have come from different works. The label often used for this state of affairs is *intratextuality*; George Lindbeck (1984:113–24), Francis Clooney (1993:77–118), and Daniel Boyarin (1990) provide some useful discussion of this idea. According to a strong version of it, every element of a given body of texts becomes part of the interpretive context within which every other element is read and understood, so that scholastic readers read, recall, and teach what is functionally a single text, even if one that is internally differentiated, composed of works that may have come from the minds of different authors at different times. The presence of this kind of intratextuality in the reading practices of ideal-typical scholastic readers has its effects upon their compositional practices, and to these I now turn.

Scholastic Composition

Scholastic reading as just sketched is connected very closely with scholastic composition: it is difficult for ideal-typical scholastics to separate the one from the other since they are related symbiotically. The very practices that constitute scholastic reading are themselves also compositional practices, as John Dagenais (1994), in his study of the *Libro du buen amor*, a fourteenth-century Spanish work on (among other things) the arts of love, has pointed out. He has coined a useful term for this intimate linkage: *lecturature*—reading that is also composition. The term serves to emphasize what has already been suggested here, that scholastic reading is typically not passive, not done with the

principal goal of amassing information or sharpening writerly skills. It is done, instead, for the purpose of altering the course of the readers' cognitive, affective, and active lives by ingesting, digesting, ruminating over, and restating what is read, and the ways in which these goals are met have direct and obvious effects upon what and how scholastic readers compose.

The first such effect comes from the fact that lecturature typically involves the use of mnemotechnical devices of various kinds, since part of its active involvement with the work being read will require that work to be stored in memory in such a way that it can be retrieved easily and rapidly. This in turn often will require that the text be divided into bite-sized pieces (recall Hugh of St. Victor's words quoted earlier), and then that these pieces be ordered according to an artificial schema so that they can be retrieved almost instantly. Very long and complex works can be memorized in this way and specific parts recalled and redisplayed almost instantly; the point of such devices is precisely to prevent readers from having to suffer a sequential turning of the pages of the whole of a work engraved on their memories in order to retrieve a particular section of it. This could be a very lengthy process if the chunk of text needed occurs at the end of a long, memorized work. However, if the work is divided into gobbets (as undergraduates at Oxford still call the short sections of Greek and Latin texts they are asked to translate to demonstrate their linguistic competence—the use of such a term in such a context is almost certainly a survival from forgotten mnemotechnical practices), and the gobbets then ordered by devices that have nothing to do with the content of the work, any gobbet can be retrieved and redisplayed as rapidly as any other.

This aspect of lecturature explains (or goes a good way toward explaining) some typical scholastic compositions, compositions in genres whose existence and function is otherwise difficult to understand (and which, for precisely that reason, are largely ignored as barbaric and incomprehensible artifacts by contemporary Western scholarship).

One such is what in the West has been called the the "bouquet of flowers," *florilegium*—small but fragrant textual blooms—culled from many different works and arranged into a new work for the delectation and improvement of other readers. The blooms thus culled may be arranged topic-wise, or according to some other ordering principle, perhaps one given by the demands of the techniques of memorization; but however they are arranged, little or no attention will be paid to the integrity of the works from which they are drawn.

This kind of scholastic reading / composition survived in the West for a long time, though in attenuated form, in the habit of keeping commonplace books in which readers would note down, for delectation,

digestion, and rumination, juicy morsels from their reading, and would keep and return to these feasts for subsequent ethical, religious, and aesthetic improvement. Another example is the *catena,* a kind of commentary upon Scripture that began to be produced in the Greek church in Palestine from the sixth century A.D. onwards and continued to be a popular form for almost a thousand years (on this genre see Gilles Dorival, 1984). These are commentaries on a book or books of the Bible that proceed by amassing relatively brief exegetical comments from a large number of authorities, extracting these from their original context (whether in a commentary or some other kind of work), and then "chaining" (hence *catena*) the extracts together following the section-by-section order of the biblical book under discussion.

The composition both of *florilegia* and of *catenae* makes perfect sense if those who compose such works use mnemotechnical devices as part of their normal reading practice and if those devices require that works read be stored in small pieces. In such a case, the stored pericopes will be capable of easy recall from storage independently of their location in a larger work (which is not to say that such location is forgotten by or irrelevant to scholastic readers) and therefore capable of recombination in an infinite variety of ways—hence florilegia and catenae and their like. Hence also, I suggest, the importance of commentary to scholastic readers and scholastic composers. Commentary is the archetypical and basic scholastic genre; here I can only say of it that both the ethical and the practical demands of memorization suggest that composing commentaries will be important. Ethically, as already suggested, writing a work upon the pages of the memory gives it an importance that can be given it by no other kind of reading; such importance consists in large part on the demand it makes on scholastic readers by its presence in their memories, a demand that can be met in one way by composing a commentary. Practically, the presence of the whole work in the memory, coupled with its storage in the form of gobbets, any one of which can be recalled and juxtaposed to any other, will suggest and enable the composition of commentaries that have two important formal features, both of which are typical of scholastic commentaries. The first is that the scholastic commentary will take as its first object precisely the gobbets into which the work has been divided for memorizing, which means that it will treat in the first instance small units of the work, and only secondarily larger units or the work as a whole. The second is that a comment on any one of these gobbets will presuppose knowledge of them all and may be incomprehensible without such knowledge.

Scholastic lecturature, then, most often will produce commentaries and formally similar artifacts such as florilegia and catenae. What

technology is it most likely to use for its compositional purposes? It may, but need not, use writing (in the ordinary sense of making marks on some physical medium of storage) as its principal tool; it is equally likely to use some combination of mnemonic and oral technique. Although making scratch marks on paper or using a keyboard seem to most late-twentieth-century writers quite indispensable as tools of composition, especially for long or complex works, there is much evidence to suggest that this was not so (and is not so) for scholastic communities. The connection between writing (in the ordinary sense) and composition is at best a contingent one. Instances of the looseness of such a connection—and of the fact that a particular technology need not become dominant as soon as introduced, nor have the same significance in all cultural settings, *pace* Walter Ong, Jack Goody, and others—easily can be found in the premodern world. But a more contemporary example may help to drive home the extent to which composition can proceed without writing even when writing is easily available and a culturally standard technology of composition.

Charles Dickens used, at the period in his career when he was working on *Hard Times* (in the 1840s), quite frequently to compose and deliver political speeches, usually in support of reforms in the system of public education. Peter Ackroyd (1990:423), in his biography of Dickens, describes how these speeches were usually composed and delivered:

> Dickens never made or kept notes but seemed to speak spontaneously and effortlessly, all the more extraordinary since the speeches themselves are as graceful and as fluent as anything he ever wrote . . . he had an astonishing verbal memory. He did not make notes because he memorised everything he wished to say, and this for speeches that lasted some twenty or thirty minutes. Even after he had finished, he could still repeat what he had said verbatim to reporters anxious for 'clean' copy. . . . How did he achieve this? The morning before he was due to speak, he would take a long walk and in the course of that journey he would decide what topics he was going to raise. He would put these in order, and in his imagination construct a cartwheel of which he was the hub and the various subjects the spokes emanating from him to the circumference; "during the progress of the speech," he said, "he would deal with each spoke separately, elaborating them as he went round the wheel; and when all the spokes dropped out one by one, and nothing but the tire and space remained, he would know that he had accomplished his task, and that his speech was at an end." . . . One of his closest friends noticed that at public dinners he did indeed "dismiss the spoke from his mind by a quick action of the finger as if he were knocking it away.

Dickens' political speeches, for the most part, had no existence as written texts until verbatim written records of his spoken words were made by newspaper reporters present at their delivery. These speeches were composed mentally, stored mnemonically, and delivered orally, using techniques known and written about in the West at least since the *Ad Herennium*, traditionally attributed to Cicero. I mention Dickens here not because he is an ideal-typical scholastic, but rather to signal the possible endurance and use of such techniques even when they are separated from an attitude to texts that best grounds them and gives them sense. Dickens was a member of the last, or perhaps the penultimate, generation of Western intellectuals to have made much use of these techniques; they have not survived in the intellectual life of the twentieth century.

Scholastic compositional practice, I suggest, bearing this Dickensian example in mind, requires techniques both for composition and for storage. But it does not require writing (in the ordinary sense) for either, and is likely, given some of the assumptions sketched above, to lean more heavily toward the use of thought and speech as the principal tools of composition, and toward memorization as the principal tool of storage.

There are important contrasts with the technologies of composition and storage favored by contemporary Western academics. From the sixteenth to the late twentieth century our technologies of storage have been print centered and our technologies of composition have focused upon the making of marks on paper. It has become part of the ordinary mental furniture of academics and intellectuals of all kinds to think of a text as only the kind of thing that is composed on paper and in solitude, then printed, and finally stored to be reread, cited, dissected, and analyzed at will. The trope of the solitary writer is, like that of the innocent child, a cliché, but one found everywhere from high to popular culture; it is mirrored in our copyright laws and publication practices. Academic assent to all this is evident in our views as to the sanctity of authorship and its concomitant, the heinousness of plagiarism, as well as in the ways that we assess, evaluate, and reward one another. The key measures of our worth are the volume of our publication and the extent to which that publication is cited by others. Both measures are predicated upon compositional techniques that require paper and storage techniques that require print, as they also are upon a strong view as to the proper boundaries of texts and their proper relations to authors.

All this is changing at the end of the twentieth century as electronic technologies for composition and storage become increasingly

dominant. I shall not venture prophecies as to the future of these technologies and their effects upon academic practice and academic views about reading, writing, and authorship, as well as upon the legalities of copyright and publication. But it is clear that their use comports very well with the intellectual life understood through the metaphor of writing as described above; and the quotation given earlier from Fredric Jameson makes the connection quite explicit. But whether print- and paper-centered technologies maintain their dominance, or whether they gradually vanish in favor of electronic technologies, one central and irreducible difference between Western academic practice and ideal-typical scholastic practice will remain. Western academics see their texts as without intrinsic value, as instruments to be consumed and discarded, or consumed and stored, just as are automobiles. The mnemonic arts are irrelevant, and the modes of reading, already discussed, that foster those arts are a positive drawback. Indeed, scholastic reading is best understood as intrinsically opposed to (perhaps even incompatible with) the dominance of technologies intended to maximize the flow of information, of consumable and discardable semantic units. There are causal connections of complex kinds between the rise of print technology from the sixteenth century onward and the decline in scholastic reading; and while the axiological and epistemological implications of the rise of computer technology in the last fifteen years are in many important respects different from those of print technology, the two technologies share a profound lack of hospitality to scholastic reading and scholastic composition. If anything, the more recent electronic technologies are less hospitable to scholastic reading than the older print technology—and much less than manuscript technology.

I do not suggest that the presence of these technologies in Western academic culture is the sole determinant of the decline of scholastic reading and composition in that culture. Just as writing by itself does not have the transformative power attributed to it by its apologists, so also print or electronic technology must be placed in a certain cultural context and combined with other variables in that context before it can become dominant. It also follows from these considerations that those who wish to preserve or recover scholastic habits in contemporary Western academia need not forswear the use of print or electronic technologies altogether. But such individuals must pay close attention to the ways in which such technologies are used. The technologies should be closely circumscribed servants rather than lively masters, and it may be that such circumscription, given the power of conformist and consumerist pressures in academia, will be difficult to maintain.

Scholastic Epistemology

Scholastic reading, as described to this point, implies an epistemology, a particular set of views as to how knowledge is to be gained, maintained, and extended. Any intellectual practice has such implications, so it is scarcely surprising that this particular practice has them. But what are they in this case?

Suppose we begin by using a distinction now standard in anglophone epistemology: the distinction between internalist and externalist epistemologies, made clear in the recent work of William Alston (1991) and Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b). Epistemological theories typically are interested in distinguishing between instances of belief that are not well-grounded and that as a result have no claim to be called (or to issue in) "knowledge," on the one hand, and instances of belief that are well grounded and that therefore do have some such claim, on the other. For instance: I may believe that I can generate reliable beliefs about the course of future events by consulting the entrails of properly sacrificed goats. Most Western academics (certainly most anglophone epistemologists) would tend to say that beliefs about the course of future events generated in this way lack the property or properties that might give them claim to be called "knowledge." By contrast, I may believe that I can generate reliable beliefs about what Boris Yeltsin said in discussion with Bill Clinton last night, even though he speaks no English and I no Russian, by consulting a report of the conversation given in *The New York Times*. Many, perhaps most, anglophone epistemologists would be more likely to think that beliefs generated in this way are of a kind such that they should be considered knowledge. The debate then centers upon what account to give of the property or properties that distinguish beliefs of the first kind from beliefs of the second kind.

Internalist epistemologies typically claim that the property in question (it might be called "warrant" or "justification" or something similar) is internal to those who have the beliefs under discussion, something to which they have special access: they have had the proper experience, say, or have constructed or understood the proper argument, and to both of these facts the subject is a better witness than anyone else. Internalism in epistemology goes nicely with deontology: I may be justified (warranted) in believing that *p*, on such views, if (and perhaps only if) I have fulfilled my epistemic obligations or duties. As Plantinga (1993a:29) puts it:

> Justification, internalism, and epistemic deontology are properly seen as a closely related triumvirate: internalism flows from deontology and is unmotivated without it, and justification is at bottom and originally a deontological notion.

For the internalist, then, what counts is whether we have fulfilled our epistemic duties; and we can tell whether we have by, paradigmatically, an act of introspection, an act that will, if we are properly attentive, tell us whether, as John Locke puts it in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (ch. 17, sec. 24), we are like someone who "believes or disbelieves, according as Reason directs him," or whether we are like someone who "transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence."

Internalism in epistemology is, then, evidentialist, deontological, and (usually) radically individualist: one can tell whether one has fulfilled one's epistemic duties simply in virtue of one's generically human intellectual equipment.

Externalist views are quite different. They claim that what makes a particular instance of believing justified or warranted is something external to believers, some process or method of arriving at the belief in question that is not internal to them, and may not be known, understood, or controlled by them. Perhaps the most common kind of externalist epistemology is reliabilism: the view that believers are justified (warranted) in believing that *p* if and only if a particular instance of believing that *p* possesses the property of being produced by a reliable belief-forming practice or mechanism. Externalist views allow (indeed, require) a distinction between a belief's having been produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism (sometimes called, in the trade, a "doxastic practice"), and this fact being known to a believer. One very well may have beliefs that have been so produced and that are reliable in virtue of having been so produced and yet not know this fact; or if one does know it, one need not be able to give an account of just what it is about the doxastic practice in question that makes it reliable. It may be (though it is not) the case that consulting the entrails of properly sacrificed goats is a reliable way of arriving at beliefs about the course of future events; an externalist need not require of those who perform such a practice the ability to know that it is reliable, much less why, in order for it to produce (largely) true beliefs for them. Externalist epistemologies, then, are typically nonevidentialist, antideontological (if being deontological requires not just that one has fulfilled one's epistemic duties, but that part of fulfilling them includes knowing that one has done so—as in the case of Locke), and nonindividualist (since individuals need not be—usually will not be—the final court of appeal on the question of whether and why particular beliefs are justified).

Scholastics typically will be externalist in epistemology. It should be obvious why. They will, explicitly or implicitly, hold the view that proper scholastic reading is among the belief-forming practices that

usually produce true beliefs—and perhaps that it is an indispensable such practice. They will think that patterns of reasoning and the knowledge produced by them are constitutively and necessarily tradition-specific; that engaging in them is best likened to the performance of a complex skill; and that, concomitantly, the idea that some particular set of patterns of reasoning or some particular set of claims to knowledge ought to be universally comprehensible to all human persons just in virtue of some generically human intellectual equipment (a typical concomitant of internalist epistemologies) is as silly as the idea that the finer points of fugal composition ought to be so available. According to views like this, knowledge is understood as available only to those who have troubled to learn the skills necessary for access to it, and such skills can be learned only within the bounds of a set of tradition-based practices. These practices might be of many kinds; an obvious candidate would be exposure to the proper ways of reading or hearing the right texts. And this, naturally, is where scholastic practice comes in, for it is likely to be the case that scholastic readers will see their modes of reading as at least a necessary condition for the development of proper understanding. If tradition-specific reading skills are not practiced, then much knowledge (and probably the most important knowledge) simply will be unavailable. This is a typical pattern of epistemological reasoning implied by scholastic practice.

Postmodernist writers and scholastic readers are likely to have common ground here, and as a result may find themselves able to join forces against the tattered remnants of modernity, much as radical feminists and conservative Christians find themselves able to join forces against purveyors of pornography. The reason is that internalist epistemologies fit well with neither perspective. Such epistemologies require a stability and givenness to world and individual that the former cannot grant, and they require an optimism about the generic untrained intellectual capacities of human persons that is ruled out by the latter. This is one of the few signs of hope for the recovery of scholasticism in the contemporary Western academy. Internalist epistemologies are no longer dominant therein, largely because of the attacks of postmodernist critics; and once the individualism and foundationalism of internalism has been abandoned, there is at least conceptual room for the recovery of scholastic practice.

This is one of several points of convergence between scholastic reading and postmodernist writing, a fact which I am not alone in realizing. Fredric Jameson (1991), once again, makes the same point, though inchoately, in a number of ways: he acknowledges that serious religious thinkers such as John Howard Yoder (a Mennonite whom, interestingly, he wrongly characterizes as an "Amish pacifist" [391]) may

properly be understood to have serious affinities with postmodernism. And he sees the surface similarities between the literary and intellectual practices of postmodernist writers and (those whom I am calling) scholastic readers:

> Commentary indeed makes up the special field of postmodern linguistic practice generally, and its originality, at least with respect to the pretensions and illusions of philosophy in the preceding period, of "bourgeois" philosophy, that with some secular pride and confidence set out to say what things really were after the long night of superstition and the sacred. Commentary, however, also—in that curious play of historical identity and difference mentioned above—now secures the kinship of the postmodern (at least in this respect) with other, hitherto more archaic, periods of thought and intellectual labor, as with the medieval copyists and scribes, or the endless exegesis of the great Oriental philosophies and sacred texts. (393)

More laconically: postmodernism is an ersatz scholasticism whose literary and intellectual practices make sense and provide nourishment only if they become religious. Recall Geoffrey Hartman's comments upon Midrashic practice, quoted earlier. The partial agreement of postmodernist writers and scholastic readers at the level of epistemology and literary practice allows, as mentioned earlier, conceptual room for the re-establishment of scholastic practice inside the contemporary academy. But the technological considerations already mentioned are at least as important as these purely theoretical ones in deciding whether it is realistic to imagine the rebirth of scholasticism; and institutional and cultural factors also will play an important part, so it is to these that I now shall now turn.

Scholastic Institutions

The institutional requirements of scholastic practice are relatively simple. Scholastic communities, I suggest, are typically stable, authoritarian, communitarian, and leisured, and such communities have obvious institutional needs if they are to come into existence and to endure. Let us begin with authority. By this I mean, minimally, the presence of some acknowledged constraints upon what and how scholastic readers should read, as well as (by entailment) upon the kinds of conclusions that properly can be drawn and taught from this reading. Authority of this kind is, of course, present in all human discursive practices—even those of modernist readers who, following a broadly Cartesian epistemology, might in unguarded moments think of themselves as freely

deciding what they will read and drawing their own unfettered conclusions from this reading. But even though such authority is always present, its presence is not always acknowledged; it is part of modernist error in almost all fields of intellectual enterprise to refuse to acknowledge it, and to think, instead, of modernist intellectual practices as self-constituting and self-founding, and so as standing in no need of external authority to constrain their pursuit and outcome. Jeffrey Stout, in his *Flight from Authority* (1981), has traced this refusal of acknowledgement in ethics with great lucidity. A similar story could be told in jurisprudence, political theory, and epistemology. Scholastic readers, then, may not differ from modernist readers in the extent to which their reading is constrained by authority; but they typically will differ one from another in the extent to which such constraint is acknowledged, and, often, in the substance of the convictions underwriting the exercise of authority.

As a result, scholastic readers typically will be clear about the fact that their reading practices presuppose a select list of works worth reading, things that must be read, as well as a concomitant (and much longer) list of works not worth reading, things that ought not be read. The ideal type of such an approved list is the canon; its complement is the index (in the sense of *index librorum prohibitorum*). Scholastic readers typically will openly embrace both. Such open embracing may, but need not, go with sanctions of various kinds against those who refuse to read the canon and instead delve into what is prohibited by the index. Such sanctions, extending even to the extreme sanction of murder, have been used, for instance, from time to time by some institutions. But the use of such is not a necessary part of the open acknowledgment of the presence of constraining authority and so not intrinsic to the ideal type of scholasticism.

The constraining authority also may work itself out in various particular ways: a papal pronouncement ex cathedra is distinct, institutionally speaking, from the pronouncements of a university syllabus revision committee as to what must be read in order to gain a doctoral degree; and both are distinct from teachings given by the Dalai Lama as to whether a particular doctrine is or is not properly Buddhist, or decisions issued by a federal appeals court as to whether a particular publication is or is not obscene. So the ideal type is compatible with a wide variety of particular institutional forms; but some kind of acknowledged authority will be present in every kind of scholastic practice.

I said at the outset that the word *scholasticism* in contemporary spoken English connotes a discourse based upon authority, a discourse whose axioms are unquestioned and unquestionable. This is not, as I understand it, a necessary feature of the ideal type of scholastic reading.

Scholastics may, but need not, be committed to the view that the deliverances of their source or sources of authority are self-validating. There are many possibilities here, too many to canvass in detail. One is that the constraining authority may provide only procedural constraints rather than substantive ones. Another is that the deliverances of the constraining authority might contain within themselves, or even be partly constituted by, recursive rules of self-correction. So the tight link between the connotations of 'scholasticism' in everyday English and the use of a self-validating source of authority need to be moderated somewhat.

It also should be obvious that and how the acknowledged presence of constraining authority in scholastic practice coheres with scholastic epistemology as described in the immediately preceding section of this chapter. If, ideal-typically, scholastic practice suggests an externalist epistemology and is therefore likely to understand itself as a reliable belief-forming practice, then the acknowledged presence of an authority constraining the lineaments of that practice will simply be one more element in what constitutes this particular way of reliably forming true beliefs.

With authority, again ideal-typically, will go community and tradition. Scholastic readers do not read in isolation, either synchronically or diachronically. Their practices presuppose and engage with those who already have done what they are doing: hence tradition. And they are directed at and responsive to a community of those now doing what they also are doing: hence pedagogy. This fact explains the typical products of scholastic lecturature and florilecture as these already have been discussed: commentary is vital because it, more than any other genre, is open about its conversation with the pre-existing canon that scholastic reading presupposes; and florilegia, digests, compilations, and the like are evidence of the pedagogical engagement of scholastic readers with their present community.

Communities with a past require an institutional form; this is especially true of communities partly comprised of individuals with the leisure to engage in scholastic reading, for this practice is extremely labor intensive. It cannot be done only on weekends, and it is not a hobby. Its ideal setting, perhaps, is the monastery, for in monasteries there are communities of people for whom distractions from scholastic reading may be minimized (even if in actual monasteries they rarely are). But this means that the institutional presence of communities of scholastic readers, what George Steiner (1989:3–49) usefully has called "houses of reading," requires a social order in which there are resources free for the support of materially nonproductive people and a will to use them in that fashion. And this is the most important institutional requirement for scholastic practice: the existence of groups of leisured in-

dividuals, self-consciously communitarian and traditional, open about their constraint by authority, and committed to gaining the kind of moral relation to texts produced by repetitive reading and memorization. Literacy, in the sense of the ability to make and interpret marks on some enduring medium of storage, is unimportant by comparison.

Historically, the most obvious instances of a social order committed to providing such conditions have been medieval Europe and Tibet from the fourteenth through the early twentieth centuries. In both of these some of the most powerful institutions were the monasteries, in which at least some people were scholastic readers; and in both (perhaps more important) the ideal of being such was taken seriously enough that there was little argument about the importance of devoting resources to this purpose. But Tibet is now an "autonomous" province of the People's Republic of China and the monasteries of Europe are either gone, casualties of the Reformation, or greatly reduced, casualties of the Industrial Revolution and the rise and incipient decay of consumerist capitalism. Where then to look?

Contemporary late capitalist cultures do see fit to devote a small part of their resources to the support of institutions in which scholastic readers might flourish. These institutions are called "universities," to use the most generic term; I mean those places in which the idea that some people ought to be supported in spending most of their time reading and writing is given institutional form. This is not, of course, the only function that universities have or take themselves to have (Pierre Bourdieu usefully explores others in *Homo Academicus* [1984]). But it is a real function.

Western universities have their roots in twelfth-century Europe (Paris, Bologna, and a little later Oxford) and were given stimulus by the Renaissance and a final prod by the development of the German research universities in the nineteenth century. There are, perhaps, now a hundred or so of these institutions in the world, with the highest concentration to be found in Western Europe and North America. There is in addition a much larger number of institutions whose central reason for being is not to support people in the practice of reading and writing, but rather to train people for the performance of functions useful to late capitalist societies. These too sometimes call themselves universities, but their emphasis is different. And there are many mixed cases in which it is difficult to be sure where the central emphasis lies. All of these institutions are presently under more or less social and financial pressure to shift their emphasis away from supporting otherwise nonproductive readers and writers and toward the training of individuals with skills useful for production and consumption. But it remains unclear what the results of these pressures will be, since

there are (perhaps equally strong) pressures pointing in the other direction, encouraging traditionally vocational and teaching institutions to become more like universities. I am not in the business of prediction, though, nor in that of defending the propriety of classifying any particular institution as belonging to one or another kind. All I need for my current argument is the unexceptionable descriptive claim that there are some institutions of the kind mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph.

That there are such institutions is a small sign of hope for those who might want to recover scholastic practice. It means that some of the institutional requirements for such practice can be met: there are places in which leisure and community are theoretically (and sometimes actually) available. Historically, and until the very recent past, the epistemology dominant in these institutions has made scholastic practice difficult. Modernist theories of knowledge, of the person, and of reading, are, as explained earlier, largely incompatible with scholastic reading. There have been special difficulties with the open acknowledgment of constraint by authority that is characteristic of scholasticism. But this could change. The effective demise of modernist epistemologies centered upon a putatively autonomous subject makes it no longer possible to mount a convincing and coherent theoretical argument against the desirability of scholastic practice as described here, and that this is both the case and widely acknowledged to be the case suggests that one of the major obstacles to the recovery of scholastic practice is no longer present.

Therefore, the intentional recovery of scholastic reading by those working in Western universities may now be possible. What, concretely, might this mean? First, it is important to re-emphasize that scholastic reading requires that there be a tradition of such already in place before it can occur. And there are not many actual traditions of reading available within which scholastic practice might take place, perhaps no more than half a dozen. Most of these are religious: Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Marxism, and perhaps others. These already have in place many of the institutional requirements mentioned in this chapter: canon, index, community, tradition, and so forth. Some of them preserve vestigial houses of reading (monasteries, yeshivas, seminaries, and the like), but most have largely abdicated that function, or no longer have the resources to maintain it effectively. Universities might well—to some extent they already do—provide a home for scholastic readers who are Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, and the like. Such readers, insofar as they can be found in universities at the moment, tend to lead a double life, cloaking their identity in the tattered garments of a *wissenschaftlich* modernity. There is, I suggest, no theoretical reason to maintain such

disguises and good theoretical and ethical reasons not to do so. Scholastic readers, actual or aspiring, in any of these traditions both can and should be public about their identity as such.

The difficulties for those who come out of the closet, as it were, are likely not to be strictly theoretical but rather broadly cultural. The culture of contemporary academia is largely predicated upon an instrumentalist attitude to texts, upon a cult of individualism and novelty, and upon the uses of kinds of technology that make scholastic reading difficult or impossible. It also tends to assume without argument the validity and desirability of a particular and highly ideological version of liberalism, a liberalism that is individualistic both in religion and in politics, foundationalist and rationalist in philosophy, and rights-based and consequentialist in ethics. Specifically, this tends to mean that universities reflect the suspicion of their ambient culture about public professions of religious faith that also involve claims as to how intellectual work ought to be done, how public policy decisions ought to be made, how pedagogy ought to be practiced, and so forth. And, most of all, ideological liberalism tends to be suspicious of reference to authority as part of such claims. Insofar as such ideological liberalism attempts to maintain a foundationalist epistemology as the basis for a critique of scholastic practice it will fail; and in fact such critiques are made less and less frequently. Much more common is the attempt to rule such practice out of the public sphere by the exercise of legislative power (Michael McConnell has discussed this in two useful essays [1993a, 1993b]), or to attempt to rule it out by ornate rhetorical expressions of dislike or disgust without argument (as Richard Rorty [1994] does in responding to Stephen Carter's work).

These broadly cultural facts have a great deal of power, even if they cannot be given a coherent defense. It remains as a result unclear to what extent, if at all, Western universities—which are, historically and still to a large extent in practice, part of what Ernest Gellner (1994:9) usefully has called "that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role as keeper of the peace and arbitrator among major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society"—will prove capable of providing a home for scholastic readers. That they would be the better for doing so is fairly clear. Scholastic reading, pedagogy, and composition are preferable, both ethically and epistemologically, to the largely instrumentalist, consumerist, individualist, and in the end incoherent intellectual practices of the other two important players in the field: the earnest and unreconstructed modernist and the dedi-

cated and playful postmodernist (both of whom will tend to be ideological liberals in matters of public policy). But I am not optimistic that Western universities will be able to muster the intellectual energy to acknowledge and support professed scholastics in their practice as such. And since the only other possibility—the houses of reading supported by religious institutions—seems even less likely to have the resources or the will, the outlook, on the whole, is not promising. But the future is hard to predict, and whatever may happen, either to universities or to religious houses of reading, it is at least clear what ought to happen.

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Conclusion

José Ignacio Cabezón

In the Introduction I set forth as the principal goal of this volume the continuing cultural decontextualization[1] of the category of scholasticism. Recognizing that such a process must have a starting point, I offered my earlier reflection on the traits exemplified by the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition heuristically as a point of departure. Given that much of the discussion that follows will presume this list of characteristics, let me rehearse it briefly. Scholasticism, as I conceived of it in my early research, evinces (1) a strong sense of tradition, (2) a concern with language (with scripture, and with language generally as a medium of expression), (3) proliferativity, by which I mean the tendency to include rather than to exclude (texts, categories, lists, etc.), (4) completeness (the tendency of the tradition to conceive of itself as overlooking nothing that is religiously essential) and compactness (its claim to contain nothing unessential), (5) the belief that the universe is epistemologically accessible, (6) a commitment to systematicity, which is the attempt at recapitulating in the written word the basic orderliness found in the world, (7) rationalism, a commitment to reasoned argument and the avoidance of contradiction, (8) self-reflexivity, the tendency to objectify and then to subject to critical scrutiny first-order practices such as exegesis and argumentation, yielding second-order forms of discourse such as hermeneutics and logic, respectively.

Let us now turn to the essays themselves to see how these traits have played themselves out, as it were. How do the different traditions treated in this volume exemplify, lack, amplify, suggest modifications

to, or challenge us to rethink the above list of characteristics. Put another way, let us contemplate what the cross-cultural decontextualization of the category *scholasticism* has taught us, what insights have emerged as a result of a broader, comparative treatment of the topic.

Like my own earlier work, many of the essays in this volume look to medieval European (especially Christian) scholasticism as the comparative mirror against which another tradition can be reflected. If for no other reason than that it is historically the institutional precursor of the academy in which we situate ourselves, the scholasticism of the Middle Ages represents for us—at some level—the familiar. And yet, for those of us whose research is focused principally on the intellectual world views of other cultures, European scholasticism exhibits a dimension of foreignness. Such foreignness can unwittingly lead the specialist in non-Western traditions to impute a unity and wholeness to the former. It is therefore fitting that Louis Roy's essay is first, as Roy challenges the notion that Latin scholasticism was a monoculturally pristine, self-emergent whole, untainted by heterocultural influences. This of course complexifies the picture considerably for the comparativist. On the one hand, it makes our comparative mirror (medieval Latin scholasticism)—and the reflection it produces—multiple: more like that found in an amusement park fun house than that on our wall at home. On the other hand, it forces us to ask ourselves whether the traditions that we wish to reflect on that mirror are themselves pure, monolithic wholes.

Roy's essay is rich in its characterization of the matrix out of which medieval scholasticism arose, an environment that stressed the study of Scripture, that promoted a unitary vision of the world, that emphasized the importance of liturgy, and that made abundant use of diverse symbols. Using grammar and logic as "stepping stones," Latin scholasticism emerged out of that matrix driven, on the one hand, by "a logical inquisitiveness inherited from the Greeks," and on the other, by the urge to respond to a variety of foreign voices (Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic) that were made available through renewed translation efforts in the middle of the twelfth century. With the texts of foreign cultures permitted to "speak for themselves," Latin scholasticism became a truly comparative enterprise. Roy then illustrates how such a comparative synthesis was accomplished in the writings of Albert the Great.

Perhaps the principal lesson to be learned from Roy's contribution is: that it is as important to reveal the texture of heterocultural influence by focusing the comparative lens intrasystemically, within a cultural sphere where actual historical contact can be documented, as it is to reveal the structural patterns of similarity and difference by focusing that lens intersystematically, across cultural spheres in a kind of

analysis where the presence or absence of actual historical contact is irrelevant.[2] Put another way, we can learn a great deal from a historical-philosophical analysis that reveals the comparative dimension within a "single" scholastic tradition, and even within the writings of a single scholastic author.

Daniel Madigan, like Louis Roy, offers us an analysis of scholasticism that is more historical than structural. Madigan analyzes the scholasticism of Islam, but as he points out, the boundaries of scholasticism in Islamic intellectual life are not always clear, given that the term has been applied to various schools and movements in Muslim history. To clarify the relationship of these various sub-traditions, he begins his essay with a useful historical overview of philosophical theology in Islam. In this regard it is interesting to note how in Islam different subtraditions will emphasize or downplay different traits (e.g., rationalism), thereby complexifying the issue of how—even within a single religious tradition—the boundaries of scholasticism are to be drawn. Like many of the other essays in this volume, moreover, Madigan's analysis also shows that even when a trait like rationalism is emphasized in a particular school, it often is evinced in a way that is different from its characterization in the above list. Hence, the use of reasoned argument by the *mutakallimûn* tends to be more constrained, more polemical, and perhaps more "performative" in tone than the use of reasoning in other scholastic traditions. But if the rationalist theology of the *mutakallimûn* evinces a more limited use of reasoning, Madigan points out that in the juridical theology of the legal *madhahib* of Sunni Islam "we find all the characteristic features of European scholasticism already in full bloom." Like Roy, Madigan challenges us not to overlook the rich texture of intrasystemic variety that is to be found when we contemplate a category such as scholasticism, even in the case of a single religious tradition.

Whereas several of the essays in this volume describe how scholastics worked comparatively with materials from other traditions to irenic and synthetic ends,[3] Daniel Madigan's discussion of the Islamic rationalist tradition reminds us that scholastics were also polemicists. Robert Goss takes up this same theme in his essay, where he focuses on the Catholic scholasticism of the eighteenth-century Jesuit missionary to Tibet, Ippolito Desideri. Tracing the development of Catholic scholasticism through its various phases, Goss is concerned first with contextualizing and elucidating the Jesuit "second scholasticism" in which Desideri was intellectually socialized. He then demonstrates the extent to which Desideri's scholastic educational background infiltrates his Tibetan writings: in genre, style, and content. Goss believes that it was the scholastic character of Desideri's writing—

its systematicity and its commitment to rational argumentation especially—that made it both accessible to and appreciated by his Tibetan dGe lugs pa interlocutors; and, conversely, it was the scholastic character of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy—both the theory and its practice in debate—that made this system of thought both approachable and, at least as far as its methodical precision and clarity were concerned, an object of Desideri's esteem.

Although his aims were apologetic—to make Christian doctrine intelligible and acceptable to Tibetan Buddhists—Desideri realized that this could not be accomplished apart from a hermeneutical engagement of the Buddhist material. This meant understanding Buddhist doctrine not only as object of critique, but also as medium of communication, for Desideri had no means of constructing that critique apart from its formulation in terms of Buddhist doctrinal categories. If, as Goss maintains, Desideri's scholastic background aided in this hermeneutical task, is it not possible that, whatever *our* motives as academics, we too, as inheritors of the scholastic world view,[4] benefit from our own—even if only latent—scholastic structures in *our* hermeneutical engagement of this material? The question of motives aside, the problems encountered by Desideri and the solutions he found do not seem nearly so distant or foreign when we contemplate them in this light.

Most of the contributors to this volume are concerned with issues of scholastic method or ideology. Michael Swartz's contribution to this volume also is concerned with demonstrating how Rabbinic Judaism exemplifies paradigmatically scholastic traits, such as preoccupation with commentary, dialectic, and the reconciliation of inconsistency. While interested in the similarities between Rabbinic Judaism and other forms of scholasticism, however, he also is attentive to differences. Hence, Swartz, like Clooney, points out that notions such as completeness and the tendency to abstraction are not exemplified in the same way, if at all, in every tradition. He also observes that Rabbinic Judaism is more concerned with intrasystemic polemic than with a polemic that is directed outward at an external opponent. By his elucidation of this pattern of semblance and contrast, Swartz thus offers us a nuanced treatment of Rabbinic Judaism's "familial" relation to other forms of scholasticism.

But in addition to being concerned with questions of scholastic method and ideology, Swartz also wishes to draw our attention to the more sociological dimension of scholasticism: "the living context of learning in scholastic cultures," a context populated by individuals situated in institutions that are part of a broader society. Concentrating on the form, rhetoric, and transmission histories of texts from the third to the sixth centuries, Swartz attempts to reconstruct the interplay of ideas

and their social context in Rabbinic Judaism. He shows, for example, how the authority of living teachers in classrooms is reinforced by their being placed in a scholastic lineage that begins with Moses, and how the depiction of scholars' interaction in texts serves as a model for the intellectual community in real life. More important, perhaps, is Swartz's consideration of the political consequences of Rabbinic scholasticism in its creation of "a class of scholarchs who has real influence over people's lives," a class of practical scholars not unlike the jurisconsults discussed by Madigan. By focusing our attention on issues of pedagogy, institutional ethos, politics, and even "scholastic magic," Swartz, like Madigan, forces us to consider the divergent ways in which scholasticism functioned socially, both internally and vis à vis the wider community. That this generally important insight should emerge out of, for example, the study of Judaism is of course no accident, for, as Swartz points out, the general scholastic tenor of Rabbinic Judaism is directed "to actions more than to thoughts."

Livia Kohn's essay on Taoism also takes up the theme of the social function of scholasticism, this time in Chinese society. She sees the rise of Taoist scholasticism in the Tang dynasty as "a direct function of the political unification and elevation of Taoism to the status of a major religious teaching," with the goal of making Taoism more accessible both to the court and to the society at large. Hence, it was a social requirement—at least in part—that propelled Taoists to strive for greater systematization of their tradition, a tendency that led to the emergence of a full-blown Taoist scholasticism. As with the Neo-Confucianism that Henderson treats in his essay, Kohn shows how Taoist scholasticism was a response to the challenge posed by Buddhism, with its relatively integrated metaphysical vision. As with the Christian appropriation of Aristotle during the Middle Ages, Taoism had an ambivalent relationship to its rival: though perceiving Buddhism as a competitor in the social sphere, Taoist scholastics were willing to borrow freely from this more highly developed system, incorporating Buddhist ideas such as Mādhyamaka logic and two-truth theory. Like other chapters in this book, Kohn's reflections thus reiterate the importance of a nuanced treatment of the interaction of scholastic traditions in history. Clearly, it is too facile to conceive of the scholastics' strong sense of tradition as leading them to an unequivocal rejection of the doctrines of competitors. When we do find Taoist texts responding polemically to a rival school, that polemic—like Desideri's against the dGe lugs pas—often is modulated by the fact that it incorporates Buddhist terminology and methods.

Kohn's contribution details how a variety of Taoist *texts* exemplify many of the scholastic attributes discussed above, but her essay is

equally concerned with the *personae* of scholastics themselves. In this regard, it is interesting that she should reiterate a theme raised by other contributors (Madigan, Swartz, and Henderson), namely, the position of scholastics in the political/social sphere. Their being situated in the court meant not only that the great Taoist scholastics of the Tang dynasty had a continuing influence on Chinese political and social life, but also that they themselves were "influenced by the evolving cultural and political climate." Focusing on the life and works of three Tang figures, much of Kohn's chapter is dedicated to demonstrating how Taoist scholastic thought changed in response to the historical shifts that occurred during the Tang dynasty. It is also worth noting that, like Swartz and Clooney, Kohn illuminates the importance of ritual to scholasticism, an aspect of social life that often has been overlooked in the treatment of elitist religious traditions like those of the scholastics.

As mentioned above, my own previous work in the area of comparative scholasticism focused almost exclusively on philosophy. My chapter in this volume thus represents a departure from my previous research, addressed as it is to the relationship between scholastic ideology and architecture. Using the work of the medievalist Erwin Panofsky as a springboard, I attempt to show how the social organization, art, and especially the architecture of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries recapitulates some of the features of the scholastic world view mentioned in the list above. Panofsky believed that many of the stylistic elements of the Gothic cathedral were the direct result of scholastic influence. Although mine is a slightly weaker hypothesis, I too believe that there exists a homology between scholastic ideology and the material culture in which it flourished. We know that many of Tibet's greatest scholastic minds played a considerable role in the building, restoration, and expansion of temples and monuments. After surveying some of the (principally historical) sources that discuss the role that these scholars played as the directors of various artistic and building projects, I turn my attention to two case studies—the complex of buildings at dPal 'khor sde chen monastery in western Tibet, and the monastery of Se ra on the outskirts of Lhasa, Tibet's capital—so as to document the link between Tibet's scholastic world view and several aspects of its material and social culture.

Like Livia Kohn's contribution, John Henderson's also is focused on China, but in this case on Neo-Confucianism. His essay begins with some general remarks of a theoretical nature. What factors, he asks, are necessary for the rise of scholasticism? Although he acknowledges a closed and historically decontextualized canon as a condition for *pre*scholastic speculation, Henderson believes that the rise of "high scholasticisms" depends—frequently, if not invariably—upon an en-

counter between a proto-scholastic tradition and a well-developed philosophical tradition (e.g., Aristotelianism or Buddhism), where the latter challenges the former and provides it with tools of analysis (both methodological and substantive). At the same time, Henderson notes the ambivalence with which these precursorial philosophical traditions were treated by scholastics. When confronted with an increasing quantity of material to be considered, this latent ambivalence, he notes, often led to a new canon which then itself became the object of reflection of a secondary- or neo-scholasticism. When the amount of material becomes overwhelming—as was the case in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China—scholasticism gives way to historical and critical modes of scholarship, which gradually bring about its own demise.

In Neo-Confucianism Henderson finds many of the qualities of scholasticism outlined above: a concern for order, for maintaining the completeness or comprehensiveness of world view and the compactness of the canon, the felt need to explain redundancy and to reconcile inconsistency, and especially the great preoccupation with lineage. But Henderson makes it clear that there are historical and cultural factors at play in China that make Neo-Confucian scholasticism distinct. By bringing these to the fore, his essay challenges the comparativist in several ways. (1) Even if "order" is as much a concern for Neo-Confucianists as it is for other scholastics, Henderson makes it clear that *how* order is conceptualized and made manifest in a body of religio-philosophical literature is a complex matter, thus forcing us to rethink the very notion of *order* and to offer more subtle treatments of systematicity. (2) Concern with the completeness or comprehensiveness of vision also seems to be evinced as a quality in Neo-Confucian thought, but by bringing up the issue of motives (what factors are at play in the Confucian decision to posit such a quality to their world view?), Henderson forces us to take into account the historical factors that influence this and indeed *all* aspects of scholastic ideology. (3) By showing that lineage was more of a preoccupation for Neo-Confucianists than was reconciling inconsistencies in their relatively abbreviated canon, Henderson quite explicitly raises the issue of the relative weight of these different attributes in different traditions, something that cannot be considered uniform across cultures. (4) Finally, Henderson points out that Neo-Confucianism was more enmeshed in the social and political fabric of Chinese culture than were other such movements in their respective social spheres—something that could account for the former's relative longevity.

Like John Henderson, Francis Clooney also sees the presence of many of the traits in the above list in the three Hindu traditions that are the focus of his chapter: Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, and Śrivaiṣṇavism. But

Clooney sees this fact as only the beginning of a more elaborate inquiry that must be undertaken in treating scholasticism as a comparative category. That more nuanced treatment he focuses around six questions. He asks, for example, whether a scholastic tradition need be uniformly scholastic through and through in order to be considered a form of scholasticism, an issue also raised by Madigan. How do we reconcile the genre and stylistic diversity of scholastic literary corpuses with our attempt to ascribe an overarching trait—that it is scholastic—to that corpus as a whole? Clooney also raises a related question concerning the dividing line between scholastic discourses: are Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, and Śrivaiṣṇavism three separate scholasticisms or three variants of a single scholastic discourse? "How much weight do we wish to give the *content* of related discourses when we are deciding whether or not to group them together?"[5] These questions are by no means trivial.

Like Roy, Clooney wants to draw attention to the increased complexity of the issues when there is historical interaction between scholastic traditions within a circumscribed cultural sphere. And like Henderson and Goss, Clooney also is interested in the dialogue that emerges in the historical encounter of culturally disparate scholastic traditions. Finally, like Henderson, he points out that in addition to attesting to the presence of traits such as the ones in the above list, it is also important to remember that the balance of these elements will vary from one tradition to the next. This leads Clooney to propose a distinction between *intellectualist* and *performative* types of scholasticism—"the former more preponderantly focused on questions of comprehensive understanding, the latter on formation in right thinking and action"—and to suggest that his three schools (perhaps like Swartz's Rabbinic Judaism) might best be thought of as belonging to the latter category. In showing how this is so, Clooney complexifies the question of what "completeness" means, forcing us again to ask ourselves not only to what extent, but also in what way, if at all, scholastic traditions exemplify this (and implicitly any other such) quality.

Clooney's essay leaves us with the tantalizing question of where our own project as comparativists falls on his intellectualist/performative spectrum, and, given that we must be located *somewhere*, what responsibilities we have in our depiction of discourses when they are differently situated than our own. How scholastic is our own enterprise as scholars? How scholastic should it be? This is the question taken up by Paul Griffiths. Griffiths begins with an interesting preamble in which he elucidates what he means by key terms (*composition, display,* and *storage*); he discusses especially how writing epitomizes these combined activities; and he deliberates on the state of affairs concerning the issues of orality and literacy. He then turns his attention to an ideal-

typical scholasticism that he characterizes using a fourfold heuristic scheme focused on the questions of how scholastics read, how they compose, what their epistemological commitments are, and in what kinds of institutional settings they are likely to flourish. Griffiths' chapter is comparative, but not in the same way as the other chapters in this volume. Although he presents evidence from disparate cultures in his analysis, his primary comparative mirror is the Western academy, often in its postmodern version. Scholasticism in its ideal-typical form thus is reflected on the mirror of contemporary scholarly (mostly instrumentalist, consumerist, individualist) modes of reading, composition, and so forth, to extremely interesting and insightful ends. Although there is some overlap with my own earlier characterization of scholasticism, Griffiths' analysis—more normative in tone and less bound to a specific historical tradition—is broader, more far-reaching, and thus advances the discussion in new and interesting ways. His characterization of scholasticism raises new questions of each of the historical traditions treated by the other contributors to this volume, making it a kind of epilogical capstone to the present work.

There is, however, another reason for situating Griffiths' essay separately and last. Most of the contributors to this volume generally evince (even if only implicitly) a kind of passive admiration of—a positive attitude to—the phenomenon of scholasticism. However, Griffiths' task is proactively normative: his goal is to argue for scholasticism as a middle way between modernist and postmodernist modes of intellectual practice, one that ought to be given institutional support in contemporary society. Put another way, Griffiths's term *ideal type* as applied to the scholasticism he is constructing has, in his case, a *double entendre*. On the one hand, his scholasticism is ideal-typical in the Weberian sense of "paradigmatic"; on the other, it is an ideal type in a normative, even ethical, sense. Griffiths commends scholasticism as a type of practice that is ideal not only as a scholarly mode of discourse, but as an overall way of life even (perhaps especially) for contemporary intellectuals: a bold and well-argued claim that is likely to spur controversy.

What new insights have been gained as a result of the cross-cultural and comparative treatment of scholasticism in this volume? What directions for future research are suggested by the chapters?

If scholastic traditions are not monolithic wholes with fixed boundaries, but permeable entities that exhibit complex patterns of influence, this means that the comparative analysis of such traditions—and indeed of all traditions—must, at the very least, take this fact into

account. Whether or not a particular study makes this kind of complexity explicit—and this will depend on the specific goals of the study—at the very least it is incumbent on the comparativist to be aware of the heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon he or she is studying. What is more, as several of the contributors point out, when such internal complexity *is* made explicit—when the boundaries between one tradition and another are explored, when external cultural and ideological influences are examined, or when a generalized scholasticism is constructed as an heuristic category for the purpose of cultural critique—one is engaged in an analysis of a different sort, one that, though not principally cross-cultural, is still very much comparative. Be that as it may, the first point (a methodological one) is clear: in the comparative analysis of scholasticisms, or in a comparative analysis that utilizes scholasticism as *one* of the comparanda, the notion of a scholastic tradition as a *sui generis* whole is at best a useful fiction. While perhaps serving the specific ends of the theorist in specific types of analysis, this volume speaks to the fact that we must remain open to forms of analysis that make manifest the internal complexities inherent even within a "single" scholastic tradition and that explore the diversity of scholasticisms even within a "single" cultural sphere.

Second, if scholastic traditions are related to each other not by the sharing of a collective essence as specifiable by a list of common properties, but by the more complex notion of family resemblances, then we should find that some of the "familial" traits will be present in some traditions while being absent in others, and that even when specific traits *are* exemplified, they may be exemplified in different ways or to varying degrees. By exploring whether or not a specific trait is present in a given context, and if so, how and to what extent it is emphasized, the essays in this volume continue the process of the construction of scholasticism as a category by elucidating the pattern of such resemblances between traditions, both within a single culture and across them. In addition, several of the essays remind us that discussion of the traits that characterize a tradition as scholastic cannot be divorced from a discussion of sociocultural, political, and economic factors (for example, from a discussion of the various *motives* that lie behind the claim of certain traditions concerning the completeness of their canons). It is also clear from the chapters in this volume that certain traits not preeminent in my original list should be highlighted and perhaps even added to that list as independent characteristics. These include the fact that scholastic traditions tend to be *polemical*—intratraditionally, intertraditionally, or both; that they are greatly preoccupied with *lineage* (whether historical or mythic), and with *hierarchy*; and that they are concerned with a variety of extra-intellectual practices which they see as intrinsic

to the formation, maintenance, and perpetuation of their scholastic identity (*prayer, ritual,* and *liturgy* especially).

A third general insight that emerges from this volume relates to the second and points us in the direction of a preliminary typological classification of scholastic traditions. By similarly emphasizing certain traits over others, by exemplifying certain traits in similar ways, or by sharing similar motivations in their exemplification of traits, scholastic traditions will tend to form subfamilies. Several of the contributors suggest ways of construing such "types," but none as directly as Clooney, who proposes the intellectualist/performative distinction. What new types will emerge as other traditions or subtraditions are brought into the conversation? In addition, it also might be suggested that history provides us with a classificatory scheme of a different sort. This is already evident in the way that other typological schemes (pre/proto scholasticism vs. true/high scholasticism) are used in several of the essays. Clearly, future research will require the more detailed exploration of both structuralist and historical modes of typologizing the phenomenon of scholasticism.

That history cannot be taken for granted, that scholastic traditions are dynamic, is perhaps one of the most important themes in this volume, serving as a corrective to my earlier work, which is more structural (and therefore more static in its orientation). Many of the contributors are concerned with the factors that led to the rise and/or decline of specific scholastic traditions, and at least one contributor (Henderson) suggests that there might be a pattern concerning the historical evolution of scholastic traditions even across cultures. Questions of historical evolution aside, however, many of the essays stress the importance of investigating the concrete historical interaction between scholastic traditions, both within a single culture and/or religious tradition, and across cultures. How do various scholastic traditions and subtraditions influence each other through actual historical contact? How do common scholastic presuppositions ease intertradition, and even interreligious, communication? How do the lack of such common presuppositions impede it? Both in its more nomothetic and its more idiographic modes, history will continue to play an important role in the investigation of scholasticism.

Finally, if there is one single, consistent area of concern evinced by all of the essays, it is this: aside from the investigation of scholastic ideology and method—that is, aside from the exploration of the intellectual content of scholasticisms by investigating ideas in texts and their manipulation by scholastics—there is an entirely different tack that can be taken in the study of a phenomenon like scholasticism: a sociocultural one. Here the scholar is concerned with the study of scholastic in-

stitutions (their organization, their hierarchies, their relationship to the broader society), with the day-to-day process of religious education in those institutions (how teaching/learning is accomplished, and the role that memorization, formal disputation, commentary, and less "cognitive" factors such as prayer and magic play in the educational process). Equally important in this regard is the study of the political, economic, and material factors that influence and are influenced by scholasticism. Finally, under this same rubric we might situate the study of the lived lives of scholastics as individuals, their influence on the broader communities in which they are located, and in turn the pressures exerted on, and the rewards offered to, them by those communities. Not broached in this book, but falling equally under the present rubric, is the study of the relationship of scholasticism to gender. With the exception of the latter, all of these topics are broached by the various contributors, but it is equally clear that a great deal of work still needs to be done in regard to the sociocultural dimensions of scholasticism and that this field represents one of the most fertile grounds for future research.[6]

If the reader will be indulgent in allowing me to extend the horticultural analogy slightly further, only time will tell which of the areas of possible future research suggested in this volume will bear fruit. But one thing, I think, is clear: the seeds have at least been planted by the rich and provocative chapters of my fellow contributors. And so I take this opportunity of thanking all of them for making the otherwise arduous task of the editor so much less burdensome by the intellectual excitement elicited in me by their work.

Notes

1. On the role of decontextualization in the process of comparative analysis see Scharfstein (1989).

2. A similar point is made by Tracy (1990).

3. In addition to Louis Roy's essay, see also Clooney's remarks concerning de Nobili's reading of the *Taittirīya Upsaniṣad* in *his* contribution to this volume.

4. Madigan, Clooney, and Griffiths in the present volume show, albeit in different ways, the extent to which we as academics might be considered inheritors of the scholastic mindset. See also Cabezón (1994: 17–19).

5. As I have observed elsewhere (Cabezón 1994:16, 194–95), among European medievalists the attempt to define scholasticism as a general category can be divided roughly into two: those that emphasize similarity of content (de Wulf)

and those that emphasize similarity of method (Grabmann, Knowles, et al.). Both Clooney and Goss invoke de Wulf in their respective chapters in this volume, though the latter with greater trepidation. On my position concerning the comparative study of philosophical content in scholastic discourses, see Cabezón (1994:195). On a related issue concerning the dividing line between scholastic and nonscholastic movements within a single religious tradition see Cabezón (1994:197).

6. That this is already a topic of interest in the academy is demonstrated by a recent panel on comparative religious education (Buddhist/Islamic) at the meeting of the American Academy of Religion in New Orleans (1996).

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